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Volume 9

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American SOCIOLOGICAL Review

April
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Volume 9
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The Official Journal of the American Sociological Society



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Membership dues of the Society, including subscription, are \$6.00 per Year. Subscription rates: non-members, \$4.00; libraries, \$3.00. Single issues, \$1.00. Postage is paid by the publishers in the United States, Canada, and other countries in the Pan-American Union; other countries in the Postal Union, fifty cents.

Address all business communications to the Managing Editor, U. S. Dept. of Agri., Washington, D.C. Changes of address must be requested at least one month in advance.

Address all editorial communications to the Editor, Vassar College, Poughkeepsie, N.Y. All unsolicited manuscripts must enclose return postage.

Address all matters pertaining to book reviews to Book Review Editors, 327 Sterling Hall, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin.

Entered as second-class matter at the post office at Menasha, Wisconsin, under the Act of March 3, 1879. Acceptance for mailing at special rate of postage provided for in the Act of February 28, 1925, embodied in paragraph 4, section 538, P. L. and R., authorized June 4, 1936.

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American SOCIOLOGICAL Review

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SOCIOPATHY AND WORLD ORGANIZATION*

READ BAIN
Miami University

THIS discussion is conceptual rather than factual and the concepts are derived largely from other men. Among them is the idea of active and passive adaptation, from Lucius Bristol and T. N. Carver; system, and especially social system, from L. J. Henderson; tentative process and organic growth, from C. H. Cooley; role-taking and social symbol, from E. Faris and G. H. Mead; the technological conditioning of culture from Veblen, Bernard, and Ogburn; that men's beliefs define social situations and are potent social reality, from W. I. Thomas, later reinforced by Sumner, Sorel, and Pareto; that culture accumulates, integrates, accelerates, and specializes, from many sources. These concepts did not spring full-formed from the brows of these Jovian gentlemen who are not mentioned for prestige purposes but to indicate that their ideas of these ideas have influenced my ideas. No one should blame them for my use or misuse of these concepts. There is no implication of "priority" or "originality" in the list; it merely indicates roughly the order and sources of my contacts with these concepts.

These ideas are all related to the basic concept of interaction which implies dynamic

fields and forces, a conception equally useful to all physical, biological, and social sciences. Here we are concerned only with social, societal, or cultural interaction. Culture is behavior mediated by social symbols.¹ A culture is a social system in and by which organisms make social-symbol-mediated adaptations to the three-fold environment. A personality is a social system in and by which an organism makes similar adaptations. Most of these adaptations are passive, relatively unconscious, often maladjustive, and sometimes destructive, but in all passive adaptations, there is also a "strain toward consistency," an integrative tendency, a tentative, fumbling, persistent growth toward stability or equilibrium. When passive adaptation fails, as in crises or periods of rapid or drastic change, active and even rational adaptation may occur.

* While other organisms than man may behave culturally, the present evidence for this view is not very convincing. The alleged "cultural behavior" of the higher apes and animals in contact with man is mostly "tricks"—conditioned responses which are not social symbols. That much behavior of untamed "social" insects, birds, and animals is "learned," i.e., is not "instinctive" or genetically predetermined, is obvious, but this does not make it cultural as here defined. Such behavior may be called "proto-cultural" to satisfy those who think my definition is too rigorous. See "A Definition of Culture," *Sociology and Social Research*, Nov.-Dec. 1942, 87-94.

* Presented to the Thirty-eighth Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Society, New York, December 4, 1943.

Conscious behavior appears only when previously acquired responses are partially blocked or fail to function in their usual manner. Many personal and societal systems are destroyed or severely damaged when consciousness does not appear in a blockage situation, and also when the consciousness that does appear does not remove the blockage, properly define the situation, or solve the problem. Such failures in biological, personal, and societal systems are biopathic, psychopathic, and sociopathic, respectively.

When there is no consciousness of the maladjustment, or when the consciousness is rationalization, delusion, or displacement, the personal or social system is psychotic. When there is consciousness of the maladjustment but it leads only to rigid, compulsive, irrational behavior accompanied by morbid fears, guilt feelings, worry, etc., so that the more of such consciousness there is, the more maladjustive the behavior becomes, the personal or societal system is neurotic. As I have tried to show elsewhere, the conception of neurotic and psychotic sociopathy is no analogy or figure of speech but is a societal actuality derived from objective observation in the same way that similar concepts of biopathy and psychopathy are derived. These concepts have the same origin and utility that all scientific generalizations possess. They are constructs of minds functioning in blockage situations and are valid only insofar as they aid in active adaptation.

Psychotic behavior usually is accompanied by induced or derived neuroses, and vice versa. A psychosis, whether psychopathic or sociopathic, may be observed directly or may be inferred from derived neurotic symptoms. A derived psychosis may be cured by curing the basic neurosis of which it is a symptom, but a basic psychosis probably cannot be cured until it becomes a neurosis, unless perhaps when the psychosis is due to an organic disorder. There is no certainty that mere neurotic consciousness of psychotic psychopathy will effect a cure. The patient may be more disorganized after the attempted therapy than he was before as both psychiatrists and psychoanalysts have

learned. The same is true of a societal psychosis which has become a societal neurosis. It may give rise to ill-advised reform efforts which merely aggravate the social maladjustment and may induce or intensify derived societal psychoses. The antislavery, prohibition, and labor movements are cases in point.²

A societal psychosis may become a societal neurosis whenever behavior formerly regarded as normal begins to be regarded as socially detrimental. This merely means that other values which are thought sound and necessary are now thought to be menaced by the behavior in question: a new definition of the situation is being made.³ Milling, unrest, tension, sporadic crises, riots, "movements," legislation, etc., are evidences of instability in the social system. The social problem may be defined and rational active adaptation achieved. This is called "prog-

² Read Bain, "Sociology and Psychoanalysis," *American Sociological Review*, April 1936, 203-216; see also *Sociometry*, "Psychopathic Interlude," May 1944, and "Sociopathy of Anti-Semitism," Nov. 1943, in my "column," "Man Is the Measure." See also George A. Lundberg, "Societal Pathology and Sociometry," *Sociometry*, Feb. 1941, 78-97, esp. 90 ff.; and R. W. Gerard, "Higher Levels of Integration," in *Levels of Integration in Biological and Social Systems*, Jacques Cattell Press, 1942. This volume indicates that biologists are reviving the concept of "social organisms," or more accurately, the concepts of "biological organism" and "social organization" are being replaced by the concept of "system" which is equally useful to physical, biological, and cultural scientists. More and more biologists speak favorably of Spencer's "organismic analogy." One is reminded of Newton's "corpuscular theory of light" in relation to quantum theory. Both Spencer and Newton "adumbrated" ideas, or made "first approximations," which were rejected and then revived as a result of further research. Of course, the quantum theory and the new organicistic theories are based upon different empirical evidence and different logical and semantic analysis than the "first approximators" used.

³ See Richard C. Fuller and Richard R. Myers, "The Natural History of a Social Problem," *American Sociological Review*, June 1941, 320-329. The authors use but do not mention both the concept of sociopathy and definition of the situation. For the first, see Note 2; for the second, W. I. Thomas, "The Behavior Pattern and the Situation," *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, Vol. XXII, 1928, 1-13.

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ress." However, if the definition of the situation entails irrational worry and fear and the rigid, compulsive, maladjustive behavior continues, the social psychosis merely has become a social neurosis and the tensions in the social system may remain unresolved until some violent adaptation occurs. The problem may be solved without destroying the social system by luck or time, or by tentative, fumbling, commonsense trial and error. When a new and relatively stable equilibrium is thus attained, we have a case of organic and passive adaptation. If a scientific analysis is made which provides the rationale for successful sociotherapy with a minimum of time, waste, irrational fear, hate, and worry, the social system retains its equilibrium, the problem does not become a social neurosis, and we have a case of rational active adaptation.

The relevance of this too brief analysis to world organization should be clear. War has long been a form of psychotic sociopathy. For many millions, the virtues and inevitability of war are still a psychotic delusion. For my purpose, it is sufficient to note that until recently war was commonly regarded as natural, inevitable, necessary, noble, just, and inspiring. Delusions of grandeur and persecution, irrational fears and hates, unrealistic myths and fantasies flourished rankly in the pattern of this worldwide societal psychosis. Among these, are absolute sovereignty, balance of power, superior races and classes, imperialistic nationalism, preparation for war to preserve peace, and the Devil and Saint theory of history—the naïve belief that great men and leaders are causes rather than symbols and results.⁴

Many of these ideas are social psychoses in their own right but as they yield to accumulating scientific knowledge and are recognized as being socially detrimental, they either are forgotten or are transformed into social neuroses. The latter fate has befallen the war psychosis in most democratic coun-

tries. Individually and collectively, we worry about war, resent it, and define it as an unmitigated evil. Many self-styled "realists" regard it as "necessary, social facts being what they are," and therefore as a somewhat mitigated evil, but they still worry about it and seek to prevent it by rigid, compulsive, neurotic support of social structures and ideologies which inevitably lead to war. Among such neurotic ideas is the belief that the United States, with or without the help of Britain, must dominate the next century as England did the last; that we must maintain a five-ocean navy, an army of a million, the most powerful air force, compulsory military training, and fling a line of impregnable bases across the Pacific; that extraterritoriality must be maintained in Asia and elsewhere; that it is nonsense for Hottentot babies to drink milk; that all Japanese are beasts, not men, and that all Germans are germs; that we should pursue a policy of isolation, except in this hemisphere perhaps, but we also should dominate the world politically and economically; that our sovereignty is absolute and immaculate and would be smirched by any world agreements not based on the balance of power—which of course means balanced in our favor. Needless to say, not all Americans believe all of these things.

We also may observe much neurotic behavior in the conduct of the war: for example, the divinity that doth hedge a general—or even a sergeant—and the invidious comparisons between the armed forces and civilians. This latter delusion has attained such magnitude that men in essential nonmilitary activities feel like "slackers"⁵ and specialists cannot work with military men without being commissioned. The myth that every man in uniform must be fit to fight has made the armed forces the greatest hoarder of manpower in the country. There is widespread belief that the acts and policies of the military are sacrosanct and hence above criticism. On the often absurd bare assertion that it might aid the enemy, much

⁴ C. A. Beard, *Devil Theory of War: An Inquiry into the Nature of History and the Possibility of Keeping Out of War*, New York, 1936; see also his "The Devil Theory of History and War," *New Republic*, March 4, 1936, 100-102.

⁵ Daniel Lang, "Everyone Walks too Slow," *New Yorker*, October 23, 1943, 44-51; esp. the incident on page 48.

information has been suppressed or too long delayed that would have helped the war effort both by giving needed data to business men and farmers and by improving the morale of the country. We have relied too much on hortatory blah-blah and not enough on simple, honest, timely information. The OWI has tried to remedy this but has been obstructed by the military at almost every turn and often by the Administration. It will require much research after the war to tell the complete story of war-contract bungling and venality; the stupidity of antiquated, ill-advised, traditional Army and Navy specifications; the confusions of Selective Service, OPA, WPB, and BEW; the undemocratic dirty-dealing received by Negroes and Japanese-Americans; the dangerous and disgusting feuding by and between Congress, the Administration, labor and capital, and the various war agencies and administrative departments. This is only a small part of the evidence of neurotic worry and fear, hate and suspicion, which aggravate the irrationality and inefficiency of the war effort. After the war and the probable Peace à la Versailles, we may look for such sociopathic disturbances as Red-hating and Red-baiting, labor union smashing, a free hand for business, race riots, religious bigotry, Legionnaireism, and the mad effort to return to prewar conditions.

Another symptom that the war psychosis has become a neurosis is the almost hysterical fear that we shall "win the war but lose the peace." By this, most people appear to mean that we shall fail, again, as in 1919, to make the world safe for democracy and free from war.⁶ However, there is small consensus as to what democracy means aside from the reiteration of a few ill-defined catch-phrases such as the Four Freedoms, Individual Liberty, and the Age of the Common Man. Spykman well says, "It is difficult to create a fighting doctrine by merely reiterating the values of individual liberty in a world of personal insecurity, and by reaffirming the beauty of laissez faire when only government interference with economic life can

⁶ Elmer T. Peterson, "Once Again, the 1919 Dilemma," *Harper's Magazine*, April 1943, 525-529.

prevent starvation."⁷ As for the prevention of war, most of the hundreds of proposals for postwar world organization strike me as almost certain preparation for World War III. Most of them show almost complete ignorance of elementary sociology, social psychology, social anthropology, geography, economics, the ideology of science, and the impact of modern technology on cultural reality. Most of them still swallow the myth of sovereignty, the sacredness of nationalism, the dogma of "backward peoples," the magic of balance of power, are very tender of the "rights" and "future" of the country to which the author belongs, and assume that economic activity is primarily for "prosperity"—which is a euphemism for "private profit." Most of the planners revert to the psychotic gibberish of the past to meet the neurotic needs of the present. Thus, the vicious circle is widened, but not broken; the neurosis is intensified, but not cured; and the future is pregnant with violence and disaster.

One of the best illustrations of this is the use of regionalism by many of the planners. Watkins recently surveyed this literature in relation to regionalism. He concludes, "... regionalism as a scientific approach appears to have been entirely ignored."⁸ Regionalism

⁷ Nicholas J. Spykman, *America's Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power*, 258, New York, 1942.

⁸ James T. Watkins, IV, "Regionalism and Plans for Post-War Reconstruction: The First Three Years," *Social Forces*, May 1943, 370-389; see also George A. Lundberg, "Regionalism, Science, and the Peace Movement," *Social Forces*, Dec. 1942, 131-137.

Watkins has a good bibliography up to Sept. 1942. The following titles were published since, or are not cited by Watkins or elsewhere in this paper. Not complete, of course—merely a few things I read. (Books): R. M. Brickner, *Is Germany Curable?*, New York, 1943; E. Fromm, *Escape from Freedom*, New York, 1941; W. Lippmann, *U. S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic*, Boston, 1943; R. M. MacIver, *Towards an Abiding Peace*, New York, 1943; M. Mead, *And Keep Your Powder Dry*, New York, 1942; H. Motherwell, *The Peace We Fight For*, New York, 1943; W. Willkie, *One World*, New York, 1943; H. M. Wriston, *Challenge to Freedom*, New York, 1943. (Articles and pamphlets): W. H. Chamberlin, "The Middle Road, Postwar," *Harper's Magazine*, May 1943, 587-595;

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is merely a popular catch-word for most of the planners. For them, it means blocs of states, and therefore balance of power.

This loose use of regionalism is often associated with another equally loose term, geopolitics. Strausz-Hupé has well exposed the pretensions of geopolitics, especially in his chapter, "Heartland and Hokum." Stiles says, "But there are several American geographers who believe that geopolitics is nothing but another example of the Nazi genius for the misuse of scientific knowledge and that it makes no new contribution to geography" (page 630); Lorwin says, "Geopolitics makes economics a branch of power politics" (page 227); Straight says, "If (Spykman's book) were simply one man's chess game, its gambits might well be forgotten; but . . . this attitude is becoming a form of megalomania shared by our War and Navy Departments, our State Department, and our great corporations, none of which we have challenged since this war began" (page 262).⁹ Thus, the "regional federations" of geopolitics, like the unscientific blocs-of-states regionalism,

become merely larger units in the old shell-game of power politics. History shows that balances of power, be the units large or small, perversely get out of balance: "imbalance of power" would be a better name. It means continued diplomatic jockeying, secret alliances and agreements, and the good old art of the gentlemanly double-cross. Spykman tacitly admits this in his discussion of the imponderables in balance of power systems and so concludes that we must keep Europe disunited and be prepared for perpetual war.¹⁰

The idea of absolute sovereignty looms large in most proposals for world organization. This social myth is repeated with neurotic rigidity despite the fact that no government has ever exercised the powers which the concept implies. Few men are so monomaniacal that they can give absolute allegiance to any government. This is to say that most people are dominated by stronger allegiances and loyalties than patriotism or political duty. No government, however ruthless, could long exist in violation of this basic social fact. That is the meaning of the phrase, "governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed." Political sovereignty exists within a country only because the citizens have other supreme values which are thought to be assured by their political system; it exists between nations because they have surrendered sufficient sovereignty to make mutually beneficial interaction possible. This is more or less axiomatic among most political scientists.

Another somewhat similar mythical idea is the concept of "form." Many people, like Mr. Streit and his followers, believe the League failed because it was not "properly organized."¹¹ This idea is also manifested by those whose first reaction to a social problem is, "There ought to be a law!", or who think we can cure the ills of our economic system by busting a few trusts. The form-worshipper is one who mistakes appearance for reality,

⁹ *Op. cit.*, 22 ff., 447, 450, 464 ff., et passim.

¹⁰ One of the best criticisms of *Union Now* is found in R. L. Buel, *Isolated America*, New York, 1940, 422-424; see also Peterson, *op. cit.* in Note 6.

P. F. Drucker, "Europe After the War," *Harper's*, April 1943; G. Gorer, "Japanese Character Structure and Propaganda," *Committee on National Morale*, Washington, D.C., 1943 (mimeo); O. Harris, "Will Japan Crack Up?", *Harper's*, May 1943, 630-644; E. H. Erikson, "Hitler's Imagery and German Youth," *Psychiatry*, Nov. 1942, 475-492; J. K. Jessup, "America and the Future: I. Our Domestic Economy," *Life*, Sept. 13, 1943, 105-116 ff., and "II. Our Foreign Policy," Sept. 20, 1943, 105-108 ff. (*Time* published this and other material as a pamphlet, *America and the Future*, in Oct. 1943); L. Kartman, "Sociological Excursions of Biologists," *Scientific Monthly*, Oct. 1943, 337-346; M. Lerner, "International Organization after the War," *National Council for Social Studies*, Washington, D.C., 1943.

¹⁰ Robert Strausz-Hupé, *Geopolitics: The Struggle for Space and Power*, New York, 1942, esp. 153 ff.; Dan Stiles, "Why Not Teach Geography?", *Harper's*, May 1943, 626-632; Lewis L. Lorwin, "New Frontiers Abroad," *Survey-Graphic*, May 1943, 211-213 ff.; Michael Straight, *Make This the Last War*, New York, 1943. See also Werner J. Cahnman, "Methods of Geopolitics," *Social Forces*, Dec. 1942, 147-154, and "Concepts of Geopolitics," *American Sociological Review*, Feb. 1943, 55-59; Joseph K. Folsom, "Geopolitics and Psychopolitics," *Family-Community Digest*, April 1943, 1-7; John H. Herz, "Power Politics and World Organization," *American Political Science Review*, Dec. 1942, 1039-1052.

words for things, wishes for facts. Such people often assert that the United States succeeded because the Constitution is the most perfect instrument of government ever conceived by the mind of man; hence, if we give the world social system a Constitution like our own, the Millennium will dawn. One can make a fairly convincing argument that we succeeded in spite of the Constitution rather than because of it. Consider its cumbersome system of checks and balances, which fortunately have never worked very well; its unrepresentative representation; its disfranchisement of over half of the population; its concern for the *status quo*, including slavery and economic inequality; its encouragement of economic waste and exploitation of natural resources; its age, sex, and race discriminations; its unworkable method of electing presidents; its difficulty of amendment, etc. We succeeded because we ignored its "form" by loose if not licentious construction, because of a common cultural heritage, vast resources available to a limited population, the preoccupation of more powerful nations with conflicts closer at home, and because of timely technological innovations which made it possible to bind the sprawling continent together and develop its resources rapidly. In spite of all these favorable circumstances, we almost failed three or four times. In the case of the War Between the States, it was touch and go for five years with a period of postwar confusion and disorganization veering between anarchy and oligarchy. It becomes increasingly evident now that our "democracy" may retain its "form" and still become a plutocracy of private capitalism, a facist imperialism, or a bureaucratic semisocialistic state. It is safe to say that whatever we may become will be sanctioned by the Constitution and the "forms" of democracy just as all the historical varieties of Christianity have been called Christian. Thus, changes in the world system must appear not to violate the myth of absolute sovereignty, not to change the social forms of the constituent states, not to modify the cultural habits of the people concerned. This is necessary because of our widespread psychopathic and sociopathic

habit of reifying symbols, taking forms and appearances for realities, and assigning causal significance to factors which merely are associated in time and space.

The present war has done much to increase the already highly unstable equilibrium of the world social system and doubtless will do more. National social systems are much more stable than the international system, although they also are greatly disturbed by the war. Most of them probably will return to their proximate prewar state and prewar trends. Mr. Churchill does not intend to preside at the liquidation of the British Empire; Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Hull apparently intend to restore a slightly modified *status quo ante bellum* in France, Italy, Holland, Belgium, and the Balkans. The Axis powers doubtless will be branded with "total war guilt" and some form of reparations will be imposed in spite of our sad experience after World War I. Their military systems may be destroyed, at least temporarily, and there may some punishment of an as yet unspecified class of individual "war criminals" according to principles as yet undisclosed. There is every reason to believe that each nation will attempt to return to business as usual. As yet, the United Nations have expressed no specific postwar policies; they deal only in fine phrases of almost meaningless generality for the inspiration of those who reify symbols and believe in the magic of words. The Moscow Agreements seem to mean little more than that the Big Three assert that they have agreed to agree. To say that the "war criminals" will be punished under the laws of the countries in which the crimes were committed does not clarify the matter much. Is an officer a "war criminal" who orders 5000 Jews or other civilians shot, when he himself has been ordered to give the order? If he did not give it, he himself would be shot. By this declension, or ascension, only Hitler and a few high ranking Nazis could be punished justly for "war crimes." The United Nations may find themselves in the doubtful position of condoning wholesale blood purges after the war. The punishment of "war criminals" is a minor matter compared to the basic

problems of world and domestic reorganization which most nations seem unwilling to face realistically.

So the Third World War already looms, and possibly the Fourth. Future wars might be more destructive than this one but there is little reason to think they would destroy civilization and bring a new Dark Age upon us. It is difficult to imagine an age much darker than the present if we define darkness as what *is* compared to what reasonably *is possible*. The trends of world culture clearly are in the direction of what is possible to a science-based technology. These trends doubtless will continue by means of passive adaptation—which means waste, delay, confusion, death and destruction. The real problem facing mankind is how to hasten and direct social adaptation rationally and efficiently. This calls for a world system capable of preventing war and producing active adaptation by the development and application of scientific social techniques.

Two sociopathic social structures are the main obstacles to such a development. These are the military and economic systems. They are mutually reinforcing vicious circles and vicious cycles. If one of them could be cured, the cure of the other would be much easier. War is more susceptible to therapy because it already has become a social neurosis while the ills of the economic system are still largely psychotic. Millions of otherwise sane people sincerely believe that economic activity would stagnate were it not motivated by private profit; that powerful economic overlords are necessary and desirable; that goods and services must be produced primarily for sale rather than for use; that natural resources are unlimited, or that science always will find a substitute in time; that waste and exploitation of natural and human resources are "natural"; that booms and depressions are inevitable; that a man can "make a million dollars—and is entitled to it"; that only weaklings, incompetents, and traitors are critical of "free American enterprise"; that economic ills are due to "human nature"—and you can't change human nature. The ever increasing maladjustments of the economic system are beginning to produce wide-

spread neurotic behavior but until the neurosis becomes much more serious, i.e., until we become much more conscious of the sociopathic elements in the economic institution, we cannot cure them, especially in their international manifestations. We may give billions for social welfare at home and abroad but we insist that international, like domestic, business must be done according to "sound," i.e., insane, "business principles" such as exploitation of materials and markets; "protection" of our foreign investments; dollar diplomacy; monopoly, if possible; profits in any case. Therefore, since our economic attitudes are still largely psychotic, and since war is already a clearly defined social neurosis in most of the United Nations, war offers the most hopeful point of attack.

If global war could be prevented for a hundred years, or even less, and the hitherto passive trends toward international integration could be actively accelerated, the world social system might become so well integrated that future world wars would be impossible. A couple of generations of active adaptation and rationally directed organic growth might be sufficient to break the vicious cycle of war. Such a constructive era probably would do much to cure the sociopathic characteristics of the economic system as well.

It is evident we cannot hope to change nationalism very much very soon, supported as it is by the myth of sovereignty and the distinctive institutional systems of which the nation is the symbol. Political and economic forms are also vital myths and living symbols which can be changed only slowly by redefinition and gradual formal modification. After the Axis is destroyed, the only nations capable of waging global war will be the United States, the British Commonwealth, Russia, and China. The only sure safeguard against war must be the determined agreement of these nations to prevent it. The formal expression of their agreement is of small consequence. If such a cumbersome, compromised, jerry-built, inflexible instrument as that which the Founding Fathers finally tinkered together could work well enough to permit the organic growth of the United States, we need not worry much about the

form of the agreement. What we should worry about are the social realities; we should worry about whether we are defining the situation properly in relation to present facts and probable future developments rather than in terms of compulsive, rationalized, neurotic, and psychotic fantasies.

Mr. Culbertson's plan is one of the most carefully worked out. He believes that our Senate and other similar national bodies will never adopt any plan which does not at least appear to retain the vital myths of absolute sovereignty, 100 percent nationalism, national rights and interests, etc., Hence, his plan is really a balance of power scheme backed by an International Police Force so cunningly organized that no nation or probable combination of nations will dare to break the peace. He believes his plan will work long enough for the active adaptations of world integration to create such an overwhelming consensus for peace that the police force eventually can and will be reduced to a minimum. He is betting that the Quota Force System will bluff the nations out of war until a permanent and effective world government can develop by rationally directed organic growth, and his plan makes provision for hastening this development.

Several difficulties occur to me. Perhaps the most serious is the danger that the military system will be perpetuated along with other sociopathic structures and ideologies such as sovereignty, national interests, and balance of power. His "regional federations" are merely blocs-of-states and hence are subject to all the criticisms of imbalance-of-power structures. The 22 percent Mobile Corps (heavy weapons) in the hands of the smaller nations, theoretically always on the side of the world government, might not be able to defeat a strong National Contingent (light weapons), especially if some of the Mobile Corps and other strong National Contingents should join the aggressor nation. A two percent leeway is not enough to overcome the imponderables of distance, supplies, technical changes, industrial power, secret weapons, secret diplomacy, and morale. The Mobile Corps is scattered all over the world in strategic stations and therefore

might fail to reduce a strongly armed, highly industrialized, well-drilled nation before it could build heavy weapons. The plan has detailed and plausible answers to almost every objection than can be raised, but one is forced to the conclusion that it would work only if the Big Four played the game according to the rules, and then only so long as they remained the Big Four. Any other plan, or no plan, would prevent war equally well under the same conditions. It is as simple as this: so long as the Big Four retain their present power, there can be no war unless they permit it. Culbertson's plan might defeat its purpose because it is too "realistic" in retaining too much of the neurotic and psychotic social structure and ideology which breed war.¹²

The United States is now the most powerful nation on earth, but it may well be displaced by Russia within the next generation; China may soon equal Russia. There are other possibilities for powerful industrial nations to develop within the next hundred years: a U. S. A. south of the Sahara; a unified middle Europe and Balkans; India; the Malaysian region; Brazil. Soon we shall lack the man power and raw materials to maintain our leadership unless we immediately undertake a policy of ruthless imperialistic expansion and population increase. We shall probably do neither. We are much more likely to have a stationary or declining population and to continue gutting our natural resources to bolster our sagging economy. At the same time, we shall fling our temporary surpluses into the industrialization of backward areas and thus finish cutting off the limb upon which we have been sitting and sawing for the past hundred years. Thus we shall run our course, driven by psychotic and neurotic economic practices, until we finally succeed in becoming a second rate power.

In the game of power politics, you cannot succeed unless you breed—and bleed. We are increasingly unwilling to do either; there-

¹² Ely Culbertson, *The Total Peace*, New York, 1943. See *Time*, "Freedom From Attack," Sept. 9, 1943, 105-108, for a good brief criticism of the briefer statement of Mr. Culbertson's plan.

fore, we must settle down to our manifest destiny of becoming a second rate power with a declining population living off our own greatly depleted resources at whatever standard of living the state of the industrial arts will permit. Hence, it is imperative for our own future welfare and security that we utilize our present position of power and leadership to create a world organization in which we can maintain our way of life. That we shall so conduct ourselves in the postwar world seems to me quite unlikely.

This much seems certain: all balance of power arrangements will fail, whether they be nuclear alliances, regional blocs-of-states, spheres of influence, buffer states, or Quota Force systems; all imperialistic, absolute sovereignty, national interest policies and practices lead to war; all isolation schemes, whether national, federal, or hemispheric, are unrealistic and impossible; immediate union, whether regional or global or lingual, is a sentimental pipe-dream; mighty armaments and postwar militarism are parade-ground preparation for World War III. If the postwar world remains an armed camp, we soon shall kiss the boys—and girls—goodbye again. In the face of this gloomy prospect, what can we do?

The best hope is the immediate organization of the United Nations primarily for the prevention of war. If this is not done before the war is over, the chance of success will be much reduced. The Big Four must dominate such world organization at the start—or there will be no start. If this domination is socially intelligent, which means replacing absolute sovereignty and power politics by law consistent with natural science knowledge, the organization may develop into a world government capable of enacting international laws, adjudicating them for nations, corporations, and individuals, and enforcing them by an international police. Until this degree of integration is attained, the Big Four must accept the responsibility for preventing war. To discharge this responsibility, they must define aggression as crossing a border with armed forces and must attack such aggressors immediately. All nations, including the Big Four, must disarm at once

to the barest internal police requirements. The military establishments of all nations, whether or not they are members of the United Nations, must be surveyed yearly by United Nations officials and reported to the world. No technical military equipment should be manufactured except in nonprofit United Nations plants and should be available to all nations on equal terms according to permitted quotas. Members or nonmembers who violate these rules should be declared world criminals and policed at once. Since the Big Four would dominate the United Nations, they could reduce all armaments almost to zero. The money thus saved would amply finance the United Nations and greatly increase the wealth of all nations. Such a system requires abandoning the myth of absolute and equal sovereignty but this is necessary for the prevention of war.

The Big Four alone are capable of doing this. They must accept the responsibility that goes with power and discharge it for world welfare which is the only way their own welfare can be permanently secured. Hence, they must control the United Nations organization, but each nation should have at least one representative. This means abandoning representation by population and adopting some principle of representation based on power, such as production of heavy industry, machine tools, and food, weighted so as to give a majority of representatives to the United States, British Commonwealth, Russia, and China, in that order. This principle also provides a reasonable basis for changing each nation's representation as its power status changes. Since peace can be preserved only by the most powerful states until a high degree of world integration has been attained, the unanimity principle must give way to the majority principle of voting representatives. Voting by states is impossible since it is based on the myth of absolute and equal sovereignty.¹³

¹³ Cromwell A. Riches, *Majority Rule in International Organization: A Study of the Trend from Unanimity to Majority Decision*, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1940. For failures and successes of the League, Paul Birdsall, *Versailles Twenty Years After*, New York, 1940; Herbert Hoover and Hugh

In social, as in physical systems, equilibrium is maintained only by the operation of natural forces in dynamic fields. This is "justice" and "freedom"—the only kind we ever shall know. We should not hate and curse and fear the dynamic forces in social systems any more than we do in physical and biological systems. In all three fields, we are sooner or later compelled to make adaptations or die. Reason suggests that we should make active rational adaptations by means of tested scientific knowledge. The trend of our culture is clearly in this direction.

Hence, the United Nations organization, which means the Big Four for fifty or a hundred years, should invade the "sovereignty" of other nations only to prevent war, as outlined above. However, it also should strive to effectuate workable international agreements in such matters as migration and travel, education, tariffs, investments, monetary policies, health, transport, communication, patents, copyrights, weights, measures, and equal access to markets and raw materials. These are some of the main factors working toward world integration and should be accelerated as rapidly as possible. The Secretariats of the League of Nations and the World Court should be taken over by the United Nations and expanded as much and as rapidly as world consensus will permit. It should be proclaimed and enforced that people and capital entering foreign countries do so at their own risk. The United Nations should conduct all plebiscites involving transfer of territory, determine its own membership, and decide when colonial peoples are ready for self government. The right of revolution within each country should be preserved but such conflicts should be isolated immediately to protect both sides from outside interference.

Thus the Big Four, with the United Nations organization as their instrument, could prevent war for possibly two generations and at the same time hasten world integration so that a world government might develop

which would be capable of preventing war when the present power pattern shifts. Such a development is impossible if the United Nations becomes a symbol of the status quo. If they, or any one of them tries to perpetuate the present power structure in spite of dynamic changes in the world social system, if they fail to find rational techniques for quickly resolving tension, unrest, and imbalance, they are doomed—and so is peace. This is equally true of the national systems which are parts of the world system, and especially true of the Big Four. If they do not make needed changes fast enough, do not learn how to substitute active for passive adaptation in their domestic affairs, they too will be disorganized and possibly destroyed. Their most pressing, if not most important, problems are largely economic. What they do in this field will have widely ramifying repercussions upon the equilibrium of their own and the world social system.¹⁴

The wars of the last hundred years have been due largely to sociopathic political and economic structures and ideologies, but at the same time other trends have been emerging which make eventual world government inevitable. However, so long as these trends function chiefly at the level of passive adaptation, they are not likely to develop rapidly enough to prevent future wars. The most

¹⁴ Some factors bearing on this point are discussed in Read Bain, "Morale for War Peace," *Social Forces*, May 1943, 418-425; Read Bain, "Cultural Integration and Social Conflict," *American Journal of Sociology*, Jan. 1939, 499-509; G. D. H. Cole, *Europe, Russia, and the Future*, New York, 1942; Stuart Chase, et al., *Basic Post-War Problems*, pamphlets issued by The Twentieth Century Fund, New York; Lewis Corey, *The Unfinished Task: Economic Reconstruction for Democracy*, New York, 1942; Alvin H. Hansen, *Economic Problems of the Post-War World*, Washington, D.C., National Council for Social Studies, 1943; John K. Jessup, *op. cit. supra.*; J. Donald Kingsley and David W. Petegorsky, et al., *Strategy for Democracy*, New York, 1942; Lewis L. Lorwin, *op. cit. supra.* and *Economic Consequences of the Second World War*, New York, 1941; J. E. Meade, *The Economic Basis of a Durable Peace*, New York (Oxford Univ. Press, 1940); Walter Nash, "Down Under—and Up," *Survey-Graphic*, May 1943, 206-210; E. M. Patterson, *The Economic Bases of Peace*, New York, 1939; Michael Straight, *op. cit.*

probable postwar arrangement is a false-front organization screening an Anglo-American nuclear alliance or gentlemen's agreement backed by powerful armaments to protect our alleged national interests and spheres of influence. Part of this unstable balance of power system will doubtless be regional structures like the Pan-American Union which is neither Pan-American nor a Union. Such a policy will make the Third World War almost certain. We may escape if the unstable equilibrium can be maintained long enough for the world integrating trends to mature, but this is a dubious hope since it is unlikely that armed peace can last more than fifty years or so and it is questionable whether the integrating trends can create a sufficiently homogeneous world culture in that short time to make war impossible, even if the nations foster the integrating trends with all energy and intelligence—which is unlikely. Hence, it is very doubtful that the postwar instability can be transformed into an integrated world system in time to prevent other global wars. We cherish and will perpetuate too many societal myths, sociopathic structures, and psychesociopathic systems of thought, feeling, and action. On the whole, we appear to be too socially unintelligent, too blinded by the sociopathic elements in our culture. I repeat, the two sociopathic structures most likely to produce war are the military system itself and the profit-motivated economic system. Directly and indirectly, these are two of the greatest sources of neurotic and psychotic societal behavior.

Perhaps it is proper to conclude this somewhat gloomy discussion by mentioning some major trends toward world integration. The first and most important is the international nature of natural science and the technology it has produced. The most revolutionary effect is the shrinking of time and space. Machine production and distribution and science-based technology in all fields are rapidly increasing worldwide uniformity in folkways, mores, and thoughtways. This will accelerate. The following four factors are largely derivative from natural science which is the major influence in the transition from

passive to active and rational adaptation.

The second factor is the growing conception that social phenomena are natural phenomena and that social sciences are natural sciences. The scientific methods, findings, and applications of the social sciences will accelerate.

Third is the trend toward secular religion. This means the increase of this-worldly, science-based values and the decline of transcendental, supernaturalistic, other worldly sanctions and goals. Myths, magic, spirits, ghosts, goblins, gods, devils, occult influences, wishful escapism, and nonscientific authoritarianism will have increasingly hard sledding during the next century. The religious-to-secular trend is a by-product of natural science and will accelerate.

Fourth, the global scope of travel, education, science, art, literature, recreation, news, health, business, social work, and all other aspects of culture, is rapidly producing the world consciousness and conscience which in time will make world government inevitable. This trend would be accelerated greatly if every teacher of every subject in every country were literate in sociology and the other social sciences. We should put a 24-inch globe in every classroom in the world; flat maps delay and distort world consciousness. Exchange of teachers and students, cheap and easy travel, artistic and scientific movies and radio, and a worldwide rise in the standard of living would speed the process.

Fifth, the world is sick and tired of war. Even the stupid can see its folly, futility, and insanity. More and more people see the menace of the military type of mind, the antidemocracy of the military system, and resent private profits made from war. The war psychosis has become a neurosis and hence is ready for sociotherapy.

Sixth, a considerable body of use and wont exists, sometimes called "international law," which, if generalized by socially intelligent jurists rather than by legalistic word jugglers, can furnish the legal basis for a world government adapted to a science-based culture.

Finally, all that prevents world peace is lack of scientific social intelligence. Most

people want peace, but their "want" is neurotic; their behavior belies their words. However, the acceleration of social intelligence portends the eventual destruction of the vicious cycles of war and economic insecurity. If war has killed its millions, economic folly has slain its tens of millions. Eventually, we shall solve our major economic problems but probably not until we have abolished war. If we fail this time, it will be because our leaders and privileged classes, with the sociopathic consent and support of the masses, are trying to preserve the economic inequality, cruelty, waste, and confusion to which we are so well accustomed. In this connection, social scientists have a

two-fold task: first, to create the necessary scientific knowledge of societal phenomena; and second, to help educate mankind to use it.

The bold Democratic Dream may again be delayed, but it cannot be destroyed. The postwar world will probably be a postwar nightmare breeding other wars and economic disasters but our social intelligence will mature during such passive adaptation and we eventually shall learn how to make natural-science-guided adaptations to the necessities of worldwide communal life. It really *is* a small world now—small enough for common men to be good neighbors, to become their brother's keeper, not his killer.

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A BASIS FOR SCALING QUALITATIVE DATA*

LOUIS GUTTMAN
Cornell University

I. INTRODUCTION

IN A GREAT deal of research in the social and psychological sciences, interest lies in certain large classes of qualitative observations. For example, research in marriage is concerned with a class of qualitative behavior called marital adjustment, which includes an indefinitely large number of interactions between husband and wife. Public opinion research is concerned with large classes of behavior like expressions of opinion by Americans about the fighting ability of the British. Educational psychology deals with large classes of behavior like achievement tests.

It is often desired in such areas to be able to summarize data by saying, for example, that one marital couple is better adjusted than another marital couple, or that one person has a better opinion of the British than has another person, or that one student has a greater knowledge of arithmetic than has another student. There has been considerable discussion concerning the utility of such orderings of persons. It is not our intention in this paper to review such discussions, but instead to present a rather new approach to the problem which seems to afford an adequate basis for quantifying qualitative data.

This approach has been used successfully for the past year or so in investigating morale and other problems in the United States Army by the Research Branch of the Morale Services Division of the Army Service Forces. While this approach to quantification leads to some interesting mathematics, no knowledge of this mathematics is required in actually analyzing data. Simple routines have been established which require no knowledge of statistics, which take less time than the various manipulations now used by various

investigators (such as critical ratios, biserial correlations, factor analysis, etc.), and which give a complete picture of the data not afforded by these other techniques. The word "picture" might be interpreted here literally, for the results of the analysis are presented and easily assimilated in the form of a "scalogram," which at a glance gives the configuration of the qualitative data.

Description of the practical procedures, as well as the mathematical analysis, must be postponed to other papers. The present paper is devoted to a non-technical discussion of what we mean by a scale.

2. THE NOTIONS OF VARIABLE, FUNCTION, AND SIMPLE FUNCTION

First, a word about what is meant by a variable, whether qualitative or quantitative. We use the term in its conventional logical or mathematical sense, as denoting a set of values. These values may be numerical (quantitative) or non-numerical (qualitative).¹ We shall use the term "attribute"

¹In conventional courses in undergraduate college mathematics it is not ordinarily pointed out that a great deal of mathematics deals with purely qualitative variables. Notions of metrics and quantitative variables can be arrived at by sequences of qualitative classifications. In fact, this is the manner in which our approach to scaling derives a scale ordering.

The reader who is interested might look at a recent departure in textbooks for an introductory course in college mathematics (M. Richardson, *Fundamentals of Mathematics*, Macmillan, 1941). This book gives a simple, entertaining, and mature introduction to the foundations of mathematics. Its emphasis is on understanding, rather than on manipulation. It covers fundamental topics like point sets, the concept of number, and others that are rarely mentioned in ordinary undergraduate curricula and yet are mainstays of mathematical theory. It is only that most of us have been exposed exclusively to certain algebraic manipulations that we conceive such manipulations to be the essence of mathematics. A more sophisticated view is to regard mathematics as unveiling necessary relationships that arise from classifications. Much useless discus-

* Presented to the Thirty-eighth Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Society, New York December 4, 1943.

interchangeably with "qualitative variable." The values of an attribute (or of a quantitative variable, too, for that matter) may be called its *subcategories*, or simply *categories*.

An example of an attribute is religion. A person may have the value "Catholic," "Buddhist," "Jewish," "Mormon," "atheist," or some other value of this variable. There is no particular intrinsic ordering among these values. Another example is expression of an opinion. A person may say, "I like the British," "I don't like the British," or "I don't know whether or not I like the British." Another example is, a person may be observed to smile at another person upon meeting him, or he may be observed not to smile.

Quantitative variables are readily recognized and need no discussion here.

A variable y is said to be a single-valued function of a variable x if to each value of x there corresponds a single value of y . Thus, if y has the distinct values y_1, y_2, \dots, y_m , and if x has the distinct values, x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n , where m and n may be different, y is called a single-valued function of x if a table of correspondence can be set up like, for example, the following:

x	x_1	x_2	x_3	\dots	x_n
y	y_2	y_5	y_{m-2}	\dots	y_2

For each value of x there is one and only one value of y . (The converse need not hold: for the same value of y there may be two or more values of x .) Obviously, if y is to be a single-valued function of x , then we must have $m \leq n$.

In particular, suppose y is an attribute, say like the above attribute about expression of liking for the British. Then $m = 3$, and we may denote by y_1 the statement, "I like the British"; by y_2 , the statement, "I don't like the British"; and by y_3 , "I don't know whether or not I like the British." If x is a quantitative variable which takes on more than m values ($n > m$), and if we can divide the x values into m intervals which

sion of mathematics as a "tool" in social research could be saved by recognition of the fact that qualitative classifications lead to just as rigorous implications as do quantitative.

will have a one-to-one correspondence with the values of y , then we shall say the attribute y is a *simple* function of x . For example, suppose x takes on the ten values 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9. Then the correspondence table might be as follows:

x	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
y	y_1	y_1	y_1	y_2	y_3	y_2	y_2	y_2	y_2	y_2

Or we might show this graphically by plotting the x values on a straight line, and cutting it into intervals:




FIGURE 1

For statistical variables, another representation is in terms of a bar chart of frequencies, and this is what we use for convenience in §10 and §11 below.

3. THE DEFINITION OF SCALE

For a given population of objects, the multivariate frequency distribution of a universe of attributes will be called a *scale* if it is possible to derive from the distribution a quantitative variable with which to characterize the objects such that each attribute is a simple function of that quantitative variable. Such a quantitative variable is called a *scale variable*.

Perfect scales are not to be expected in practice. The deviation from perfection is measured by a *coefficient of reproducibility*, which is simply the empirical relative frequency with which the values of the attributes do correspond to the proper intervals of a quantitative variable. In practice, 85 percent perfect scales or better have been used as efficient approximations to perfect scales.

A value of a scale variable will be called a *scale score*, or simply a *score*. The ordering of objects according to the numerical order of their scale scores will be called their *scale order*.

Obviously, any quantitative variable that is an increasing (or decreasing) function of a scale variable is also a scale variable. For

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example, in the illustration in §2, consider x to be a scale variable. Any constant could be subtracted from or added to each of the x scores, and y would remain a simple function of the transformed x . Thus, the scores 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 could be replaced by the respective scores -5, -4, -3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4. Or the x scores could be multiplied by any constant, or their square roots or logarithms could be taken—any transformation, continuous or discontinuous, could be used, as long as the rank order correlation between the original x and the transformed variable remained perfect. All such transformations will yield scale variables, each of which is equally good at reproducing the attributes.

Therefore, the problem of metric is of no particular importance here for scaling. For certain problems like predicting outside variables from the universe of attributes, it may be convenient to adopt a particular metric like a least squares metric, which has convenient properties for helping analyze multiple correlations. The interesting mathematics involved here will be discussed in another paper. However, it must be stressed that such a choice of metric is a matter of convenience; any metric will predict an outside variable as accurately as will any other.

In practice, the rank order has been used as a scale variable. (It is in fact a least squares metric for a rectangular distribution of scale scores.)

4. THE UNIVERSE OF ATTRIBUTES²

A basic concept of the theory of scales is that of the universe of attributes. In social research, a universe is usually a large class of behavior such as described in the introduction above. The universe is the concept whose scalability is being investigated, like marital adjustment, opinion of British fighting ability, knowledge of arithmetic, etc. The universe consists of all the attributes that

define the concept. Another way of describing the universe is to say it consists of all the attributes of interest to the investigation which have a common content, so that they are classified under a single heading which indicates that content.

For ease in focusing, let us take an example from opinion research where it is desired to observe the population of individuals in a standardized manner by a checklist of questions. The behavior of interest to the investigation is responses of individuals to such questions. Suppose the universe of attributes consists of all possible questions which could be asked in such a list concerning the fighting ability of the British. Such questions might be: "Do you think the British Army is as tough as the German Army?"; "Do you think the R.A.F. is superior to the Luftwaffe?"; etc. (We do not pause here for problems of wording, interpretation, and the like. The reader is urged rather to focus on the general outline we are trying to establish.) There may be an indefinitely large number of such questions which belong in the universe; and in a particular investigation, ordinarily only a sample of the universe is used.

An attribute belongs to the universe by virtue of its content. The investigator indicates the content of interest by the title he chooses for the universe, and all attributes with that content belong in the universe. There will, of course, arise borderline cases in practice where it will be hard to decide whether or not an item belongs in the universe. The evaluation of the content thus far remains a matter that may be decided by consensus of judges or by some other means. This has been recognized before, although it need not be regarded as a "sin against the Holy Ghost of pure operationalism."³ It may well be that the formal analysis for scalability may help clarify uncertain areas of content. However, we have found it most useful at present to utilize informal experience and consensus to the fullest extent in defining the universe.

²The words *population* and *universe* are ordinarily used interchangeably in statistical literature. For scales, it is necessary to refer both to a complete set of objects and to a complete set of attributes, so it will be convenient to reserve *population* for the former, and *universe* for the latter. In social research, the objects are usually people, so that *population* is appropriate for them.

³Clifford Kirkpatrick, "A Methodological Analysis of Feminism in Relation to Marital Adjustment," *American Sociological Review*, June 1939, 4: 325-334.

An important emphasis of our present approach is that a criterion for an attribute to belong in the universe is *not* the magnitude of the correlations of that item with other attributes known to belong in the universe. It will be seen (in §10 below) that attributes of the same type of content may have any size of intercorrelations, varying from practically zero to unity.*

5. THE POPULATION OF OBJECTS

Defining the universe of attributes is a problem similar to the standard problem of defining the population of objects or individuals⁵ of interest to the investigation. An investigator must always delimit the population with which he is working. For example, in the case of opinion about the British as fighters, he must decide *whose* opinions he wishes to ascertain. Is he interested in everyone in the world, or just in everyone in the United States? Is he interested in everyone in the United States, or just in adults? If just in adults, how is an adult to be defined? Here, too, decisions will sometimes be difficult as to whether a particular individual belongs in a population or not, and decisions must be made somehow before the investigation begins, else the investigator will not know whom to observe.

6. METHODS OF OBSERVATION

Let us assume that somehow we have a universe of attributes and a population of individuals defined. Next, observations are made as to the behavior of the population with respect to the universe. (In practice this will often be done only with samples. A sample of individuals from the population will have their behavior observed on a sample of attributes from the universe.) How the observations are to be made is of no concern to us here. In opinion research and other fields, questionnaires and schedules have been used. But any technique of observation which

* That correlations are no criterion for content has been quite well known. See, for example, R. F. Sietto, *Construction of Scales by the Criterion of Internal Consistency*, Sociological Press, Hanover, N.H., 1937.

⁵ For convenience, since the examples in this paper concern populations of human beings, we shall talk entirely in terms of such populations.

yields the data of interest to the investigation may be used. Such techniques for the social and psychological sciences might be case histories, interviews, introspection, and any other technique from which observations may be recorded. The important thing is not how the observations were obtained, but that the observations be of central interest to the investigation.

Use of a questionnaire implies that the investigator is interested in a certain type of universe of verbal behavior. Participant observation may imply that the investigator is interested in a certain type of universe of non-verbal behavior. Such distinct universes may each be investigated separately. It may often be of interest to see how well one universe correlates with another, but such a correlation cannot be investigated until each universe is defined and observed in its own right.

The examples of scales to be given later in this paper happen to comprise observations made by means of questionnaires. It should not be inferred, however, that scaling refers only to that technique. *Scaling analysis is a formal analysis, and hence applies to any universe of qualitative data of any science, obtained by any manner of observation.*

7. THE PURPOSE OF SCALING

Obviously it is very clumsy to record the large number of observations ordinarily involved in a universe of attributes for a population of individuals. The recording requires a table with one row for each individual and one column for each attribute. (The table may theoretically be indefinitely large.) It would be convenient if we could represent the observations in a more compact manner which would enable us to reproduce such a table whenever desired. A compact representation, if it could be obtained, would have two great advantages: first, a mnemonic advantage, for a compact representation would be easier to remember than would be a large table; and second, if it were desired to relate the universe to other variables it would be easier to do so by means of the compact representation than by using the large multivariate distribution of the attributes in the universe. From these are derived other ad-

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vantages which will become apparent as the reader's familiarity with scales grows.

A particularly simple representation of the data would be to assign to each individual a numerical value and to each category of each attribute a numerical value such that, given the value of the individual and the values of the categories of an attribute, we could reproduce the observations of the individual on the attribute. This will be possible only for restricted types of data, where each attribute in the universe can be expressed as a simple function of the same quantitative variable, that is, where the universe of attributes forms a *scale* for the population of individuals.

8. AN EXAMPLE OF A DICHOTOMOUS SCALE

As may be expected, the universe of attributes must form a rather specialized configuration for the population of individuals if it is to be scalable. Before describing a more general case, let us give a little example. (A sociological interpretation of this apparently mathematical example is given in §15 below.) Consider a mathematics test composed of the following problems:

- If r is the radius of a circle, then what is its area?
- What are the values of x satisfying the equation

$$ax^2 + bx + c = 0$$
- What is de^x/dx ?

If this test were given to the population of members of the American Sociological Society, we would perhaps find it to form a scale for that population. The responses to each of these questions might be reported as a dichotomy, right or wrong. There are $2 \times 2 \times 2 = 8$ possible types for three dichotomies. Actually, for this population of sociologists we would probably find only four of the possible types occurring. There would be the type which would get all three questions right, the type which would get the first and second questions right, the type which would get only the first question right, and the type which would get none of the questions right. Let us assume that this is what would actually happen. That is, we shall assume the other four types, such as the type getting the first and the third questions

right but the second question wrong, would not occur. In such a case, it is possible to assign to the population a set of numerical values like 3, 2, 1, 0. Each member of the population will have one of these values assigned to him. This numerical value will be called the person's score. From a person's score we would then know precisely to which problems he knows the answers and to which he does not know the answer. Thus a score of 2 does not mean simply that the person got two questions right, but that he got two particular questions right, namely, the first and second. A person's behavior on the problems is reproducible from his score. More specifically, each question is a *simple function* of the score, as is shown in §10 below.

9. THE MEANING OF "MORE" AND "LESS"

Notice that there is a very definite meaning to saying that one person knows more mathematics than another with respect to this sample. For example, a score of 3 means more than a score of 2 because the person with a score of 3 knows everything a person with a score of 2 does, and more.

There is also a definite meaning to saying that getting a question right indicates more knowledge than getting the same question wrong, the importance of which may not be too obvious. People who get a question right all have higher scale scores than do people who get the question wrong. As a matter of fact, we need no knowledge of which is a right answer and which is a wrong answer beforehand to establish a proper order among the individuals. For convenience, suppose the questions were given in a "true-false" form,⁶ with suggested answers $2Ir$, $(-b \pm \sqrt{b^2 - 4ac}) / 2a$, and xe^{x-1} for the respective questions. Each person records either a T or an F after each question, according as he believes the suggested answers to be true or false. If the responses of the population form a scale, then we do not have to know which are the correct answers in order to rank the respondents (only we will

⁶We shall assume that no one gets an answer right by guessing. In a later paper it will be shown how scale analysis can actually pick out responses that were correct merely by guessing. But for this, much more than three items are necessary.

not know whether we are ranking them from high to low or from low to high). By the scale analysis, which essentially is based on sorting out the joint occurrences of the three items simultaneously, we would find only 4 types of persons occurring. One type would be $F_1 T_2 F_3$, where the subscripts indicate the questions; that is, this type says F to question 1, T to question 2, and F to question 3. The other three types would be $F_1 T_2 T_3$, $F_1 F_2 T_3$, and $T_1 F_2 T_3$. These types could be shown in a chart (a "scalogram") where there is one row for each type of person and one column for each category of each attribute. Without going into details, the scale analysis would establish an order among the rows and among the columns which would finally look like this:

F_3	T_2	F_1	T_3	F_2	T_1
✓	✓	✓			
✓	✓		✓		
✓		✓	✓	✓	
	✓	✓	✓		✓

FIGURE 2

Or, alternatively, both rows and columns might be completely reversed in order. Each response to a question is indicated by a check mark. Each row has three checkmarks because each question is answered, either correctly or incorrectly. The "parallelogram" pattern in the chart⁷ is necessary and sufficient for a set of *dichotomous* attributes to be expressible as simple functions of a single quantitative variable.

From this chart we can deduce that F_1 , T_2 , and F_3 are all correct answers, or are all incorrect answers. That is, if we were now told that F_1 is a correct answer, we would immediately know that T_2 and F_3 are also correct answers. This means that we can order the men according to their knowledge even if we do not know which are the correct answers and which are the incorrect answers, only we do not know whether we are ordering them from highest to lowest or from lowest to highest. Except for direction,

⁷ Such a chart, where one column is used for each category of each attribute, we call a *scalogram*. The scalogram boards used in practical procedures are simply devices for shifting rows and columns to find a scale pattern if it exists.

ordering is a purely formal consequence of the configuration of the behavior of the population with respect to the items. The importance of this fact will become more apparent in more complicated cases where the attributes are not dichotomous but have more than two categories. We do not take the space here to expand on this point, but merely state that the scale analysis automatically decides, for example, where an "undecided" response to a public opinion poll questionnaire belongs, whether it is above "yes," below "no," in between, equivalent to "yes," or equivalent to "no."

10. THE BAR CHART REPRESENTATION

Another way of picturing the dichotomous scale of the sample of three items would be as follows: suppose that 80 percent of the




FIGURE 3

population got the first question right, 40 percent got the second question right, and 10 percent got the third question right. The univariate distributions of the three respective items could be shown by the bar chart in Figure 3.

The bars show the percentage distributions for the respective questions. The multivariate distribution for the three questions, given that they form a scale for the population, can also be indicated on the same chart, since all those who are included in the group getting a harder question right are also included in the group getting an easier question right. Thus, we could draw the bar chart over again, but connect the bars with dashed lines in the fashion shown in Figure 4.

Here we are simply margin together scale, which percent are in question dashed 2 and 3 of the through got the percent and 30 hardest got the 30 percent question

(c)

(b)

(a)

Frequency Score

Here we can see how the three questions are simple functions of the scores. From the marginal frequencies of the separate items, *together with the fact that the items form a scale*, we are enabled to deduce that 10 percent of the people got a score of 3. The 10 percent who got the hardest question right are included in those who got the easier questions right. This is indicated by the dashed line on the right, between the scores 2 and 3, which carries the same 10 percent of the people (those with a score of 3) through the three bars. The 40 percent who got the second question right include the 10 percent who got the hardest question right and 30 percent out of those who got the hardest question wrong, but all 40 percent got the easiest question right. This leaves us 30 percent who got just the first and second questions right. And so on. Thus we can




FIGURE 4

think of an ordering of the persons along a horizontal axis, and each item can be thought of as a *cut* on that axis. All those above the cutting point get the question right and all those below the cutting point get the question wrong. Thus there is a one-to-one correspondence between the categories of an item and segments of the axis. Or we can say that each attribute is a simple function of the rank order along the axis.

It is because all the items in the sample can be expressed as simple functions of the same ordering of persons that they form a scale. Each item is perfectly correlated with or reproducible from the ordering along the

axis. However, the point correlations between the items are not at all perfect. For example, the four-fold table between the second and third items is as follows:

		Question (b)		
		Right	Wrong	
		Right	0	10
Question (c)	Right	10		
	Wrong	30	60	90
		40	60	100

The point correlation between the two items is .41. As a matter of fact, the point correlation between two dichotomous items may be anything from practically zero to unity, and yet they may both be perfect functions of the same quantitative variable. That this may be paradoxical might be explained by inadequate treatment of qualitative variables in conventional courses and textbooks on statistics.⁸

An important feature of this four-fold table is the zero frequency in the upper right-hand corner cell. Nobody who got the third question right got the second question wrong. Such a zero cell must always occur in a four-fold table between two dichotomous items which are simple functions of the same quantitative variable.

* *Technical Footnote.* A tetrachoric coefficient for the four-fold table above, assuming a bivariate normal distribution, would be unity. However, this is not the correlation between the items. It does not tell how well one can predict one item from the other. The tetrachoric coefficient expresses instead the correlation between two quantitative variables of which the items are functions, provided the assumptions of normality are true. The reason the tetrachoric is unity in this case is that the quantitative variables of which the items are functions are one and the same variable, namely, the scale variable. Notice, however, that the distribution of the scale variable according to the rank order is not at all normal. One of the contributions of scaling theory is to do away with untested and unnecessary hypotheses about normal distributions. It is the point correlation that is involved in the mathematical analysis of scaling, not the tetrachoric.

II. ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF A SCALE

Now let us give an example of a more complicated scale. Suppose we were interested in finding out how much desire soldiers may express now about going back to school after the war is over. Suppose that out of

3. If you could get no job at all, what would you do?
 - (a) I would not go back to school
 - (b) If the government would aid me, I would go back to school
 - (c) I would go back to school even without government aid




FIGURE 5

the universe of attributes which define this desire we select the following sample of four questions to be presented on a questionnaire.

- i. If you were offered a good job, what would you do?
 - (a) I would take the job
 - (b) I would turn it down if the government would help me go to school
 - (c) I would turn it down and go back to school regardless
2. If you were offered some kind of job, but not a good one, what would you do?
 - (a) I would take the job
 - (b) I would turn it down if the government would help me go to school
 - (c) I would turn it down and go back to school regardless

4. If you could do what you like after the war is over, would you go back to school?

- (a) Yes
- (b) No

Let us suppose the responses of the men to these questions form a scale in the manner shown in Figure 5.

We now know how to read such a chart. 10 percent of the men said they would turn down a good job to go back to school; 20 percent said they would turn down a good job only if the government aided them; 70 percent said they would take a good job; and so on. The 10 percent who said they would turn down a good job are included in the 20 percent who said they would turn down

some kind of a job, and the 20 percent are included in the 25 percent who said they would go back to school if they got no job at all, and these 25 percent are included in the 50 percent who said they would like to go back to school.

For three trichotomous and one dichotomous questions there are $3 \times 3 \times 3 \times 2 = 54$ possible types. In order for these to form a scale, it can be shown that at most eight types can occur. The chart shows the eight types, which have been scored from 0 through 7. The chart shows the characteristics of each type. For example, the type with the score 3 includes all men with the following four values: they say that they would take a good job if it were offered to them rather than go back to school; that they would turn down some kind of job if the government would aid them to go back to school; that they would go back to school if the government would aid them if they could get no job at all; and that they would like to go back to school. Thus, by reading the categories crossed by the dashed lines which enclose each type, we can read off the characteristics of the type.

Notice that each of the four attributes is a simple function of the scale scores. For example, the "good job" question has its categories correspond with the following three intervals of the scale scores: 0-3, 4-6, 7.

The question might be raised as to how often will scales be found in practice. Isn't even a fair approximation to a structure like that in the above chart too much to hope for to be found in real life? Towards an answer to this, we can only cite thus far our experience with research in the Army. Literally dozens of sufficiently perfect scales have been found in various areas of attitude, opinion, and knowledge. The example given above of desire to go to school is a fictitious version of a set of similar questions that have actually proved scalable for the Army. Many varieties of data have been found scalable, and many have not. Those data which proved scalable could then be related to other variables very easily. Those that were not scalable required a more complicated analysis to handle them properly.

12. ON SAMPLING THE UNIVERSE OF ATTRIBUTES

An important property of a scalable universe is that the ordering of persons based on a sample of items will be essentially that based on the universe. If the universe is a scale, what the addition of further items would do would be merely to break up each type given by the sample into more differentiated types. But it would not interchange the order of the types already in the sample. For example, in Figure 5 above, type 6 would always have a higher rank order than type 5. People in type 6 might be ordered within the type into more subcategories; people within type 5 might be ordered into more subcategories; but all subcategories within 6 would remain of higher rank than all those in type 5. This may be seen in reverse, for example, by deleting one of the questions and noticing that all that is accomplished is to collapse the number of types to a smaller number so that two neighboring types may now become indistinguishable; but any types two steps apart would still remain in the same order with respect to each other.

Hence, we are assured that if a person ranks higher than another person in a sample of items, he will rank higher in the universe of items. This is an important property of scales, that *from a sample of attributes we can draw inferences about the universe of attributes*.

One of the criteria for selecting a sample of items is to choose a sample with enough categories to provide a desired amount of differentiation between individuals. Thus if individuals are desired to be differentiated say only into 10 groups, items should be chosen which will yield 10 types.⁹ The shape of the distribution of the rank orders in a sample of attributes will of course depend upon the sample. One sample of attributes may give one shape distribution; another sample may give another shape distribution. This need not be a matter of concern, since our primary interest lies in the ordering of

⁹We are of course not considering problems of reliability in the sense of repeated observations of the same attributes. For convenience, we are tacitly assuming perfect reliability.

people, not the relative frequency of each position.

It might be asked how can one know the universe forms a scale if all one knows is a sample from the universe. At present it seems quite clear that in general the probability of finding a sample of attributes to form a scale by chance for a sample of individuals is quite negligible, even if there are as few as three dichotomous items in the sample and as many as one hundred individuals.¹⁰ It seems quite safe to infer in general that if a sample of attributes is selected without knowledge of their empirical interrelationships and is found to form a scale for any sizeable random sample of individuals, then the universe from which the attributes are selected is scalable for the entire population of individuals.

13. SCALING AND PREDICTION

It is important to distinguish between two closely related topics, scaling and prediction. Finding that a universe of attributes is scalable for a population means that it is possible to derive a quantitative variable from the multivariate distribution such that each attribute is a simple function of that variable. We might phrase this otherwise by saying that each attribute is (perfectly) predictable from the quantitative variable.

This is the converse of the ordinary problem of prediction. In an ordinary problem of prediction, there is an outside variable, independently defined, that is to be predicted *from the attributes*. For example, it might be desired to predict the income of a

¹⁰ Technical Footnote. To work out the complete probability theory would require two things: first, a definition of a sampling process for selecting items, and second, a definition of what is meant by a scale not existing. A definition of the sampling process is difficult because items are ordinarily developed intuitively. Stating a null hypothesis that a scale does not exist leads to many possible analytical formulations, for different limiting conditions may be imposed upon the multivariate distribution of the items. For example, should the marginal frequencies be considered fixed in all samples, should the bivariate frequencies be considered fixed, etc.? These are questions which may become clearer as the theory of scaling develops, and in return may clarify our conceptions of what observation of social phenomena implies.

student five years after he graduates from college, from his present knowledge of mathematics. To do this, an experimental sample would have to be obtained where salaries five years after college are known for each person and where responses to each item on the mathematics test are known. If the criterion of least-squares is adopted, then the best prediction on the basis of the sample would be the multiple regression of income on the three items in the sample. The multivariate distribution of the three items and the outside variable would give the necessary data for computing the regression, curvilinear or linear, which would be best for predicting the outside variable. If we wished to predict some other outside variable from the same items, a new multiple regression would have to be worked out from the multivariate distribution of the three items and the new outside variable. In general, the first of these regressions would ordinarily be expected to differ from the second. In general, weights to be used to predict one outside variable from a set of attributes will differ from those used to predict another outside variable; a new multiple regression must be worked out for each outside variable.

This emphasizes an important property of scales. If the items have a multivariate distribution that is scalable, it can easily be seen that no matter what the outside variable may be, the same prediction weights may be given to the items. The correlation of any outside variable with the scale scores is precisely the same as the multiple correlation of that outside variable with the items in the scale. Thus we have an outstanding property of scaling, namely, that it provides an invariant quantification of the attributes for predicting any outside variable. No matter what prediction purpose is to be served by the attributes, the scale scores will serve that purpose.

14. ON "ITEM ANALYSIS"

Let us repeat the distinction just made. In scaling we reproduce the attributes from a quantitative variable. In prediction, we predict a variable from the attributes. This is a sharp difference which enables us to avoid much of the confusion that seems to

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prevail in the previous literature on scale construction. It seems to have been felt that items in a universe are merely stepping stones from which to obtain scores. It seems to have been felt that it was an embarrassing deficiency to lack a particular variable to predict from the items—that as a necessary evil one had to resort to methods of internal consistency to derive scores.

This accounts for current "item analysis" approaches to scaling. These use procedures that are typically as follows. A trial set of weights is assigned the categories, yielding a trial set of scores. Then each item is examined to see how well it by itself discriminates between these scores, that is, how well the scores can be predicted *from the item*. Those items which individually discriminate best are retained, and the others eliminated.

The misleading character of such procedures can be seen by inspection of the examples of scales in §10 and §11 above. We have pointed out that the intercorrelations between attributes in a scale can be as close to zero as one pleases. It can also easily be seen that the correlation ratio of the scale scores with any single item can also be as close to zero as one pleases. The predictability of the scale variable from an attribute does not tell whether or not the attribute is predictable from the scale variable.

The use of the "item analysis" procedures in connection with scales seems to be an unfortunate carry-over from the problem of ordinary prediction of an outside variable. In such a prediction problem, the items are truly but stepping stones to enable predictions to be made. It is known¹¹ that item analysis affords a first approximation to multiple correlation (or the discriminant function), and an item is of interest only insofar as it aids in the multiple regression.

Our emphasis for scaling is quite different. In scaling, we are interested in each and every attribute in the universe on its own merits. If we were not, we would not work with the universe. The attributes are the important things; and if they are scalable,

then the scores are merely a compact framework with which to represent them.

If a compact framework is found, it has the additional important property of being an efficient device for predicting any outside variable in the best manner possible from the given universe of attributes.

15. THE RELATIVITY OF SCALES

An interesting problem associated with scales is: why does a universe form a scale for a given population? For example, take the sample of three mathematics questions given above. Why should these three questions be scalable? There is no necessary logical reason why a person must know the area of a circle before he can know what a derivative is, and in particular the derivative of e^x . The reason for a scale emerging in this case seems largely cultural. Our educational system is such that the sequence with which we learn our mathematics in our high schools and colleges is first to get things such as areas of circles, then algebra, and then calculus. And the amount of drill that we have on each of these topics is probably also in that order. It would be quite possible, however, for the proverbial "man from Mars" to come to this earth and study calculus without having to learn the area of a circle, so that he might not be a scale type, according to the scale presented above; or a student may have had some personal incident which somehow impressed upon him with great force the derivative of e^x , but in the ordinary course of circumstances would have forgotten it even more readily than he forgot the area of a circle.

The scale analysis will pick out such deviants or non-scale types. Of course, if these non-scale types are too numerous, we shall not say that a scale exists. In practice we find scales, although never perfect scales, only because there has been sufficient uniformity of experience for the population of individuals so that the attributes mean essentially the same thing to the different individuals. As a matter of fact a study of the deviants is an interesting by-product of the scale analysis. Scale analysis actually picks out individuals for case studies.

A universe may form a scale for a popula-

¹¹ See, for example, Louis Guttman, "An Outline of the Statistical Theory of Prediction," in Paul Horst, et al., *The Prediction of Personal Adjustment*, Social Science Research Council, 1941.

tion at a given time and may not at a later time. For example, the items in the scale of expression of desire of American soldiers to go back to school after the war may not prove to be scalable if they were asked once more at the close of the war.

A universe may form a scale for one population of individuals, but not for another. Or the attributes may form scales for two populations in different manners. For example, a sample of items of satisfaction with Army life which formed a scale for combat outfits in the Air Force did not form a scale for men in the technical schools of the Air Force. The structure of camp life for these two groups was too different for the same items to have the same meaning in both situations.

If a universe is scalable for one population but not for another population, or forms a scale in a different manner, we cannot compare the two populations in degree and say that one is higher or lower on the average than another with respect to the universe. They differ in more than one dimension, or in kind rather than in degree. It is only if two groups or two individuals fall into the same scale that they can be ordered from higher to lower. A similar consideration holds for comparisons in time. An important contribution of the present theory of scaling is to bring out this emphasis quite sharply.

16. SUMMARY

1. The multivariate frequency distribution of a universe of attributes for a population of objects is a scale if it is possible to derive from the distribution a quantitative variable with which to characterize the objects such that each attribute is a simple function of that quantitative variable.
2. There is an unambiguous meaning to the order of scale scores. An object with a higher score than another object is characterized by higher, or at least equivalent, values on each attribute.
3. There is an unambiguous meaning to the order of attribute values. One category of an attribute is higher than another if it characterizes objects higher on the scale.
4. It can be shown that if the data are scalable,

the orderings of objects and of categories are in general unique (except for direction). Both orderings emerge from analysis of the data, rather than from *a priori* considerations.

5. The predictability of any outside variable from the scale scores is the same as the predictability from the multivariate distribution with the attributes. The zero order correlation with the scale score is equivalent to the multiple correlation with the universe. Hence, *scale scores provide an invariant quantification of the attributes for predicting any outside variable whatsoever.*
6. Scales are relative to time and to populations.
 - a. For a given population of objects, a universe may be scalable at one time but not at another, or it may be scalable at two periods of time but with different orderings of objects and categories.
 - b. A universe may be scalable for one population but not for another, or it may be scalable for two populations but with different orderings of objects and categories.
 - c. Comparisons with respect to degree can be made only if the same scaling obtains in both cases being compared.
7. From the multivariate distribution of a sample of attributes for a sample of objects, inferences can be drawn concerning the complete distribution of the universe for the population.
 - a. The hypothesis that the complete distribution is scalable can be adequately tested with a sample distribution.
 - b. The rank order among objects according to a sample scale is essentially that in the complete scale.
 - c. The ordering of categories in a sample scale is essentially that in the complete scale.
8. Perfect scales are not found in practice.
 - a. The degree of approximation to perfection is measured by a coefficient of reproducibility, which is the empirical relative frequency with which values of the attributes do correspond to intervals of a scale variable.
 - b. In practice, 85 percent perfect scales or better have been used as efficient approximations to perfect scales.
9. In imperfect scales, scale analysis picks out deviants or non-scale types for case studies.

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STATUS, STATUS TYPES, AND STATUS INTERRELATIONS

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THE SYSTEMATIC study of social stratification has been impeded by the lack of a preliminary analysis of status.² Class, caste, and egalitarian types of social organization are essentially variant modes of status distribution, and require a preliminary analysis of status itself for their proper comprehension. The *desiderata* here are: first, a clear-cut distinction between status and the other main varieties of social position,³ and second, a description of the types of status and their interrelations.⁴ These are the chief topics of the present article.

I. THE VARIETIES OF SOCIAL POSITION: STATUS, SITUS AND LOCUS

The basic term in the field of social dif-

ferentiation and stratification is "social position." In current usage this term has a broader meaning than any other, a meaning so broad, in fact, as to make a definition virtually impossible.⁵ Social positions are generated by the application of any socially accepted criterion of differentiation between individuals. The three chief criteria in use are: relative position in a hierarchy, membership in a social group, and socially defined function in an organized group. Corresponding to these criteria are the three fundamental types of social position, which we propose to designate by the terms "status," "situs," and "locus" respectively.

Status. By a hierarchy we mean a number of individuals ordered on an inferiority-superiority scale with respect to the comparative degree to which they possess or embody some socially approved or generally desired attribute or characteristic. A hierarchical position is thus always a position in which one individual is identified with others with regard to the possession or embodiment of some common characteristic, but differentiated from these others in the *degree*, or *measure*, to which that characteristic is possessed or embodied. The three chief hierarchies with which we will be concerned are: the economic hierarchy, the political hierarchy, and the prestige hierarchy. Relative position within these hierarchies con-

¹This article was written while the author was teaching at Wells College and it has no relation whatever to his present work in the United States Department of Labor. The ideas expressed are entirely personal and are not those of any government agency.

²This deficiency impairs the value of the excellent article by Professor Talcott Parsons: "An Analytical Approach to the Theory of Social Stratification," *American Journal of Sociology*, 1940, Vol. 45, pp. 841-862.

³Our justification for finding inadequate the distinctions proposed by certain anthropologically oriented sociologists (e.g., Lloyd Warner, and Allison Davis) will presently appear.

⁴The acute analysis of "Types of Power and Status," by H. Goldhimer and E. Shils (*American Journal of Sociology*, Sept., 1939, Vol. 45, pp. 171-182), unfortunately devotes little attention to the problem of the types of *status*. A distinction is made between "total status judgments" and "segmental status judgments," but not between the different "segments." The discussion proceeds in terms of a homogeneous "social status," or status in general.

Kingsley Davis' article, "A Conceptual Analysis of Stratification," *American Sociological Review*, 7: 309-321, June, 1942, would have been most helpful to the worker if it had appeared before this article had been written. The reader will note some points of similarity, but the present article does not treat several phases of the subject that are admirably handled by Professor Davis, and its emphasis is rather different.

⁵"Social position" is a concept which is logically so primitive that some degree of circularity in its definition is ineliminable. Every science seems to utilize concepts indefinable in terms of the entities and categories of that science. Such, for example, are space, time, mass in physics; life, in biology; mind or behavior, in psychology. If the operationalists think that they would avoid this problem by defining these concepts in operational terms, they merely deceive themselves. In defining space in terms of the manner in which one manipulates a ruler, one simply assumes that one already knows the meaning of a ruler of definite *length*, and of the relation of *spatial* juxtaposition. Thus, for the operationalist, the most fundamental *tools* or *operations* are indefinable.

stitutes economic status, political status, and prestige status respectively.⁶

In an older usage the term "status" was frequently reserved for social positions in which individuals were firmly fixed by law or custom, and which they could not freely enter upon or leave behind. This meaning of status is no longer popular; it is defective, moreover, in that it presupposes the existence of an extremely complex set of social relationships and involves an implicit theory as to their mode of operation.⁷ The other and currently more popular use of the term "status" virtually equates it with what we have been calling "social position," and makes it refer to hierachal and non-hierachal types of social position indifferently.⁸ However, two of the chief exponents of this usage admit that it is confusing, and that the term "social position" is preferable to the term "status" when referring to the widest category of social position, inclusive of both hierarchical and non-hierarchical varieties.⁹ Moreover, it seems significant that in their actual use of the term "status" they inadvertently return to its hierarchical meaning¹⁰

⁶ The exact nature of (and the interrelations between) the different types of status constitutes the theme of the second half of this paper.

⁷ We take it as methodologically established that it is desirable to begin any analysis with concepts which are as far as possible purely descriptive (thus reducing implicit explanatory hypotheses to the minimum) and which apply to the simplest elements in the reality being analyzed.

⁸ In such cases the term "rank" is sometimes reserved for hierarchical position, as in the following usage: "Rank is but one form of the larger category of status. Other forms of status are those in which an individual or a group is not given superior or inferior position and where comparative ranking and evaluation are not considered. Status . . . is the most general term which refers to the location of individuals in groups in the social system of a given society." (W. L. Warner and Allison Davis, "A Comparative Study of American Caste," chap. 8 in *Race Relations and Race Problems*, Edgar T. Thompson, ed., Duke University Press, 1939.)

⁹ "The terms *social position*, and *social places*, are used in this chapter as synonymous with status. These latter terms are in some respects to be preferred to the former since status for most people tends to accent the legal or political part of a person's position rather than his total social participation as do the other two." Warner and Davis, *op. cit.*

¹⁰ As in the expressions: "high status whites"

which is so firmly fixed in general usage, or else find it necessary to accompany each use of the term with appositional phrases indicating that it is being used in the non-hierarchical as well as hierarchical sense.¹¹ There seems to be slight justification for using two words to cover an identical meaning, particularly when one of the terms must be forcefully wrenched out of a well understood, colloquial and extremely important meaning of its own. A more serious criticism is that this usage has discouraged rather than stimulated the further analysis of the hierarchical type of social position. The latter has been called "rank" and has been conceived as a homogeneous category; whereas, as we shall endeavor to show, hierarchical social positions are actually of several distinct types. Even more serious has been the misconception, which this usage has facilitated if not engendered, that hierarchical social position is simply membership in a particular social class. This misconception, if it does not depend upon circular reasoning, leaves us with no independent criterion for the definition of social class itself.¹²

Situs. We pass now to the second criterion of social classification, which we have described as membership in a social group and designated by the neologism "situs."¹³ A so-

(Allison Davis "American Status Systems and the Socialization of the Child," *American Sociological Review*, 1941, vol. 6, p. 350); "relative social status" (W. Lloyd Warner, "Social Anthropology and the Modern Community," *American Journal of Sociology*, May, 1941, vol. 46, p. 790); and "economic status," *ibid.*, p. 788.

¹¹ E.g., "statuses (positions as here defined)"; "status (positions)"; "status (social positions)"; "general statuses (positions)." (W. Lloyd Warner, *op. cit.*, p. 793.)

¹² As we shall attempt to show in a later article, a social class is a particular type of a social stratum, and a social stratum is best defined as an aggregate of like-status individuals.

¹³ The introduction of neologisms is undoubtedly fraught with dangers and always requires special justification. The justification in this case is that there exists no simple term or brief expression which unambiguously refers to the analytic category which the writer has in mind. As in so many other cases in sociology when a sub-class A is distinguished from the general class C, no term is invented at the

cial group is an aggregate of persons socially distinguished by any common characteristic except status and locus.¹⁴ The distinguishing criterion may be biological (as in family, sex group, age group, race), physical (as in groups distinguished by geographical location—community, neighborhood, nation,

time to refer to (C-A), and resort is had to such cumbersome expressions as "the class of C which is not A," and "the non-A type of C." The nearest approximation in the literature to our category of situs is Professor Sorokin's category of "horizontal social position." The latter, however, relies heavily on a spatial analogy which we would prefer to avoid, and in its use of a simple two-dimensional scheme unduly simplifies the criteria of social organization.

Two general remarks on sociological neologisms may be added (I hope not inappropriately) at this point. First, that neologisms have a legitimately large place in a young and rapidly growing science. Second, that sociologists who have turned very largely to the notation of mathematics and symbolic logic for the expression of their ideas frequently employ concepts which would be recognized as neologisms if expressed in more conventional language. It is questionable, indeed, whether much of the impression of novelty in their work is not the result of the wholesale introduction of such concepts without regard to their immediate cognitive utility. Be that as it may, the further growth of our sociological vocabulary along traditional lines would appear to be more desirable than the development of new symbolic methods, except in those cases where it can be actually demonstrated that the traditional symbolism is incapable of designating with precision and economy any new entities, relations, or operations which the progress of our science requires us to study or to utilize.

"We are using the term "social group" in a sense which is wider than what is usually meant by a "real social group," implying, as it generally does, social interaction, interstimulation and response. At the same time, it is not so wide as a "statistical group," which could include any aggregate of persons having a conceptually isolable uniform trait, e.g., all red-haired persons named Jones. A social group in our usage will refer to an aggregate of persons having a common characteristic by which they are in fact distinguished by society from other persons. There will usually be a common term which will indicate that all these persons possess this common characteristic, and the attitudes and behavioral responses of other persons will, at certain times or under certain circumstances, vary in accordance with the common characteristic in terms of which the individuals are "grouped." Thus a social group is here defined in terms of the reaction of the rest of society to it, rather than in terms of the reaction of its members to one another.

etc.), psychological (as in the groups designated "normal," feeble-minded, or insane), or cultural (based on language, religion, vocation, manners, education, etc.). Moreover, the criteria may be either real or imaginary, in the sense that they may or may not correspond to objective characteristics of the persons so distinguished.

The distinction between situs and status may be somewhat clarified by an examination of five ways in which a society may utilize the theme of biological differences for purposes of situs and status location. (1) certain real biological distinctions may be left entirely unutilized either for situs or status differentiation. Examples in our society are the distinctions between dark and fair, tall and short, thin and fat, potent and impotent, fertile and sterile, hyperthyroid and hypothyroid. Some of these distinctions are of great biological importance, but none of them is utilized in our society as a principle of social grouping.¹⁵ (2) Imaginary biological distinctions may be used for situs but not for status location. In the exogamic clan of some preliterate tribes, the members possess a fictitious biological unity setting them apart from other clans (this being clearly evident from the incest taboos), but no clan need be rated higher than another, i.e., there need be no status difference. (3) Imaginary biological distinctions may be utilized for both situs and status differences. An example is the current distinction between "Jews" and "Aryans." (4) Real biological distinctions may be utilized for situs but not for status. Examples of this are hard to find, but Soviet Russia provides an approximation in the distinction between the sexes, which remains a basic principle of

¹⁴We may be aware of the distinctions and may even in certain cases utilize them for social purposes (e.g. classify individuals according to eye-color on passports and drivers' license blanks), but the distinctions remain on the level of biological description and are not thought of as true *social* distinctions. We do not have distinct patterns of attitudes and behavior toward the blue-eyed and brown-eyed as we do toward Bostonians and New Yorkers, "madmen" and sane people, Catholics and Protestants, English and French-Speaking Canadians, literates and illiterates, etc.

social classification (reflected, e.g., in special social legislation for women), but which carries with it (at least in theory and in intent) no invidious distinctions of status. (5) Very common, on the other hand, is the case of the real biological differences utilized both for situs and status. Age and sex groups in most societies sufficiently illustrate this category.¹⁶

If space permitted, a systematic analysis might be made of the ways in which the other criteria by which groups are defined are utilized by different societies. The point to be emphasized is, however, that situs distinctions exist whenever a socially accepted classification distinguishes between groups, and whenever membership in a group is considered a socially relevant criterion in making distinctions between individuals. To this there may or *may not* be added a distinction of status. A distinction between two groups as such is a distinction of situs, but when the members of one group have on the average a higher status than members of another group, situs ascription is connotative of status as well. In a patriarchal society "manhood" is primarily a situs ascription, but it also implies a probability of status above the average. The distinction between situs and status is perhaps specially difficult to perceive clearly in our own society where preoccupation with status is so intense that almost every situs is scrutinized intently as a clue to status. If a man moves to a new neighborhood or joins a new club his friends will probably think of the change as primarily a change in status. Neighbor-

hoods and clubs are evaluated as "good" or "bad" in accordance with the status which membership within them presumptively reveals. Realistically viewed, however, not the group as such, but its members, possess status. To join a "good" or "exclusive" club is to join a group the other members of which have a high status. It is presumptive evidence of high status for the newcomer because: (1) voluntary associations in our society are organized along status lines—only a high status individual is permitted to enter an "exclusive" club; and (2) the lessening of social distance between the newcomer and the older members, produced by club membership, will enable the former to "participate" in the high status of the latter.¹⁷

Locus. The third type of social position arises from the socially standardized function which an individual performs in an organized group. A group is organized when there exists among its members a socially defined division of functions. A family, for example, is an organized group, whereas in our society an age group or a neighborhood is usually not. Membership in the organized group called the Jones family constitutes a situs for Mr. Jones, but the fact that he is also the *father* in the Jones family gives him a special type of social position within the family, a position which is connected with the assumption and performance of certain distinctive functions as defined and standardized by custom and law. Unfortunately none of the existent sociological terms seems exactly suitable for designating this variety of social position. The term "function" refers to the actual contribution of the individual to the group life rather than to the social position of the functioner. The term "role" may seem at first sight more promising, but it is generally used indiscriminately to refer to the socially standardized patterns of behavior required of an individual occupying *any* type of social position and not merely a situs in an organized group. Thus we speak of an "adult role" or a "masculine role" to refer to a standardized pattern of

¹⁶ However, the establishment of the criteria for age-groups depends greatly on social definition. If individuals are arranged in the order of priority of birth we have a continuum without sharp breaks into distinguishable groups. Age-groups must be defined in terms of the time units upon which the particular society's calendar is constructed. In our society a boy of 16 years and 10 months is considered "of the same age" as a boy of 16 years and 2 months, though he is chronologically much closer to the boy of 17 years and 1 month. In some preliterate societies with considerably less efficient calendars, single age groups contain even wider chronological disparities. In the definition of the wider age groups such as childhood, adolescence, adulthood, and old age, cultural relativity is still more clearly apparent.

¹⁷ The mechanism of prestige participation is described below.

behavior socially required of an individual occupying a particular *situs* in an *unorganized* group, and we speak of an "upper class role" with reference to the behavior expected of an individual occupying a particular *status*. Since the social position derived from function in an organized group constitutes one of the fundamental types of social position, it is of some importance that it be given a distinguishable and generally accepted name. Unless the term "role" can be confined to a more restricted meaning than it now enjoys, we believe that the use of a new term would be advisable and we offer—with some hesitation, and in the hope that a better term will occur to the reader—the term "locus" to fill this major gap in our sociological terminology. This term is suggested by the legal expression "to stand in *loco parentis*," to stand in the place of, or to fulfill the function of, a parent. In this expression, the term locus is used in precisely the sense required, i.e. a social *position* arising out of the fulfillment of a specific function in an organized group. The term locus has the additional advantage of being homologous with the terms status and *situs*. All three terms mean place or position and may appropriately designate the three main types of position in society.

II. THE VARIETIES OF SOCIAL STATUS

Status has already been defined as relative position within a hierarchy. There are, of course, an indefinitely large number of respects in which individuals are compared and adjudged superior or inferior, and it would be theoretically possible to set up a comparably large number of distinct hierarchies and types of status. There are three types of status, however, that appear to be especially fundamental and to provide especially important and objective indices of the individual's hierarchical location in most societies, i.e. they are what "count"—a high ranking in other respects will have little objective importance unless it succeeds in producing an improvement in one of these three basic types of status, whereas those who possess a high status in these fundamental respects retain a high social position

even if they are weak in other regards. The three types of status which we consider primary or basic are economic status, political status, and prestige status. The individual's standing with respect to wealth, power, or prestige will of course depend to a large degree on his relative rank in the particular concrete hierarchies which the society thinks important. The seniority principle, for example, is extremely important in many societies. It is our view, however, that the high social status of the aged in such societies derives not from the biological fact of age itself but from the wealth, power, or prestige that society accords, or makes available, to its older members. Each society is apt to take for granted the "naturalness," inevitability, and intrinsic rightness of its own customary manner of awarding status. If we would avoid ethnocentrism, however, and achieve theories which will apply to all societies, including those of the future, we must attempt to catch the basic abstract elements which any possible social structure would exhibit. It is in this sense that we consider economic, political, and prestige statuses to be fundamental types, although we concede that other types of status of a comparable degree of abstractness and comprehensiveness exist, and might, in particular societies, even become very important.¹⁸

The question must now be faced whether these hierarchies are truly distinguishable and whether the distinction between the dif-

¹⁸ The ability of an individual to inspire love might constitute a fourth type of status, which could be of great importance in certain societies. In a monastery, for example, the presiding abbot may have the highest political status, the most rigorous ascetic may have the highest prestige, but a monk less eminent in authority and austerity may be the best loved and be generally recognized as being outstanding in this respect. In this society, moreover, every member may have a well-defined status expressive of his capacity to inspire affection. Moreno's "sociometric" tests disclosed the presence of clearly defined gradations in capacity to inspire affection (with perhaps certain elements of prestige intermingled) in a school for female juvenile delinquents. It seems possible that "affectional status" (if we may thus dub the status dependent on capacity to win affection) will be most likely to be important in the small shut-in monosexual community, with a limited range of economic statuses.

ferent types of status is not illusory, or purely verbal. The tendency of Marxism, for example, has been to deny that political status could be abstracted from economic status, and to assume that differences in power were (at least in any established social order) simply an institutional expression of differences in wealth.¹⁹ On the other hand, those theorists who are concerned primarily with power relationships (such as Gumpelowicz, Ratzenhofer, Oppenheimer, Spann, and Pareto) tend to view economic status as simply the material expression of relationships of subordination and domination. There can be no doubt, of course, that the economic and political types of status are closely interrelated and that usually a high degree of concomitant variation exists. Ordinarily the man who possesses much power will use it to appropriate a considerable share of wealth or a high level of income, and the man with high economic status will use his wealth or income to buy a certain amount of power. Nevertheless, we feel it possible to maintain (without raising the question of causal priority) that the two are in essence distinct, i.e. that they refer to two interconnected but not identical types of social phenomena.

Political and Economic Status. Power is the capacity to make (or participate in) decisions which require other individuals to act in ways in which they would not act in the absence of such decisions. Wealth or income is the possession of goods or services (or claims to goods or services) which yield satisfaction directly or facilitate the production of more goods and services.²⁰ In normal economic relationships in a competitive market economy, wealth is always offered as part of an exchange in which both parties alike

stand to gain. The ratio in which the different forms of wealth exchange are, moreover, approximately established by the competitive bidding of many buyers and many sellers, so that neither the buyer nor the seller confers any particular favor on the other. When confined to such uses wealth is not identical with power, and its chief value to those who hold it is its capacity to provide creature comforts, and not any delight of domination. Power on the other hand enables the individual to act "arbitrarily," and to "punish" or "reward" others. It is true, of course, that the use of wealth outside of market relationships, where there is no objectively determined normal price for a particular commodity or service, conveys power since the price paid can either convey a favor or impose a punishment.²¹ To the extent that the relationship diverges from the pole of pure competition and approaches that of monopoly it loses its economic, and takes on a political, character.²²

The right to transfer wealth by gift or bequest (i.e. in the absence of a *quid pro quo*) necessarily endows the property holder with arbitrary power, but such a right is not an intrinsic and essential part of the right to private property, and it has already been substantially limited by inheritance and gift taxation. In sum, wealth in our society frequently confers political as well as economic status but not insofar as it is used within the confines of a purely economic (market competitive) situation.

¹⁹ For this reason the state is viewed as merely the executive agent of the property owning classes.

²⁰ In most cases there is close enough correlation between wealth and income so that either may be used as the criterion of economic status indifferently. In those cases where the correlation does not exist (as for example in Soviet Russia where variations in income exist in conjunction with virtual equality of wealth) one will probably choose the criterion in which variation is most apparent, or which the society in question regards as significant in estimating economic status.

²¹ The political nature of monopoly has not been popularly realized simply because possibilities of substitution have limited the extent of monopoly. However, when practically all types of commodities and services are controlled by a single monopoly, as in a totalitarian society, offers of income and wealth constitute a political weapon, and economic relationships are more or less completely transformed into political relationships.

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The fact that political and economic status are distinct in essence, is further evidenced by the fact that a perfect correlation between the two types of status does not always obtain. Thus, under the Russian Soviet system, particularly in the early phase of strong communist idealism, a high political status did not guarantee a high economic status. The party leaders who wielded immense power possessed virtually no wealth and enjoyed incomes which were much lower than the incomes of many private traders, artists, engineers, and others of much lower political status. Moreover, in modern capitalist democracies, there are at least a few rich men who, because of lack of political ambition or because of democratic scruples, have not used their wealth to buy power, and have a far lower political status than some men of comparatively low economic status (as, e.g., government officials and trade union leaders).

Prestige Status. Let us now turn our attention to prestige status. The chief criteria of prestige are five in number. The person of high prestige is: (1) an object of admiration, (2) an object of deference, (3) an object of imitation, (4) a source of suggestion, and (5) a center of attraction. The admiration may or may not be based on objective characteristics or personal achievements. Deference is the symbolic expression of another's priority: it is manifested in the presumptive right of another to take the initiative in many social relations, to enter first or to occupy a special "place of honor" in certain assemblies and ceremonies, to be addressed in certain distinctive ways, and, other factors being equal, to be given specially favored treatment in many social situations. With regard to imitation we may say that the behavior of the person of high prestige becomes a model and is deliberately or unconsciously reproduced by others. Deliberate imitation may be intended to create a favorable impression upon the one imitated,²³ but in many cases some psychological mechanism like identification will probably

be required to account for the imitative behavior. Those having high prestige status are sources of suggestion, in that the ideas they express are accepted more readily than the same ideas expressed by others.²⁴

The fact that the man of high prestige is also a center of attraction has particular sociological interest. This attraction results from the fact that prestige is *contagious*. Those who associate with people of high prestige, participate in that prestige; even fleeting contact confers some prestige. ("Shake hands with the man who shook hands with the President.") Prestige contagion is a common-place phenomenon, though its psychological origin, like that of prestige suggestion, remains obscure. It shows an undoubted resemblance to other psychological contagion phenomena, as, e.g., contagious magic. Those who regularly associate with a person of high prestige status, come, in some mysterious fashion, to "participate" in that prestige, at least to the extent of raising their own. For this reason even menial offices rendered to a king tend to enoble, and the servants of the great assume a supercilious demeanor. *Per contra*, close association with those of markedly lower prestige status tends to degrade. These facts explain in large part the ceaseless struggle of those of low prestige to lessen the physical, and *a fortiori* the social distance separating them from those of high prestige; and the no less determined efforts of those of high prestige to avoid physical and *a fortiori* social propinquity with those of lower prestige. Prestige contagion and prestige participation explain the various manifestations of the nearly universal phenomena of social climbing and snobbery.²⁵

Since the members of a family are in a relationship of peculiar intimacy, they will

²³ Cf. Bowden, A., et al., "A Study in Prestige," *American Journal of Sociology*, 1934, 40: 193-204. Arnett, A. A., et al., "Prestige as a Factor in Attitude Changes," *Journal of Sociology and Social Research*, 1913, 16: 49-55.

²⁴ Of course societies which either place a smaller value on status or have a narrow range of status variation, or have rigid institutional barriers against changes in status, will have a smaller place for such behavior.

²⁵ Surely members of the academic profession need not be reminded that imitation is often the most *insincere* form of flattery.

in most societies participate to some degree in one another's prestige status, and particularly in the prestige status of the "head" of the family (however defined).²⁶ (The degree of participation may of course be limited by sex or other considerations.)²⁷ Marrying into a family of high prestige is therefore a major method of prestige participation. In some societies the normal explanation of A's high prestige lies in his (socially defined) biological or in-law relationship to B.²⁸

Data on the importance of participation techniques in our own society may be found in the society columns of the daily newspaper. In the particular social stratum popularly known as "society," the acquisition, maintenance, and improvement of prestige status is a dominant preoccupation. It is remarkable how nearly exclusively the news about this stratum is concerned with the topic of social distance. Almost without exception the reports tell who entertained or was entertained by whom, who was married, or was promised in marriage to whom, who appeared (and in what company) at some public gathering, and who has become a member of a charitable or other group (of which the previously existing membership is known). Even where the ostensible concern of the narrative is the artistic or charitable activities of certain individuals, it requires no very practiced eye to perceive that the real interest resides in the question of who thereby associates with whom. Moreover, any description of the principals involved (especially when the news is concerned with en-

gagements, marriages, births, or deaths) places heavy emphasis on genealogical data, revealing the major role of prestige participation in social location within this social stratum.

It may be well to remark at this point that the above described criteria of prestige should not be confused with the sources or occasions of prestige. Skill, beauty, strength, old age, wisdom, luck, holiness, insanity, and many other attributes may in particular societies be sources of prestige, depending upon the society's value system. In our society, for example, beauty is a major source of prestige for women, but an insignificant source for men. The Greeks tended to despise manual skill as the distinguishing trait of the artisan class, whereas in some primitive societies one's skill in producing pottery, canoes, or other implements may be a major determinant of one's prestige. Physical strength and endurance is often a chief source of prestige, whereas in our society it is usually an insignificant one, especially for women.

The *criteria* of prestige, as distinguished from the *sources* of prestige, are not characteristics of persons as such, but of the social interactions surrounding persons.

Interrelation of the Forms of Status. We now turn to the topic of the relationship between prestige and other forms of status. Can prestige status be distinguished from economic status and political status at all; and if so, how is it related to them? Prestige status differs from economic and political status in that it cannot be wholly described in behavioristic terms. At the core of prestige is a sentiment which some individuals feel towards others, and which like any internal state can be described only by relating it to other internal states, and by designating the external behavioral context in which such a sentiment is generally experienced. We know what is meant by prestige when we remember how we feel in situations where we pursue, show deference to, imitate and readily accept suggestions of, other individuals, and where such behavior is not motivated by love or the pursuit of wealth or power. But the sentiment itself need not invariably be manifested in such behavior; and the behavior,

²⁶ In our society the "head" of the family is the husband and father; in some patriarchal societies he is more usually the grandfather; and in some matri-lineal societies he is the wife's brother.

²⁷ In a patriarchal society wives and daughters may participate less fully than sons; in a polygynous society the first wife may participate more fully than later wives; and where primogeniture is practiced, the eldest son may participate more fully than his brothers.

²⁸ Just what is considered a biological relationship depends upon the kinship system utilized by the particular society. In the extreme case paternity may be considered an in-law rather than a biological relationship. See B. Malinowski, *Sexual Life of Savages in Northwestern Melanesia*, London, 1929.

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in turn, may in some cases be feigned, that is to say, may be exhibited in the absence of the corresponding sentiment. Economic and political status on the other hand, may be defined exclusively in terms of how individuals behave towards other individuals. A high economic status exists when one individual is provided by others with large quantities of food, clothing, and other goods and services. A man's political status may be measured by the number of individuals who will conform their behavior to his command, and the area of conduct over which such commands will be obeyed.

That prestige status is not identical with economic and political status is suggested by the following observations. First, in some societies high prestige status is sometimes possessed by learned or holy men whose economic and political status are both low. Second, there have been many examples of dispossessed aristocracies, which maintained a high prestige status for some time after losing both their money and their power. Third, there is the significant prejudice against *nouveaux arrivés*, which results in their being accorded a lower prestige status than others of the same economic or political status who have inherited their possessions. The millionaire who has just made his money does not rank as high in the "social élite" as the somewhat less wealthy millionaire who inherited the money from his great-grandfather. "The 400," "the social registerites," "the best people," "the smart set,"—these groups are not completely identical with the richest or the most powerful members of a community.²⁹

On the other hand, there is no denying that prestige status is to a very large degree dependent on the other types. It is significant that the dispossessed aristocrat does not indefinitely retain his prestige unless he is sooner or later able to win back his power.

Similarly, the *nouveaux riches*, though snubbed persistently, do sooner or later gain in prestige status providing they retain their money. We have to do here with one phase of an interesting social process which we may name "status conversion." Wealth is frequently "converted" into power by direct or indirect bribery, by purchasing posts of command or weapons of coercion, by hiring the services of guards or soldiers or propagandists. Power, on the other hand, may be converted into wealth by direct forceful appropriation and enslavement, by levying tribute and taxes, and by securing strategic economic positions shielded against the impact of competition (franchises, tariffs, or other form of monopolistic advantage).³⁰ The conversion of economic or political status into prestige status possesses certain special features which are worthy of attention. One technique frequently utilized is buying or forcibly appropriating the external manifestations of prestige (titles, badges, offices, etc.). Another and a more subtle method is buying or forcibly winning a favorable reduction in social distance through imposed intimacy or familial alliances and thereby participating in the high prestige status of others.

It would appear, moreover, that certain psychological tendencies facilitate prestige conversion in a more direct fashion. A variety of suggestion, comparable perhaps to the "halo effect" which psychologists have discovered in other fields,³¹ leads the uncritical

²⁹ A classic treatment of one phase of the conversion problem is found in Machiavelli's penetrating discussion, in *The Prince*, as to whether it is better to have a large war chest with which more soldiers may be hired, or more soldiers through whose services new resources may be captured.

³⁰ G. Allport writes: "The halo effect appears with monotonous uniformity in nearly all studies of ratings, and its magnitude is often surprisingly great. The judge seems intent on reporting his final opinion of the strength, weakness, merit, or demerit of the personality as a whole, rather than on giving as discriminating a rating as possible for each separate characteristic. Wherever the variables have moral connotation the halo effect is larger. . . . The halo effect is also large when any single variable is not easily observed in action or where it is ill-defined. . . . The halo has considerable theoretical significance. Its existence is proof positive that in perceiving and reflecting upon a personality we rapidly

³¹ Professor Warner found in his field investigations a lack of exact correlation between economic status and what we should call prestige status. "Some of the men," he writes, "who were consistently placed at the top of the social heap, had less money than those at the bottom." W. Lloyd Warner, *American Journal of Sociology*, 46: 788.

or unsophisticated observer to assume a prestige status corresponding to the political or economic status displayed. Status is perceived "globally" by the unsophisticated as a homogeneous unit. Evidence of much wealth or of high political status creates an undifferentiated total impression of "greatness" and produces a sort of awe in the ordinary beholder. Shakespeare's audience felt strongly that "there's such divinity doth hedge a king, that treason can but peep to what it woud"; and many persons today cannot help being "impressed" when first introduced into the presence of a multimillionaire or a dictator, no matter how the wealth or power in question has been acquired. A term which might well be utilized to designate this psychological aspect of status conversion is "status displacement."

Status Equilibration. As a result of status conversion processes which are normally at work in every society,³² there exists a real tendency for the different types of status to reach a common level, i.e. for a man's position in the economic hierarchy to match his position in the political hierarchy and for the latter to accord with his position in the hierarchy of prestige, etc. This tendency may conveniently be called "status equilibration," and a social situation in which a high degree of correlation obtains between the different forms of status, an "equilibrium status structure." There are historical grounds for supposing that when legal, customary, or other barriers seriously hamper the equilibrating tendency, social tensions of revolutionary magnitude may be generated.³³

structure our impressions into a self-consistent totality." *Personality, a Psychological Interpretation*, New York, 1937, p. 447. For a description of the halo effect see: E. L. Thorndike, "A Constant Error in Psychological Ratings," *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 1920, vol. 4, pp. 25-29.

³² In a dynamic and mobile society status equilibrium is always being disturbed since pronounced changes in status occur ordinarily in only one type of status at first, and are only gradually "converted" into equivalent statuses in the other hierarchies.

³³ Thus the customary and legal barriers of the *ancien régime* prevented the prospering bourgeoisie from achieving a position in the political and prestige hierarchies which would be in line with their

The idea of status equilibrium enables us to achieve a more exact conception of the nature of *social* status. Existing usage with reference to this term is almost anarchical. The terms "status," "social status," "socio-economic status," and "economic status" are all used more or less interchangeably and without specific denotation. We, on our part, have defined status as relative position in a hierarchy and have distinguished carefully between the three chief hierarchies and the corresponding three types of status. There remains the question whether the term "social status" is to be assigned a meaning distinct from any of the special status types. Sociologists as well as laymen apparently find occasions when they wish to refer to an undifferentiated type of status which is not specifically economic, or specifically political, but generically "social." Within the framework of the "equilibration" theory this concept can be given meaning. "Social status" is the limiting term of the status equilibrating process: it is the status which would exist if the equilibrating process were to be completed and if a perfect equilibrium status structure were present. A first approximation to it would be obtained by taking an average of the separate economic, political, and prestige statuses of the individual or group in question. Closer approximations would be achieved by introducing corrections based on

economic status. This is a point which has been adequately emphasized by the historical materialists. What has not been emphasized, however, is that the economic progress of the bourgeoisie would not in itself have produced the ensuing tension, were it not for the fact that there existed strong psychological and social forces working toward status equilibrium which were continually blocked or repressed by institutional barriers. Unless men expected power and prestige to accord with wealth, there would be no frustration involved in a disequilibrated status structure. A recent example (and one not easily explained by historical materialism) occurred in postwar Germany where the rapid impoverishment of large classes who nevertheless maintained their former political and prestige statuses (and, to the astonishment of the Marxists, refused to become proletarianized) produced a highly disequilibrated status structure. The resulting revolutionary tensions were skilfully directed by the Nazis against those groups who could be portrayed as hampering status equilibration.

existing conversion tendencies properly weighted according to their relative potency.

While there are many situations in which an unsophisticated use of the term will be adequate, we would certainly favor the use of specific status categories wherever possible, and an avoidance of the term *social* status unless the undifferentiated form is specifically meant. In the latter case, two general considerations at least should be borne in mind. In the first place, the concept will be more easily and realistically applied in a social situation in which a high degree of status equilibrium already exists. It seems a reasonable hypothesis that the degree of status equilibrium varies directly with the simplicity of the social structure. Thus in the societies of preliterates there is a good probability that the political chief is the richest

man and has the highest prestige. In our highly differentiated society, particularly in urban areas, the high degree of dissociation between economic, political, and prestige hierarchies makes difficult the ready ascription of a single social status to any individual. In the second place, it will be desirable to remember that, while a simple average (of the three specific statuses) may yield an approximation adequate for certain purposes, a more exact estimate will require a judgment as to the strength of the various currents of conversion, and the relative importance of each status type in a given society and a given period. In fact, the data suggest that economic status has been the dominating element in our own recent history, and that the priority may possibly be shifting to political status at this time.

RURAL LOCALITY GROUPS IN ARGENTINA*

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To say that the contours of all human groups can be mapped is not to say that geography or locality is the predominant conditioning factor in determining groupings nor to say that the frequency with which individuals traverse physical distance in contacting other individuals is a measure of the most significant group relations. It is primarily to say that the establishment of the geographic contours of groups is one of the easiest starting points from which to begin a systematic description and analysis of the more dynamic factors in group formation and group life. Locality grouping in Argentina furnish cues to the history of settlement, to ethnic composition of the population, to certain dominating economic and geographic facts, and to institutional development, even though there are many areas where group life beyond the family is almost nonexistent. Locality groups range all the way from geographically isolated highly cohesive groups which are easily identifiable as communities to others which are geographically isolated but are hardly either communities or even neighborhoods, to an even greater number that clearly are only neighborhoods but which are so transient that to discuss them has little value other than to show why they are so ephemeral. For every highly cohesive community, such as exists on the small oases of the Sierras, there are hundreds of nebulous or ephemeral neighborhoods in the great level pampa where no natural barriers, except physical distance itself, impede transportation and communication.

A survey of the total geography of the Argentine Nation, classified by some scheme of locality groupings, is not the purpose of this paper nor could such a classification

neatly be made without overconceptualization. Nor is it the purpose to list all types of locality groups to be found between the few remaining pureblood Indian isolated groups in the extreme north and south to the great metropolitan city of Buenos Aires. It is the purpose rather to use a minimum of conceptual framework by means of which to systematically report observations made in the country during a year's study there. The types of groupings which constitute that framework are: (1) The neighborhood, which is identified by its lowest common denominator—family visiting; (2) a unit next above the neighborhood, often an open country pattern of association which falls some place between a visiting neighborhood and a trade centered community; and (3) a trade centered community.

Early settlements in Argentina were not colonies of ethnic groups seeking homes on the land. They were little other than squatter camps intermediate between the mother country and some sought-for Eldorado. The immigrants did not come in family groups but were mainly single men. Each new settlement was formed by using the indigenous Indian groups and gradually realigning the groupings into semi-agricultural communities. This was hastened by the rapid mixing of the two racial groups. This practice delayed the marked influence of the introduction of European ethnic groups for three centuries. Today, well over 90 percent of Argentina's population has the major portion of its ancestral stock in persons who came to the country after 1850, less than 10 percent in ancestors who composed the mixed racial groups of early settlements. Immigration data and not archaeological or anthropological research, therefore, offer the chief explanation of the nation's present population characteristics and social structure.

That this is not entirely true is due to the fact that most of the land, in fact an over-

* Presented to the Thirty-eighth Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Society, New York, December 4, 1943.

¹ Bureau of Agricultural Economics.

whelming portion of the *good* land, was allotted before the great tide of immigrants arrived. It was not allotted in family-size farm units but in great holdings running into thousands, sometimes hundreds of thousands, of acres. Immigration sharply conditioned locality group patterns but even those patterns developed during the last 90 years have been compelled to make headway against the once almost universally prevailing *estancia* pattern of farm and land organization. Over against this historic fact is the ideological fact that there is today an almost universal drive in Argentina for the family-sized, owner-operated farm. In the later governmental and private colonization programs systematic attempts have been made to convert this ideology into practice. The social process of transition from some types of locality groupings to others must, therefore, also be given consideration in this discussion.

Four geographic laboratories, three of them type-of-farming areas, are selected for analysis. These four areas combined include well over three-fourths the rural population of the Nation. Each includes two or more subtype farming areas but the subtypes are fairly homogeneous in terms of human locality groupings.

THE LIVESTOCK—ESTANCIA AREA

The vast majority of the cattle and sheep of Argentina are produced on estancias. Estancias are farm and land organizations that differ from our southern plantations and from the haciendas of Chile; they differ less from the cattle and sheep ranches of the United States. An analysis of their social structure can best be presented by two specific typical samples, one a cattle, the other a sheep estancia. The social structures of the two are not markedly different except for greater extensiveness and consequently greater distances between social units on sheep than on cattle estancias.

The first example is of a cattle estancia of 50,000 acres which also produces sheep, as many of them do. In March 1943 this estancia had on it 13,544 cattle, 17,711 sheep and about 500 horses. During the 8 months from July 1, 1942, to March 1, 1943,

it sold 12,107 sheep, 3,151 cattle and 2,500,000 pounds of wool. The gross sales for the year 1942 were 1,200,000 pesos (approximately \$300,000). The permanent working population on the estancia is 72 persons, including everyone from the *administrador* or *mayordomo* to the 15-year-old peon who acts as mailboy.

Only 13 of this working force are married men who live in family residences. The remaining 59 live in barracks. The largest cluster of settlement is at the estancia headquarters where are located 30 employees and the wives and children of married men—a total of about 45 persons. This is not, however, a socially homogeneous group. The mayordomo, his assistant, their small families and the bookkeeper constitute the top social segment. The second social segment consists of the specialists and their families—gardeners, chauffeur, carpenter, blacksmith, storekeeper, etc., a total of about 12 laborers and 6 or 8 wives and children. The third segment consists of the peons, about 15 unmarried men, who live in a barracks and have their own kitchen and mess hall.

There are four other locations each with its small cluster of persons, an average of 7 employees, and 1 woman and 4 children—a total of 12 per group. These are the headquarters of *puesteros* (supervisors of assigned geographic sections of the estancia). Each puestero lives in a family residence with his wife and children. The other 6 employees of the group are 5 peons and their cook who live in an adjacent barracks.

Each of these 5 locality groups, the headquarters group more than the others, must be classed as a neighborhood simply because it is larger than a family group and because its associations are definitely patterned. In each group, especially in the headquarters group, class structure is a barrier to complete neighboring. The total estancia population constitutes a community only in the sense that the headquarters of the nearest estancia is 8 miles and the nearest town over 20 miles away; because all persons on the estancia are under the direct supervision of the mayordomo; and all depend on the estancia commissary for their food and largely for their clothes. The groupings are in no

sense organized for purposes of neighborliness or for community social action, but only for convenience in terms of work administration. The school, the church, and to a considerable extent the town trade center, are not, however, a part of estancia organization.

The owners of this estancia also own 12 others, only one of which is in this geographic area. Some members of the ownership group—5 brothers and sisters—spend a few days' vacation each year on the estancia, but are not a part of its resident population. They live in the city of Buenos Aires and participate only slightly in even the business management of the estancia. This they leave to the mayordomo who has operated the place for 38 years and who constitutes the chief link between the estancia and the outside world.²

The sheep estancia chosen as a typical sample contains 408,000 acres and has 149,000 sheep and 4,800 cattle. It has an average working force of about 112 persons and is organized very much like the cattle estancia just described. The distribution of its total resident population, about 200 persons, is in small groups located about 15 miles distant from each other. The headquarters cluster has a population of about 25 and no one of the 4 small clusters has more than 12. There are in addition to these five clusters, 15 families, each living by itself in an isolated spot, but whose home is the headquarters of one or more sheep herders who, however, spend practically all of their time with the sheep on the open range. The headquarters of the nearest estancia is more than 30 miles away and the distance to the nearest town is about 75 miles. Because of its isolation this estancia is almost a small society in and of itself. Otherwise the same generalizations concerning neighborhood, community, trade center and institutional life apply to it as to the cattle estancia described above.

Estancias do not fit into any of the neatly

patterned set of locality groups such as prevail widely in the United States. They are business organizations whose human groupings are formed and maintained for definite administrative purposes. In Patagonia where some sheep estancias are a million or more acres in size they are literally complete communities of a peculiar type. In the cattle breeding area, where many estancias are as small as 10,000 acres and interspersed with smaller owner or tenant operated farms, the physical grouping on the estancias are about as in the examples described here, but neighborhood, community and institutional life is to a considerable extent oriented to centers other than the estancias.

THE CEREAL-MIXED FARMING AREA

The cereal belt was carved out of the livestock belt after 1850 under the impact of a great tide of European immigrants, more than four million of whom flowed into the country between 1850 and 1914. Its center is in southern Santa Fe Province just north of the estancia country. At the time this new type of agriculture and new form of land occupancy began this area was in the near edge of the economic margin of the cattle belt. Estancia organization at that time was, however, by no means as thoroughly institutionalized as it is today. Nevertheless, the new way of life and the new types of social groups had to make headway against the old frontier estancia patterns. A description of this process is, therefore, essential to an understanding of present locality groups in the area.

The cereal belt was as systematically settled by colonization as were large areas of the United States by the homestead system. Specified and clearly delineated areas of land, often estancias, were laid out into individual farms and offered for settlement. Organized recruiting of definite European nationality groups was carried on and accomplished. The Swiss colony at Esperanza (1856); two other Swiss colonies at San Gerónimo (1858) and San Carlos (1859) and the adding of Italian colonists at San Carlos constitute the beginning, the roots, and the social patterns of early community organization. It is easy today (1943) to identify the influence of

² The documentation for practically all information used in this paper is personal observations made by the writer from March 1942 to April 1943 and from *Censo National Agropecuario*, Buenos Aires, 1937.

these early patterns—small farms at San Carlos, the enlargement of holdings by incorporation of reserved intervening tracts into established farms at San Gerónimo, and both farm and town patterns at Esperanza. But the great influx of unrecruited immigrants and the rapid addition of colonization projects, many of them with less precisely specified patterns of land occupancy and social arrangements, soon threw the great colonization and settlement movement into a process of trial and error in community building.

The kind of social structure first developed in the area was a direct result of the heavy flow of immigrants, schemes of colonization, and the development of cereal crop farming. It had to adapt itself to physiographic conditions on the one hand and established institutional patterns of cattle culture on the other hand. The tide of immigrants increased so rapidly that early patterns of settlement and farm operation, established at Esperanza, San Gerónimo, and San Carlos, gave way to trial, error, and success adaptations. This tide of immigration, by decades, was 134,000 in the decade 1860-69; 265,000 in 1870-79; 793,000 in 1880-89. More than 100 colonies were established in Santa Fe Province alone during this period,³ and the new crops of corn and wheat had established themselves as major factors in Argentine agriculture. Land gained rapidly in value as soon as settlement was well started and cereal production offered higher economic return than cattle production on marginal grassland. *Estancieros*, therefore, began to convert their lands into crop farms with tenant operators rather than dividing them into small farms and offering them for sale to colonists. Furthermore, earlier colonists who had become somewhat prosperous in wheat farming preferred to rent large acreages than to own small acreages. For these two reasons areas later added to the cereal belt no longer followed early colony patterns. Few immigrants arriving after 1905 became farm owners. Cattle culture and the estancia pattern which had yielded ground in 1860 to

cereal culture and the family-sized, owner-operated farm pattern, adapted themselves to cereal culture through the *estancieras'* retaining ownership of the land and renting it to tenants in family-sized operating units. The agricultural census of 1937 reported 67.6 percent of all farmers in the cereal belt as tenants. The most prevalent tenant contract runs for only five years and while this period may be increased by contract renewals in some areas, in others this is not the practice because cereal farming is used chiefly for the purpose of renovating pastures and all tenants must move at the end of their contract period.

Whether there has been anything approaching a time pattern of community or locality group evolution in the different sections of the Argentine cereal belt has depended upon the relative play of the factors which I have briefly described. In the heart of the belt, that part settled by definite colonies and well established before the tenant system of operation developed, a diversity of enterprises on individual farms, well-established neighborhoods, even open-country farm communities, and a number of farmers' towns with from 5,000 to 25,000 populations, constitute the scene. There is a well-organized network of roads, most of them paved, between the larger trade centers. Local co-operative cheese factories, a large co-operative butter factory, and a number of open-country community recreation halls have been built and are well supported by farm families. In contrast to the livestock areas, farmers and whole farm families in this area frequently go to the larger trade centers and read both locally published and Buenos Aires daily papers. At Esperanza, San Gerónimo and San Carlos the original ethnic groupings have been considerably diluted by infiltration of other settlers of different ethnic stock—chiefly Italian—but family-sized, owner-operated farms still prevail as the dominant pattern and practically all farm families participate in the group patterns just described.

In those areas converted from cattle culture to cereal culture at a later date, after both the tenancy system and something approaching the present form of estancia ad-

³ Jefferson, Mark, *Peopling the Argentine Pampa*, Chapter III, American Geographical Society, New York, 1926.

ministration had developed, the pattern of farm occupancy does not differ greatly from that in the old colony belt, but the estancia form of ownership is retained and the tenants' periods of occupancy are so short and insecure as to cause a great difference in the functioning of locality groups. The operating units are family-sized and each farm family lives on its own isolated unit, even owns the house in which it lives and everything it uses except the land which it farms. The family is, however, semi-transient, in many cases definitely sure that its occupancy is limited to a five-year period. In such areas there are no community halls, few local co-operatives, and even few local churches. Because the local schools are provided by the provincial or federal government, school operation requires little co-operation and no direction on the part of the local communities. Families in these areas visit to some extent with adjacent farm families, sometimes travel to visit with families in other localities where they have previously lived, and sometimes visit with relatives who live at not too great a distance. Local neighborhoods can be identified only by the sporadic visiting within geographic vicinities and seldom or never as mutual aid groups. Communities, even trade center communities, do not exist in any sociological sense. Except for rare occasions only men heads of families who carry on necessary marketing functions, and unmarried adult males, who sometimes go to towns on week-ends, frequent local trade centers. Even these latter much more frequently assemble at country stores, on country roads or in some grove or open pasture for visiting, horse racing, horse breaking, etc., than they do at the larger trade centers.

The pampa, in which almost the whole cereal belt is located, is an almost perfectly flat unbroken plain with few geographic barriers to channels of communication and few topographic contours which condition patterns of settlement. Large portions of it are geographically and climatically well suited to either cereal or grass culture or for diversified farming. The almost complete explanation of the differences between the social structure and social functioning within

the different geographic parts of its cereal belt and between its cereal and cattle belts are cultural, i.e., products of the historic development and current functioning of economic arrangements. None of the nationalities within the area today forms cliques, none retains its old folk culture, either language, dress, games, objects or art, or even songs. Agronomic adaptations in the area have converted immigrants who, in their native countries, were small farmers, farm laborers and industrial workers into large-scale wheat, corn and flax growers. The uniformity of these adjustments and the flat evenness of the pampa have, as it were, flattened out the social life of the farm people who live upon it. That this is not universally the case is amply illustrated by home-owned and operated farms, good roads, good social institutions and well-organized community life in those areas where the organization and ownership of the land is in the hands of the European immigrant groups, who in fact developed the cereal belt out of part of the cattle belt.

THE IRRIGATED OASES—VINEYARD, FRUIT AND SUGAR CANE BELTS

The irrigated oases—vineyard, fruit and sugar cane areas—are similar in that all practice intensive farming on small operating units; all are represented by farmers the majority of whom are owners; all have a dense farm population; and all require a large amount of extra-seasonal labor during harvest. Each depends on a common supply of irrigation water. All three were developed by immigrant populations but in very different ways.

The Rio Negro fruit belt is a development of the last 20 years, chiefly by Spanish and Italians but including a number of other nationalities, none of them with an advanced knowledge of fruit culture. Mendoza has been producing grapes for well over 150 years but became a highly specialized grape and wine area only about 60 years ago. Both the new and old farmers were predominantly Spanish with a background of grape culture. The Tucumán area has produced sugar cane for a century but had a great expansion after 1880. Its population expansion came chiefly

from Criollo stock with heavy mixtures of Indian blood. All of these facts are important in explaining the great differences which exist between these three areas, though probably not so important as the difference in the economic organizations and arrangements which prevail in the separate areas.

In the heart of the Mendoza vineyard belt, the city of Mendoza, with a population of 500,000, is the focal point of a group of local villages and these villages are the neighborhood-community centers of all the farm people of the area. Practically every farm family resident lives within walking distance of one of these village centers and can walk to it on paved roads. Each village is a school, church, recreation and trade center. Each competes with all others in the beauty of its plaza, in athletics, and for the election of its candidate as queen of the annual grape festival. The grape festival is an areal, a greater Mendoza enterprise, and a national event in which everyone from wine factory operators to grape pickers participates. In both of the last two years the queen of the festival has been a grape picker, and in 1943 so were all her attendants.

Mendoza is the heart of a large irrigated oasis that is separated by 490 miles from Cordoba, the next closest population center. It has a relatively homogeneous population. Almost its whole life is oriented to grape and wine production which is integrated directly or indirectly by the wine factories at the top of the economic pyramid. It provides largely from its own farm, village and urban families the extra labor for the grape harvest. Persons of both sexes and all ages work during the harvest in large gangs and thus become intimately acquainted with one another. All of these facts are undoubtedly as important to an explanation of the functioning as to an explanation of structure of locality groups in this area.

In the Rio Negro fruit area there are no processing plants except packing and shipping sheds, but these are largely co-operative. The chief overhead directive comes from the Southern Railroads Experiment Station and extension center which exercises no economic pressure. Its chief service is supposed to be educational but in practice is

almost managerial. Neighborhood entities definitely exist and the trade centers function as incipient though not fully developed community centers. The villages of the area do not so definitely focus on Neuquen, the largest town of the area, because each local village is more or less self-sufficient, i.e., not dependent on central processing plants as is the case with the wine factories at Mendoza. Both the thinning and harvest season require considerable extra seasonal labor, much of which is recruited from outside the community but, for the most part, housed and fed in the individual employers' homes. Improvements of roads, schools, and trade center facilities are taking place so rapidly at the present time as to give the appearance of an almost completely new community. Immigrant farmers are just now completing final payments on their farms and quite universally direct their conversations more to this fact and to the new or planned homes and recently acquired radios than they do to neighborhood or community topics.

The social structure and community life at Tucumán differs far more from that at Mendoza than from that in the Rio Negro Valley. The farm operating units, whether tenant or owner in Tucumán, are relatively small; 81.4 percent of all sugar cane farms are $12\frac{1}{2}$ acres or less in size. More than 16.6 percent of all sugar cane is, however, produced on plantations of 3,000 acres or larger, most of which are operated by share-croppers. The human organization for conducting sugar cane production is conditioned tremendously by the 42 percent which is produced on farms of 250 acres or larger, few of which are family owned and operated. All sugar cane grown in the area, whether on plantations or owner-operated farms, is purchased by the operators of sugar factories each of whom is also the operator of at least one large plantation. The majority of the small producers receive their production credit from the factories and are paid upon the factories' analysis of the sugar content of their cane. Thus the sugar cane area is as definitely oriented to the factory process at the top as is the grape area to the wine factory at the top. The sugar factory owners themselves, however, produce a much larger

percent of the cane they process than do the wineries of the grapes they process.

A second difference is that the great mass of seasonal labor required for the cane harvest is recruited almost entirely from outside the Tucumán area, chiefly from the low income, almost poverty stricken, areas of Santiago del Estero to the east and Catamarca to the south, but some of it from the mixed Indian population from the north and west. It is highly probable that the great difference in treatment accorded by operators to factory and field workers is partly due to the fact that the majority of field workers during harvest are these strangers from other areas. Some of the sugar mill villages housing the factory workers are almost model communities with modern homes, community center buildings, public bathhouses, recreation grounds, libraries, moving picture houses and even churches, whereas the field employees of these same owners live in slum houses, have no social institutions or facilities and, if seasonal laborers, live in no-man's land so far as neighborhood and community life is concerned.

Different types of groupings prevail among year 'round field laborers, the patterns varying with and being dictated by arrangements provided by large holders. In a few cases the plantations are divided into operating areas managed by mayordomos, the employee families under each mayordomo living in a small pueblo or court type of village. In a far greater number of cases, however, the plantations are divided into tenant operated units, the owner providing from 6 to 10 working men's small homes clustered near the larger house provided for tenant operator families. In other cases working men's homes are spaced along the roads in the same fashion as are the homes of small owners, tenants, and field foremen. These scattered homes, together with those of the many small owner operators, serve to make the general pattern of settlement the same as that found in nearly all other areas of Argentina, the individual, isolated residence. The density of the population causes homes to be relatively near each other but in no sense does the fact constitute the set-

tlement as a line village or other self-conscious community group.

The town pattern of the sugar cane area is dictated by the location of sugar mills of which there are 38 in the Province of Tucumán. These towns, unlike those in the fruit and vineyard oasis areas, are not social centers for farm people. They serve as social and trade centers for the industrially employed sugar workers but not for the sugar cane field workers, who more often patronize the plantation commissaries or the crossroads stores and who live largely without the services of other institutional facilities.

RECENT COLONIZATION SETTLEMENTS

The Argentine laboratory for rural community study includes two other segments of sufficient magnitude to justify consideration: one, the new colonization areas in the federal territories of Chaco and Misiones, and, the other, the planned communities of colonization agencies other than the federal government. The first are products largely of unregulated settlement and the latter of carefully planned and directed settlement. In both cases, even in the Jewish colonies where there is a high degree of communal activities, the pattern of settlement is that of individual isolated farmsteads. In the squatter occupied areas largely settled since 1920, the settlers are mostly north or central European immigrants. In the most outstanding privately promoted colonies they are Jews and Germans. In the government sponsored colonies they are native-born Argentines or persons who have declared their intention of becoming naturalized citizens. All the government sponsored new communities have been established since 1937.

In the two new colony areas, Chaco—the cotton belt—and Misiones—the yerba belt—during the last 20 years, for the most part, squatters have settled in open spaces between streams, bayous and heavily forested areas. Farm residences are often not within sight of each other and neighbors are sometimes miles distant from each other. In many localities members of various nationality groups have tended to settle in adjacent open spaces and thus to form ethnic or nationality group neighborhoods. Recently the federal

government has been attempting to "regularize" settlement and thus bring some order out of the chaos. The elements in this regularizing process are: (1) carefully bounding the operating units by decreasing the size of some and enlarging others, (2) requiring a minimum of specified improvements, (3) clearing up titles, and (4) stopping irregular squatting by directing new settlers to assigned locations. In at least two places, one partially settled, the other totally unoccupied, the government is planning complete communities.

In these areas it is possible to observe locality group formation and integration at all stages of development. Some of the phenomena observed are as follows: All nationalities are learning to speak the Spanish language, all are using the same central trade areas, in the Chaco all are growing cotton and most of them marketing it through government-sponsored co-operatives, also all of them are served and to a considerable extent directed by the experiment stations and extension agents of the Federal Cotton Board. In Misiones the individual settlers representing 26 nationalities are highly individualistic and self-sufficient. Nevertheless, they are building open-country churches; their children are attending common schools; and all families are using a very rapidly growing trade center which lies inland 25 miles from the nearest railroad or river port.

The most pronounced nationality group tendencies in the two areas are that the few Japanese families in the Misiones area mingle little with other nationalities, and in the Chaco the Czechs always gather in the trade center at a certain section of town and consider themselves the elite in the community. Here and there in both areas one sees and hears of the survival of old foreign folk traits—clothes, social fetes, and food habits. In one neighborhood a Montenegrin group has built a community building, in the parlor of which hang photographs of old country national heroes.

The two most universally integrating, or at least most definitely focusing, locality factors are the well-attended common schools which already constitute neighborhood nu-

clei, and trade centers whose influence is obvious in the character of town stores and in the streams of teams moving toward towns during harvesting seasons. Federal direction of settlement and the enforcement of minimum standards for both improvements and farming practices operate to develop a degree of consciousness of group problems and group standards.

In both private and government sponsored settlement or resettlement projects the size and layout of farms and the location of community buildings was determined before settlement began. In all of these projects a maximum of individual family initiative and freedom and a minimum of overhead direction or supervision is exercised. On all government sponsored projects, there exists a settler elected community council or board which works with the project manager on such enterprises as community buildings, community social programs, co-operative marketing, and even on financial and other management problems of individual settlers. In these relationships the colony-elected board is overwhelmingly dominant, its opinion and judgment literally never disregarded by the management. This one fact, above all others, probably accounts for the rapid development of community cohesion and consciousness which have developed in these communities during their remarkably short period of existence.

Some of the Jewish colonies have been in existence for more than 40 years and, because of ethnic and religious factors, outstanding ideologies about co-operatives, and a long period of settlement, have developed into highly cohesive communities, even though located in the midst of and completely surrounded by other settlers who have practically no community life.

The German-Polish community at Eldorado, in Misiones, is almost completely isolated from all other population centers by the fact that it is located far up the Parana River and can be reached only by river boats with infrequent and sometimes irregular schedules. It is a complete trade centered community with a complete gamut of community institutions and service agencies—schools, churches, stores, bank and picture

shows. Within it are a number of easily identifiable neighborhoods one of which is the village of Eldorado. Others are focused by open-country churches, neighborhood schools, visiting and mutual aid patterns, some of which are still highly conditioned by nationality groupings.

SOME GENERALIZATIONS

A much greater body of detail concerning organization and behavior in all these areas would need to be presented, and many more precise observations need to be made in order to warrant the presentation of a set of refined sociological generalizations on the characteristics of locality groupings in Argentine rural life. Because the observations cover a fairly large and quite diverse list of situations the writer should, however, subject himself to the task of presenting some broad generalizations. Those generalizations are:

(1) The vast majority of rural people in Argentina live in areas where natural geographic factors do not sharply condition the formation or functioning of rural groupings. The chief explanation of what is observed concerning the existence of various types of groups and their various modes of functioning is, therefore, to be found to some extent in the history of their development but primarily in the day-by-day occupational requirements and economic arrangements under and within which individuals and families work and live.

(2) The most influential occupational factor is type of farm production, which in Argentina is generally so highly specialized as to exclude diversity and force uniformity. The most influential economic arrangement factor is tenure and resultant tenure classes—owner, manager, renter, laborer. Even within certain type farming areas this class of economic arrangements presents the chief explanation of the forms and functionings of locality groups.

(3) In few places do the major social institutions of schools, churches and local government serve as group stimulating and integrating agencies because they are established and almost wholly maintained by hierarchies whose central directives come

from outside the localities.

(4) In occupational patterned areas where settlement has a fairly long history, and where family-sized farm ownership prevails, what might be called normal locality group patterns universally have developed. These patterns are also being developed rapidly in new colonization areas even when the settler families represent a great number of different nationality groups.

(5) In areas where, either because of geographic isolation, as in the cases of the desert oasis settlements and the Eldorado settlement in Misiones, or because of overhead guidance and sometimes mildly regulating factors, as in the Jewish colonies and the government sponsored colonies, locality group formation is hastened and group functioning is developed on a high level. In these cases the neighborhood patterns are generally not pronounced and the community patterns tend to dominate. On those larger oases, where population numbers are large and population density is great, all three locality groups of neighborhood, local community, and urban centers exist and function as complements each to the other.

It should, of course, be recognized that physical channels and vehicles of transportation and communication influence locality group structure and functioning. In most areas of Argentina their relatively retarded state of development is a considerable factor in explaining community behavior. The relative nonexistence of local-town-open-country relations is another conditioning and resulting factor. The relative absence of contacts and working arrangements between urban centered and urban dominated agencies and factors such as government, churches, universities and the public press, and local rural life is the rule and not the exception in Argentina. These are important chiefly because of their relative absence of functioning in rural areas. They operate in organizational patterns which largely disregard and sometimes violate normal locality group patterns. To mention these relatively negative facts is important; to elaborate upon them would only serve to emphasize the dominance of the positively conditioning factors which have been discussed.

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THE DETERRENT INFLUENCE OF CORPORAL PUNISHMENT UPON PRISONERS WHO HAVE BEEN WHIPPED*

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DELAWARE, alone among the forty-eight states,¹ has continued to prescribe corporal punishment, in the form of public whippings, as a penalty for a large number of crimes,² and today in each of her three counties there stands a whipping post as a warning to those who are tempted to violate the law. At the present time, Delaware's laws provide that public whippings may be inflicted³ as a part of the punishment⁴ for male prisoners⁵ for the following twenty-four crimes, here listed with their prescribed lashes:

* Presented to the Thirty-eighth Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Society, New York, December 5, 1943.

¹ For the failure of the penal reform movement in Delaware, see the author's "The Penitentiary Movement in Delaware, 1776-1820."

² Whipping is authorized in Maryland for wife-beating but is rarely used.

³ By the provisions of an act approved on April 7, 1925, the sentencing of a prisoner to corporal punishment was placed entirely within the discretionary powers of the court. (*Laws of Delaware*, Vol. 34, p. 504.) Before this law was enacted, the court could exercise discretionary powers in cases of wife-beating, and assault to rob, and, by a law passed on February 15, 1883 (*Laws of Delaware*, Vol. 17, p. 527), in cases of larceny where the prisoner was of "tender years," or charged with crime for the first time, and had been of good character prior to his offense, and in cases where other crimes were involved when the jury recommended mercy.

⁴ In addition to the possible penalty of whipping, imprisonment is made mandatory for all these crimes except wife-beating, for which offense a fine may be imposed instead of a sentence to imprisonment. Since Delaware does not have an indeterminate sentence law, the court in each case must sentence the prisoner to a definite prison term. A fine or restitution, also, is prescribed as part of the punishment for almost all of these crimes.

⁵ According to a law passed on February 26, 1889, no woman convicted of any crime in Delaware is to have the penalty of whipping inflicted upon her (*Laws of Delaware*, Vol. 18, p. 948).

1. Poisoning with intent to murder, 60 lashes;⁶
2. Maiming by lying in wait, 30 lashes;⁷
3. Assault with intent to ravish, 30 lashes;⁸
4. Wife-beating, not less than 5 nor more than 30 lashes;⁹
5. Robbery, first offense, not more than 40 lashes, subsequent offense, 40 lashes;¹⁰
6. Assault with intent to rob, not more than 20 lashes;¹¹
7. Burning a court house or office where public records are kept, 60 lashes;¹²
8. Burning a vessel, mill, granary, church or school, not more than 20 lashes;¹³
9. Burglary with explosives at night, person in building, not less than 20 nor more than 40 lashes;¹⁴
10. Burglary with explosives at night, no person in building, not less than 15 nor more than 25 lashes;¹⁵
11. Breaking and entering a dwelling at night with intent to commit a crime other than murder, rape, or arson of the first degree, not less than twenty nor more than 40 lashes;¹⁶
12. Other forms of breaking and entering with intent to commit a crime, 20 lashes;¹⁷
13. Larceny of horse, ass or mule, or larceny by breaking a lock, 20 lashes;¹⁸
14. Bringing a stolen horse, ass or mule into the State, and selling or attempting to sell it, 20 lashes;¹⁹
15. Knowingly buying, receiving, or conceal-

⁶ *Laws of Delaware*, "Code of 1935," p. 1048.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 1050.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 1052.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 1053.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, Vol. 42, pp. 318, 319.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, Vol. 42, pp. 318, 319.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 1054.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

- ing a stolen horse, ass or mule, 20 lashes;²⁰
16. Grand larceny, not more than 20 lashes;²¹
 17. Embezzlement by carrier or porter, not more than 20 lashes;²²
 18. Embezzlement by a cashier, servant or clerk, not more than 20 lashes;²³
 19. Fraudulent misapplication or conversion of funds, not more than 10 lashes;²⁴
 20. Counterfeiting, 39 lashes;²⁵
 21. Wilfully and feloniously showing false lights to cause a vessel to be wrecked, 39 lashes;²⁶
 22. Unlawfully obstructing railway tracks so as to make them unsafe, 20 lashes;²⁷
 23. Perjury or subornation of perjury, 40 lashes;²⁸
 24. Tampering, altering or destroying legislative bills or acts, not less than 10 nor more than 30 lashes.²⁹

The criminal code of Delaware requires that the punishment of whipping shall be inflicted publicly by strokes well laid on the bare back.³⁰ In New Castle County it is administered by the warden of the New Castle County Workhouse, or by one of his subordinates; in Kent County,³¹ by the sheriff or his deputy, or by a constable; in Sussex County, by the warden of the county jail.³² The court in every case must so graduate

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid., pp. 1054, 1055. By a law enacted on February 14, 1941, larceny was divided into grand larceny (the theft of goods valued at \$25.00 or upwards) and petty larceny, and the latter was no longer to be punishable with whipping (*Laws of Delaware*, Vol. 43, pp. 1008-1011).

²² Ibid., p. 1056.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 1061.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 897. If the death of any person is caused by the showing of such lights, the offender is to be deemed guilty of murder.

²⁷ Ibid., pp. 846, 847. If any personal injury is caused by such an act, the offender is to be answerable as for like injury maliciously inflicted by any other means.

²⁸ Ibid., p. 1062.

²⁹ Ibid., p. 94.

³⁰ Contrary to popular opinion, the law does not specify that the person who inflicts the lashes shall keep his elbow stiff during the whipping, although this practice has been followed for a number of years at the New Castle County Workhouse.

³¹ *Laws of Delaware*, "Code of 1935," p. 1077.

³² Ibid., Vol. 40, Chapter 226.

the sentences imposed upon a prisoner that the total lashes to be inflicted will not exceed sixty.³³

Although during recent years some important moves have been made toward curbing the use of the post in Delaware,³⁴ there certainly has been no definite tendency to reduce the number of different kinds of crimes for which lashes may be inflicted. In fact, since 1900, seven offenses have been added to those for which the state's laws prescribe the possible penalty of whipping.³⁵

During the period 1900 to 1942 inclusive, over 7,300 prisoners were convicted of crimes in Delaware for which they might have been whipped in accordance with the provisions of the state's criminal laws.³⁶ However, only 1,604, or about 22%, of this total were whipped. Of those who received lashes, 79% had been convicted in New Castle County,³⁷

³³ Ibid., "Code of 1935," p. 1074.

³⁴ Evidence of this is to be found in the act of April 7, 1925 (*Laws of Delaware*, Vol. 34, p. 504), which made the inflicting of whipping in every case dependent upon the discretion of the court, and in the act of February 14, 1941 (*Laws of Delaware*, Vol. 43, pp. 1008-1011), which removed petty larceny from the list of crimes punishable with whipping.

³⁵ These crimes, together with the dates when the penalty of whipping was added, follow: (1) wife-beating, February 22, 1901 (*Laws of Delaware*, Vol. 22, p. 493), (2) perjury and subornation of perjury, April 7, 1903 (*Laws of Delaware*, Vol. 22, p. 980; Vol. 23, p. 458), (3) burglary with explosives, person in the building, April 3, 1905 (*Laws of Delaware*, Vol. 23, p. 450), (4) burglary with explosives, no person in the building, April 3, 1905 (*Laws of Delaware*, Vol. 23, p. 450), (5) assault with intent to rob, February 16, 1921 (*Laws of Delaware*, Vol. 32, pp. 660, 661), (6) embezzlement by cashier, servant and clerk, April 15, 1925 (*Laws of Delaware*, Vol. 34, pp. 540, 541), and (7) fraudulent misapplication of funds by administrator, guardian, attorney-at-law, etc., April 15, 1925 (*Laws of Delaware*, Vol. 34, p. 542).

³⁶ The statistics presented in this article have been derived from an analysis of the police, court, and prison records of Delaware for the period 1900 to 1942 inclusive.

³⁷ Delaware has only three counties; namely, New Castle, Kent, and Sussex. New Castle, the northern county, contains the city of Wilmington, the state's only large city, and for many years this county's population has been more than that of the other two counties combined. It is not surprising, therefore, that most of the criminals who have been

86% had been found guilty of either breaking and entering, with intent, or larceny,³⁸ 68% were negroes, 66% belonged to the age group 17 to 35 inclusive,³⁹ 89% were American,⁴⁰ and 68% were either unskilled laborers or farm hands.⁴¹ Since the beginning of the century there has been a considerable decline in the use of the whipping post in Delaware, so that although in 1900, approximately 70% of the prisoners who had been convicted of crimes for which they might have been whipped were actually whipped, in 1942, only about 7% of such prisoners received lashes.⁴²

When the study of the whipping post in Delaware was undertaken, it was hoped that the criminal careers of all whipped prisoners could be analyzed in order to determine the extent to which the infliction of lashes acted as a deterrent influence in each case. However, an examination of the condition of the existing records made it quite clear that this aspect of the study would have to be restricted to the criminal records of those who had been sentenced to be whipped by the courts of New Castle County between 1920 and 1939 inclusive. The criminal

whipped since 1900 have been convicted in New Castle County.

Of the 1,259 prisoners who were whipped during the period 1900 to 1942 inclusive, after having been convicted in the courts of New Castle County, 85 percent had been found guilty of either breaking and entering, with intent, or larceny, 69 percent were negroes, 66 percent belonged to the age group 17 to 35 inclusive, 93 percent were American, and 72 percent were either unskilled laborers or farm hands.

³⁸ Of the total 1,604 prisoners who were whipped, 68.6 percent had been convicted of larceny; and 17.8 percent, of breaking and entering, with intent.

³⁹ 2 percent were under 17; 33 percent, in the age group 17 to 25 inclusive; 32 percent, in the age group 26 to 35 inclusive; and 32 percent, over 35.

⁴⁰ Delaware's prison records do not specify whether they were American born or naturalized.

⁴¹ Of those whipped, 7.2 percent were of unknown race, 7.9 percent were of unknown age, 7.6 percent were of unknown nationality, and 8.9 percent were of unknown occupation. Almost all of the prisoners whose race, age, nationality, and occupation were unknown were whipped between 1900 and 1906. During these years many of the police and prison records are incomplete or missing.

⁴² Delaware whipped 57 prisoners in 1900 and only 8 in 1942.

careers of prisoners whipped for the first time after 1939 were not included in this part of the study so that in each case in the analysis, which was extended down to the end of 1942, there would be a minimum of three years between the first whipping and the conclusion of the study, during which time the effects of the lashes could be observed.⁴³ Of course, for each prisoner involved all available information regarding his criminal record from the time of his first contact with the court to the end of 1942 was secured. This meant that whippings given to these prisoners before as well as after 1920 were taken into consideration.⁴⁴

In this study of criminal careers, the records of 320 different prisoners, all of whom had been whipped at least once and 74% of whom were negroes, were examined. As a result, it was found that 62% of them (52% of the whites and 65% of the negroes) were again convicted of some crime after their first whipping. It was further revealed that after the first whipping 52% of the men (37% of the whites and 57% of the negroes) were convicted of crimes committed in Delaware, and 49% (45% of the whites and 50% of the negroes) were convicted of major crimes.⁴⁵ In addition, it was ascertained that after the first whipping 42% of the total 320 (32% of the whites and 45% of the negroes) were found guilty of crimes for which whipping was prescribed by the laws of Delaware (some of these did receive lashes), and 31% (15% of the whites and 36% of the negroes) were con-

⁴³ A total of 29 prisoners, of whom 22 were negroes, received their first whippings during the period 1940 to 1942 inclusive.

⁴⁴ Twenty-one of these prisoners had received their first lashes before 1920.

⁴⁵ This classification into major and minor crimes is the same as that used by the Bureau of Census in the compilation of its judicial statistics. Such crimes as murder, manslaughter, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, embezzlement, receiving stolen property, forgery, counterfeiting, rape, commercialized vice, violation of the drug laws, bigamy, blackmail, kidnapping, and perjury are classified as major offenses; and such crimes as minor assault, nonsupport, violation of liquor laws, driving while intoxicated, disorderly conduct, vagrancy, and gambling, as minor offenses.

victed of crimes that not only were punishable with whipping according to Delaware's laws, but also had been committed in that state. Of the 320 prisoners included in the analysis of criminal records, 20% (5% of the whites and 25% of the negroes) were whipped at least twice, and 65% of these (50% of the whites and 66% of the negroes) were again convicted of some crime after their second whipping. Furthermore, of the ones who were whipped at least twice, 57% (50% of the whites and 58% of the negroes) were convicted of major crimes after their second whipping.⁴⁶

Anyone who has given much thought to the subject of corporal punishment will undoubtedly raise a question regarding the analysis that has thus far been presented. It may well be asked at this point whether the amount of recidivism among those who have been whipped should not be compared with that of some other group, that is, with a group of prisoners who have not been whipped but who have been punished in some other way. For example, it may be contended that even though a large percentage of prisoners are again convicted of some crime after they receive lashes, nevertheless, whipping exerts a greater deterrent influence than imprisonment. Obviously, therefore, this comparison must be made if the study of the subject is to be complete.

An examination of Delaware's criminal records for those who were not whipped revealed that any analysis of such records could not be a very satisfactory one if it were used for any county except New Castle County, or if it were extended back beyond 1928. Therefore, it was decided that the criminal careers of those who were convicted in 1928 in New Castle County of crimes for which they might have been whipped but were not, would be used since that would give the maximum number of years during which the effects of such punishment could be accurately observed.

⁴⁶ Of the total number of different persons whipped during the period 1900 to 1942 inclusive, almost 17 percent during this same period were whipped at least twice. (13 percent were whipped twice; 3 percent, three times; .05 percent, four times; and .02 percent, five times.)

During 1928, there were 93 persons convicted in New Castle County of crimes for which they might have been whipped but who were not. Of these, 98% had been found guilty of either breaking and entering, with intent, or larceny, 57% were white, 71% belonged to the age group 17 to 35 inclusive,⁴⁷ 87% were American, and 58% were either unskilled laborers or farm hands.⁴⁸ If a comparison is made between the foregoing characteristics and the same characteristics of the 1,259 prisoners who were whipped during the period 1900 to 1942 inclusive, after having been convicted in the courts of New Castle County, it will be seen that a higher percentage of the former (unwhipped) had been convicted of offenses of breaking and entering, with intent, or larceny (98% to 85%),⁴⁹ that more of the unwhipped were whites (57% to 31%),⁵⁰ that more of the unwhipped were in the age group 17 to 35 inclusive (71% to 66%); that more of the whipped were Americans (93% to 87%);⁵¹ and that more of the whipped were either unskilled laborers or farm hands (72% to 58%).

A further examination of the criminal records of the 93 unwhipped prisoners convicted in 1928 showed that 34% (32% of the whites and 38% of the negroes) had been convicted of some crime before 1928,

⁴⁷ 2 percent were under 17; 43 percent, in the age group 17 to 25 inclusive; 28 percent, in the age group 26 to 35 inclusive; and 26 percent, over 35.

⁴⁸ Of these 93 prisoners, 1 was of unknown race; 1, of unknown age; 3, of unknown nationality; and 3, of unknown occupation.

⁴⁹ Of the 1,604 prisoners who had been whipped in Delaware during the period 1900 to 1942 inclusive, 1 had been whipped for poisoning to murder; 7, for assault to rape; 24, for wife-beating; 172, for robbery; 4, for assault to rob; 2, for perjury; 3, for burning; 287, for breaking and entering, with intent; 2, for embezzlement; 1,100 for larceny; and 2, for unlawfully obstructing a railroad. Of the 93 prisoners convicted during 1928 for crimes for which they might have been whipped but were not, 1 had been found guilty of burning; 1, of wife-beating; 19, of breaking and entering, with intent; and 72, of larceny.

⁵⁰ During 1928, there were 11 prisoners whipped in Delaware, but only 1 of these was a white man.

⁵¹ The fact that 69 percent of the 1,259 prisoners were American negroes would help to account for this.

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and that 27% (26% of the whites and 28% of the negroes) had been convicted of a major crime before 1928. A similar examination of the records of the 349 different New Castle County prisoners who were whipped during the period 1920 to 1942 inclusive revealed that 69% (73% of the whites and 68% of the negroes) had been convicted of some crime before their first whipping, and that 62% (71% of the whites and 59% of the negroes) had been convicted of some major crime before their first whipping. Thus, a much higher percentage of the whipped had previous criminal records.⁵²

Of the 93 prisoners who were convicted of crimes for which they might have been whipped but were not, 26 (only 1 of whom was a negro) were placed on probation and the remaining 67 were imprisoned in the New Castle County Workhouse for definite terms varying from less than one month to five years. A study of the subsequent criminal careers of these unwhipped prisoners showed that 51% (53% of the whites and 49% of the negroes) were convicted of some crime after 1928, and that 40% (42% of the whites and 38% of the negroes) were found guilty of a major crime after 1928.⁵³ The subsequent records of those who were placed on probation in 1928 were better than those who were imprisoned in that year, 42% of the former and 54% of the latter being again convicted of some crime after 1928,⁵⁴ and 31% of the former and 43% of the latter being found guilty of a major crime after 1928. It will be seen from this analysis, therefore, that *the percentage of prisoners that were again convicted of some crime was*

greater for those who were whipped than it was for those who were not (62% as compared with 51%).

However, there remained the possibility that 1928 was not a representative year and that a study of the criminal careers of persons punished but not whipped in that year would not show what usually happens in subsequent years to those who do not receive lashes. Hence, it seemed advisable to select another year which would not only allow enough time between it and the end of 1942 to make possible the observation of the behavior of released prisoners, but also reflect more recent conditions. For this purpose, the year 1940 was chosen, although rather arbitrarily it is true.

During this year, 120 prisoners were convicted in the courts of New Castle County of crimes for which they might have been whipped but were not. Of these, 58 (12 of whom were negroes) were placed on probation and 62 (33 of whom were negroes) were sentenced to imprisonment. An examination of the criminal records of these men indicated that 34% (45% of those imprisoned and 22% of those placed on probation) already had been again convicted of some crime before the end of 1942.⁵⁵ The passage of a few additional years will undoubtedly raise these percentages. Apparently, then, although the amount of recidivism for this type of prisoner who was placed on probation in New Castle County dropped between 1928 and 1942, there was no material alteration in the criminal tendencies of those who might have been lashed but who were imprisoned without having to undergo this punishment.

⁵² It is interesting to note that of the 11 men who were whipped in Delaware during 1928, 9 had been convicted of some crime before 1928, and 6, of some major crime before that year.

⁵³ Only 1 prisoner (a white man) had an interval of less than five years between the total length of all sentences imposed and the number of years that elapsed between 1928 and the end of 1942. The interval for this man was less than one year.

⁵⁴ After 1928, 27 (4 of whom had been placed on probation) of the 93 men were again convicted of crimes which according to the laws of Delaware carried the possible penalty of whipping, and 20 of these were found guilty of such crimes that had been committed in Delaware.

⁵⁵ The characteristics of these 120 prisoners were in many respects similar to those of the 93 who were convicted during 1928 in New Castle County of crimes for which they might have been whipped but were not. Of the 120 prisoners who were convicted during 1940, 98 percent had been found guilty of either breaking and entering, with intent, or larceny, 63 percent were white, 86 percent belonged to the age group 17 to 35 inclusive, 97 percent were Americans, 76 percent were either unskilled laborers or farm hands, 55 percent (49 percent of the whites and 64 percent of the negroes) had been convicted of some crime before 1940, and 43 percent (41 percent of the whites and 47 percent of the negroes) had been convicted of a major crime before 1940.

It now seems possible to summarize, in the following manner, some of the conclusions that may be drawn from the preceding discussion:

1. Criminals who were convicted of crimes for which they might have been whipped but were not, tended to be better educated, younger, less hardened in criminal habits, more often white, and more often found guilty of crimes against property (rather than crimes against the person) than those who were whipped.

2. The whipping of criminals did not effectively deter them, after their release from prison, from again committing a crime. Not only were many such persons (62%), after their first whipping, convicted of crimes, but a large number of them (49%) were found guilty of major offenses. Moreover, a high percentage (42%), after their first whipping, were convicted of crimes for which the laws of Delaware prescribed the penalty of whipping, and many (31%), after their first whipping, were found guilty of having committed such crimes in Delaware.

It is interesting to observe here that although many Delawareans are convinced that whipping is an efficacious punishment, the laws of Delaware, wherever they prescribe the possible penalty of whipping, also in every such case, except that of wife-beating, require the court to sentence the convicted person to imprisonment.⁵⁶ In the sentencing of wife-beaters, a fine may be imposed instead of a term of imprisonment. Apparently, then, the legislators believe that some penalty in addition to that of whipping is needed to curb criminal tendencies.

3. The subjection of criminals to more than one whipping was not effective in changing their criminal habits. After having received at least two whippings, many (65%) were again convicted of some crime, and a large percentage (57%) were found guilty of major crimes.

4. Negroes who had been whipped showed a greater tendency to continue their criminal

careers than did whites who had been similarly punished. After their first whipping, 65% of the negroes, as compared with 52% of the whites, were again convicted of some crime. Thus, the belief held by many in Delaware that the punishment of whipping is especially effective in dealing with negro criminals is not supported by the facts.

5. The use of imprisonment as a punishment for those who might have been whipped but were not, proved ineffective in deterring them, after their release from prison, from again committing a crime. Of such persons who were imprisoned during 1928 and 1940, 54% and 45% respectively were again convicted of some crime.

6. Probation was used with apparently mixed results in the handling of some of those who might have been whipped but were not. Of such persons who were placed on probation during 1928 and 1940, 42% and 22% respectively were again convicted of some crime.

7. The amount of recidivism was greater among those who had been whipped (62%) than it was among those who might have been whipped but were not (51% and 34% of those convicted in 1928 and 1940 respectively), and those who might have been whipped but instead were only imprisoned (54% and 45% of those convicted in 1928 and 1940 respectively); and there was the least amount of recidivism among those who might have been whipped but instead were placed on probation (42% and 22% of those convicted in 1928 and 1940 respectively).

It must be recognized, however, that this comparison is somewhat obscured by the combination of a number of factors. There was, in the first place, the element of selection in the processes of apprehension, prosecution, and punishment. Not all persons who committed crimes for which they might have been whipped were apprehended and prosecuted. It may be that the most skilful and hardened in crime eluded the law enforcement agencies and so their activities were not reflected in the police, court, and prison statistics. Furthermore, there was the tendency, as revealed by the examination of the prisoners' criminal records, of not whipping the better trained, the younger and the

⁵⁶The payment of a fine and/or a forfeit, as well as the penalties of whipping and imprisonment, is prescribed by law for some crimes, but in many cases the fines and forfeits are never paid.

less hardened in crime. This tendency possibly accounts to some extent for the lower rate of recidivism among those who were not whipped.

In addition, it should be remembered that those who were whipped also received terms of imprisonment as part of their sentences so that there is the possibility that both these methods of punishment affected the subsequent behavior of the prisoners. The problem is further complicated by the fact that some of those who were whipped were not only imprisoned but also fined.

Finally, there were other more subtle factors, many of which were not involved in the processes of law enforcement, that greatly affected, in varying degrees, both those who were whipped and those who might have been whipped but were not. The love of dear ones, the hatred of enemies, the encouragement of friends and relatives, the security or insecurity of economic and social position, the attitudes of guards and wardens—these and many other influences played in an unending stream upon the lives of those whose criminal careers were statistically analyzed in this study.

All this, of course, is just another way of saying that human beings do not live in a statistical vacuum and that each of us is a product of a multiplicity of environmental and hereditary influences. Even a slight insight into these congeries of human relationships could have been achieved only by an intensive case study of each prisoner. Nevertheless, despite the complexity of the problem, the available statistics do seem to indicate that neither whipping nor imprisonment effectively deterred those who had been so punished from again committing crimes. Perhaps it is significant that those who received the greatest amount of personal attention; i.e., those who were placed on probation, subsequently had the lowest rate of recidivism.

Delaware does not stand alone in her inability to cope with the problem of recidivism. All other states have been similarly unsuccessful, and, in fact, some have higher rates of recidivism than Delaware.⁵⁷ This nation-wide record of failure is not surprising since the United States continues to handle her prisoners in accordance with the outmoded principles of the philosophy of punishment. Despite the modifications that have been made in this philosophy during the past few decades, its chief aim is still the infliction of suffering upon the convicted criminal. The application of its principles has failed in Delaware just as it has failed in the other states, but Delaware's failure has been rendered conspicuous by her persistence in the use of the whipping post, a spectacular method of punishment. To attack the lash and to say nothing in condemnation of the philosophy of punishment, of which the "post" is but an expression, is, therefore, futile and misleading.⁵⁸ There is needed, not some change in the methods of punishment, but the elimination of the entire program of punishment itself, and the establishment, in its place, of a system of scientific treatment, with its emphasis upon the understanding of the causes of crime, the rehabilitation of the individual in terms of such causes, and the modification of the conditions which produce criminality.⁵⁹ Until this can be accomplished, no real progress will be made in society's efforts to deal with criminal behavior.

⁵⁷ Thorsten Sellin, Statistician for American Law Institute; Edwin H. Sutherland, *Principles of Criminology*, p. 585; Arthur E. Wood and John B. Waite, *Crime and Its Treatment*, pp. 353, 354.

⁵⁸ Robert G. Caldwell, *The New Castle County Workhouse*, p. 241.

⁵⁹ As Professor Sutherland points out, the infliction of suffering may be necessary in the process of scientific control, but such suffering is incidental, and not a direct aim of the process. (Edwin H. Sutherland, *Principles of Criminology*, p. 355.)

JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND ECONOMIC TREND

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I. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND ECONOMIC TREND

FLUCTUATIONS in the number of cases brought into Juvenile Court from year to year are of interest to the general public as well as to professional workers in this field and are interpreted in various ways, the interpretation frequently depending upon the prejudices or purposes of the observer. Thus, a public official may call attention to a decrease in the incidence of delinquency as evidence of the efficiency of his administration. Advocates of a particular delinquency prevention program are apt to cite such statistics as proof of the benefit of their particular program. Similarly, the opponents of a particular official or of a particular preventive program are quick to quote rising delinquency figures in support of their contention.

It happens that in many American communities there was a marked decline in the incidence of juvenile court cases between the years 1929 and 1934. As a result, in many cities individuals or agencies claimed credit for decreasing delinquency by virtue of this or that local policy or activity. Reports and publicity of this kind, moreover, frequently emphasized the thought that the decrease in delinquency was accomplished in spite of the increasing unemployment and economic distress of the depression. In other words, it was, and is today, generally taken for granted that juvenile delinquency increases in periods of depression and decreases in periods of prosperity. At the present time when there is so much discussion as to the effect of the war upon delinquency the interpretation of delinquency trends is strongly influenced by the popular belief that in times of increased employment and business activity a decrease in delinquency would ordinarily take place.

So fixed is this opinion in the minds,

not only of the general public, but of professional workers as well, that relatively little attention has been paid to the actual data of the past decade, and various attempts have been made to explain away data which point to a contrary conclusion. Yet, an understanding of the relationship between juvenile delinquency and economic trend is of great importance to Probation Officers and others concerned with the problem of delinquency, not only for purposes of administrative planning and because of its significance in attempts to evaluate various techniques and policies, but also because it throws a unique light upon certain causal factors which may not have been fully appreciated heretofore. Thus, whereas the deleterious effects of poverty and privation have been widely emphasized as causal factors, it has apparently not been sufficiently recognized that prosperity and economic expansion also involve certain factors that play an important role in the causation of delinquency.

II. PREVIOUS RESEARCH STUDY

The prevalence of the misconception as to the relationship between juvenile delinquency and economic trend may be due, in part, to the fact that numerous research studies have indicated that crimes against property committed by adults tend to increase in periods of depression. The studies referred to have been based upon criminal court statistics or prison statistics which of course relate principally, if not entirely, to crimes committed by adults. The conclusions thus based mainly or entirely upon data concerning adults have been rather loosely quoted as to crime in general, so that many people have the impression that a similar trend in juvenile delinquency has been authenticated.

Among the many research studies concerning the relationship between (adult) crime

and economic trend are those by Bonger,¹ Thomas,² Winslow,³ Van Kleeck,⁴ and Warner.⁵ These authorities are substantially in agreement in concluding that there is evidence of a tendency for crimes against property, such as theft, burglary and robbery, to increase in periods of economic depression and unemployment insofar as the incidence of such crime is reflected in the number of criminal prosecutions, convictions, or prison admissions. Unfortunately none of these writers called attention to the fact that the data used in their studies excluded all or most of the offenses committed by juveniles. In general, they refer in their conclusions to "crime," tacitly ignoring the great volume of criminal offenses committed by juvenile delinquents. Thus it is not surprising that the common belief that juvenile delinquency increases in periods of depression has been encouraged by casual references to the studies of Thomas and others which actually were not concerned with juvenile delinquency at all.

In view of the extensive literature concerning the relationship of adult crime to economic trend, it is strange that so little has been written concerning the relationship of juvenile delinquency and economic trend. In recent years, however, there has been some factual study of the question available in published form. Lunden⁶ presents data from several sources, but particularly from the Juvenile Court for Allegheny

County, Pennsylvania, for the years 1924 to 1934, revealing a definite decline in delinquency during the depression years. Lunden also cites a study made in Wayne County, Michigan, which indicated a positive correlation between the incidence of juvenile delinquency and business prosperity. Carr,⁷ reviews this material and adds further evidence from St. Clair County, Michigan, confirming the observation that delinquency tends to fluctuate in the same direction as the economic index, and not conversely as has been commonly supposed. Carr points out that the effect of economic trend upon juvenile delinquency is evidently different from that which it exerts upon adult criminality, and discusses various factors associated with prosperity which may account for the increase in delinquency during periods of prosperity. So far as the writer has been able to discover, there have been no studies specifically concerned with juvenile delinquency showing trends contradictory to those cited by Lunden and by Carr.

III. DELINQUENCY AND ECONOMIC TREND IN LOS ANGELES COUNTY

The conclusion that juvenile delinquency increases in periods of prosperity and decreases in periods of widespread unemployment and economic distress is given further support by the experience of the Los Angeles County Juvenile Court during the past sixteen years. The relationship between the incidence of juvenile court cases and the index of business activity in Los Angeles County during the years 1925 to 1941 is shown in the accompanying chart. The four curves plotted on this chart are as follows:

X. Business activity. This curve is based upon the index of business activity published by the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce. This index, using 1930 as the base year, represents a composite measure of bank debits, building permits, industrial employment, industrial power, telephones in use, new car registrations, and department store sales.

Y. School population. The index of school population was obtained from statistics provided by the office of the County Superintendent of

¹ Bonger, Wm. A., *Criminality and Economic Conditions*, Little Brown and Co., Boston, 1916.

² Thomas, Dorothy Swaine, *Social Aspects of the Business Cycle*, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1927.

³ Winslow, Emma, *Relationships between Employment and Crime as Shown by Massachusetts Statistics*, Report of U. S. National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, Vol. I, Part IV, U. S. Govt. Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1931.


⁴ Van Kleeck, Mary, *Notes on Fluctuations in Employment and in Crime in New York State*, Report of U. S. National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, Vol. I, Part V, U. S. Govt. Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1931.

⁵ Warner, Sam Bass, *Crime and Criminal Statistics in Boston*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1934.

⁶ Lunden, Walter A., *Systematic Sourcebook in Juvenile Delinquency*, University of Pittsburgh, 1938.

⁷ Carr, Lowell Juilliard, *Delinquency Control*, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1941.

TRENDS IN JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND IN BUSINESS ACTIVITY
LOS ANGELES COUNTY, 1925 TO 1941



ANNUAL INDICES BASED UPON THE YEAR 1930

- X Index of business activity
- Y Index of school population
- B Index of Juvenile Court petitions—boys
- G Index of Juvenile Court petitions—girls

Schools covering the total number of children in elementary schools, junior high schools, and high schools in Los Angeles County (including the City of Los Angeles). The total number for each year was divided by the total for the year 1930 in order to correspond to the index of business activity.

B. Juvenile court petitions—Boys. This curve represents an index of the annual number of Juvenile court petitions in boys' cases compared

to the number of such cases in 1930. The index was calculated by dividing the number of boys' cases in a given year by the total for 1930, omitting traffic cases in each instance. Traffic cases (Vehicle Code violations other than Negligent Homicide or driving a car without the owner's permission) were omitted because of the fact that since 1934 the bulk of such cases have been handled without the filing of a Juvenile Court petition, principally by referral

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to the Juvenile Traffic School, whereas in earlier years petitions were generally filed in such cases. Thus in 1929 there were some 1,287 boys brought into court for minor traffic violations as compared to 236 such cases in 1941. It may be stated that when the index was plotted with traffic cases included the general shape of the curve was not changed although the 1929 peak appeared considerably higher.

G. Juvenile Court petitions—Girls. The index for Juvenile Court petitions in girls' cases was computed in the same manner as that for boys.

Inspection of the chart reveals that while the index of school population showed practically continuous growth from 1925 to 1941, the curve of business activity ascended to a high point in 1929, then dropped sharply to a low point in 1933, rising again to high levels in the last few years.

The index for the boys' cases follows that of business activity to a remarkable extent, with the exception of the years 1933 and 1934, when the boys' cases increased while the business index continued to decline. Further analysis of the Juvenile Court cases reveals, moreover, that the discrepancy in 1933 and 1934 is probably due to the fact that during those years there were a large group of cases of transient boys brought into court for the purpose of effecting their return to legal residence. Unfortunately, such cases were not segregated in the 1933 annual report so that it is not possible to determine exactly how many there were in that year. The 1934 report, however, includes a classification of petitions which permit differentiation of the transient cases. Such cases numbered 581 in that year. Since the number of transient boys (among Juvenile Court cases) dropped rapidly thereafter, it seems evident that the rise in 1933 and 1934 was due to the extraneous factor of transiency. Actually, there were 228 such cases in 1935, 180 in 1936, 210 in 1941. An estimate of the number of boys' cases which would have been filed in 1934 if not for the abnormal number of transients is indicated by the small circle on the chart and illustrates the fact that 1933 or 1934 would probably have been the low point on the curve if this factor were eliminated. Thus we find that, eliminating

minor traffic cases and allowing for the extraneous factor of transiency cases, the index of boys' cases corresponds to the index of business activity to a remarkable extent, with only minor deviations in 1928 and in 1940.

The total number of boys' cases, exclusive of minor traffic cases, was advisedly used as the measure of delinquency in this study, even though it includes a small percentage of non-delinquent cases of neglect. Some explanation of the reasons for this procedure may be in order. In general it was done because most of the Juvenile Court cases in Los Angeles County are cases of delinquency in the usual sense of this term, and because it is virtually impossible to make a clear-cut distinction between cases of delinquency and cases of neglect without consulting the individual case file. The classification of boys' cases in 1941 may help to make this clear. In 1941 the majority of the boys' cases, (53.4 per cent) involved acts of stealing, such as auto theft, burglary, petty theft, etc. Other violations of law and other types of delinquency, such as malicious mischief, sexual misconduct, etc., comprised 25.2 per cent of the total number of cases. The remaining 21.4 per cent included cases of neglect as well as cases of delinquency. Most of these were filed under Subdivision B, Section 700, Juvenile Court Law, which is so worded as to apply to cases in which the child is without proper parental supervision, as well as to cases in which the parents are unable to control the child. Petitions concerning children brought into court because of minor offenses or misconduct or concerning small children who may have committed offenses, are frequently filed under this subdivision, so that without individual study of case records, which would be impractical in a review of this kind, it is not possible to determine statistically how many of these cases should be classified as delinquency and how many are simply neglect cases in the strict sense. (The Los Angeles County Juvenile Court does not handle ordinary dependency cases, as such cases are provided for by the County Bureau of Public Assistance.) It is probably safe to estimate

that about 90 percent of the boys' cases could be classified as cases of delinquency as this term is commonly used, the balance being cases of neglect or, in a few cases, mental deficiency. (.5 percent of the total number of cases were brought into court for the purpose of commitment to an institution for mental defectives.) It is believed that the small proportion of neglect cases brought into the Los Angeles Juvenile Court has not fluctuated widely from year to year in relation to the total number of Juvenile Court cases and there is reason to believe that if it were possible to eliminate the neglect cases the trend shown in the chart would not be materially altered. On the other hand, it has been found that the classification of cases, which depends upon which of the various subdivisions of the Juvenile Court Law was cited in filing the petition, is subject to considerable variation as a result of changes in personnel and due to the ambiguous use of Subdivision B. As a result of these considerations it was concluded that the total number of Juvenile Court cases, with the exception of traffic matters, provides a better measure of the incidence of delinquency over the period of years under consideration than could be obtained by a comparison of the number of cases in a particular category of offense or problem.

The wider question as to whether or not Juvenile Court Statistics provide a valid measure of the incidence of delinquency in the community is one upon which authorities differ. Carr⁸ in his analysis of this question clarifies some of the confusion created by unfounded generalizations which have been widely circulated in this matter. In regard to the present discussion, however, it may be pointed out that the correlation between Juvenile Court cases and economic trend, which has been observed in Los Angeles County, has also been reported in Pennsylvania and in Michigan, and in the absence of contrary findings elsewhere it seems most unlikely that this relationship could be the result of local administrative factors. As will be explained hereafter, however, the

number of Juvenile Court cases is probably more valid as an index of the extent of delinquency in the community in the case of boys than in the case of girls.

The curve for girls' cases also parallels the business index to a marked degree. However, there is a considerable deviation from the upward trend of the business index in 1939 and 1940. The meaning of this divergence is not entirely clear, but it seems probable that the rapid decline in the case load of relief agencies in 1939, 1940 and 1941 has played a part in depressing the number of petitions in girls' cases. Whereas police authorities are the referring source for almost all of the boys' cases, a considerable part of the girls' cases are ordinarily referred to the Juvenile Court by social agencies, particularly the public relief agencies. In the past three years there has been a tremendous drop in the number of families known to such agencies, unemployment relief having been drastically curtailed as the result of legislative action in 1940 and the State Relief Administration abruptly discontinued in 1941. There was also a decline of more than 30,000 unemployment relief cases in Los Angeles County in the year 1937. Thus social workers have been in contact with fewer families in recent years. On the other hand, the nature of the girls' cases is such that many of them might not have been brought into Juvenile Court except for the fact that a social worker was aware of the problem. In general, it may be said that whereas most of the boys come before the Juvenile Court because of stealing or other misconduct injurious to others, the bulk of the girls' cases are brought into court because of problems of personal behavior or sex difficulties which primarily endanger the welfare of the girl, rather than constituting offenses against others. Thus, while a majority of the boys were brought into court for stealing, this type of offense was responsible for less than 5 percent of the girls' cases in 1941. Some 68 percent of the girls were filed on under Subdivision B (lacking proper parental supervision or parents being unable to control the girls), the next largest group, sex problem cases, constituting more than 26 per-

⁸ *Op. cit.*

cent of the total number of cases.

The supposition that the number of girls' cases might have been higher in 1937, 1939, 1940, and 1941 if not for the decrease in social agency case loads, is supported by the fact that while the total number of girls' cases in 1941 was 9.4 percent higher than in 1940, the number of girls referred to Juvenile Court by social agencies in 1941 was 9 percent lower than the number referred by social agencies in 1940 and was 41 percent lower than the number referred by social agencies in 1938.

IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE POSITIVE CORRELATION BETWEEN JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND PROSPERITY

The fact that juvenile delinquency tends to increase in periods of economic prosperity suggests that some of the undesirable aspects of prosperity play a more decisive role in the causation of delinquency than has been generally recognized in the past. In particular, the disorganization of family life which is characteristic of periods of prosperity helps to explain the delinquency trend. In prosperous times the divorce rate increases and although it is more difficult to show statistically, the rate of marital separations undoubtedly increases also. The difficulty of finding employment and of supporting two households, which tends to hold the family together as an economic unit in depression years, loses much of its force at times when money flows more freely and jobs are easy to find. Moreover, the employment of women increases in prosperous times, the consumption of alcohol increases, and the patronage of commercialized recreation reaches higher levels. Thus in time of prosperity there is a tendency for parental supervision to be relaxed, parents and children are away from home and away from each other to a greater extent and family ties, which seem to grow stronger in the face of adversity, tend to be weakened. There are doubtless other factors which contribute to the increase in juvenile delinquency in prosperous years, such as the carelessness with which people handle property at such times, but it seems likely that the relaxation of parental supervision and

the tendency for family disorganization are of primary importance.

This explanation may help to account for the fact that juvenile delinquency does not react to economic depression in the same way as adult criminality. Whatever the factors are which deter adults from law breaking, parental supervision is probably not predominant, at least among older men. Thus, whereas the temptations and opportunities for stealing or other mischief are sharply limited by parental supervision in the case of children, adults are not so apt to be restricted in their activities by parental oversight, as they are by the routines of regular employment. Thus the combination of enforced idleness and financial need probably leads to the increase in adult offenses against property in periods of economic depression, while the weakening of parental supervision leads to increased juvenile delinquency in periods of prosperity. Obviously, there is no fixed age at which parental supervision gives way to adult responsibilities in all cases. In general, children of Juvenile Court age are still governed to a large extent by the habits and requirements of the parental home. Among offenders who come into the criminal courts, on the other hand, there are also many youths living at home who still are largely controlled by parental supervision, rather than by adult patterns of activity. This may be the reason that studies of the relationship of criminal court statistics to the business cycle have not shown stronger correlation. In other words, the criminal court cases probably include a younger element who are effected by economic trends very much as are juvenile delinquents, thus masking the effects of the economic cycle upon older groups. Analysis of criminal trends on an age group basis might prove enlightening on this point.

V. SUMMARY

The principal conclusions of this study of the relationship between juvenile delinquency and economic trends may be briefly summarized as follows:

1. Knowledge as to the actual relation-

ship between juvenile delinquency and economic trend is important for administrative planning, for evaluation of preventive programs, and for a better understanding of delinquency trends and causal factors.

2. It has been commonly supposed that juvenile delinquency tends to increase in periods of depression and to decrease in time of prosperity.

3. Research studies based upon criminal court statistics do not justify conclusions as to juvenile delinquency since such data are largely restricted to adult offenders.

4. Studies in Pennsylvania and in Michigan have indicated a strong positive relationship between the incidence of juvenile delinquency and the economic index (as opposed to the inverse relationship which has been

generally assumed).

5. Data from the Los Angeles County Juvenile Court confirm the findings of studies made in other parts of the country, indicating that juvenile delinquency increases in periods of prosperity and decreases in periods of economic depression.

6. Family disorganization characteristic of prosperous years is probably a dominant factor controlling the incidence of juvenile delinquency.

7. The opposite effect of economic trends upon juvenile delinquency and adult criminality suggests the desirability of further study, in different parts of the country, of the relationship between economic trends and criminality upon an age group basis.

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CRIME AND THE FRONTIER MORES*

MABEL A. ELLIOTT
University of Kansas

ALL sociologists and criminologists accept the idea that culture in its wider ramifications and that culture conflict in particular provide the matrix out of which much of the modern crime problem emerges. Thus, e.g., we recognize that race, class, national origins and the varying cultural patterns of social behavior provide important sources of cultural conflict and resultant anti-social behavior.

We sometimes forget, however, that the mainsprings of anti-social conduct are as much rooted in the past as they are a function of the present and that in America in particular, crime bears a significant relationship to the folkways and mores of the frontier. As a matter of fact there are numerous evidences that crime itself is written large in these same folkways and mores.

We have all heard the old story of how in Germany all which is allowable is forbidden, whereas in France all that is forbidden is "allowed." In our country we might go even further in asserting that lawlessness has been a part of the devices of social control, and that crimes have been committed which have not only been tacitly allowed, but have had the acceptance and approval of the group. Herein we have an explanation of the confounding confusion presented by the white collar criminal, the corrupt politician, and the ethics of the "robber Barons."

Obviously the American frontier did not develop from any single matrix, nor did they pass on any single matrix to later generations. The frontier folkways and mores of New England contrasted sharply to those of Cavalier Virginia. For Puritan New England paid excessive attention to rigid personal behavior and the penal laws of Colonial New England did not distinguish between vice, sin or crime. With all the intensity with which the Puritans revolted against

the laxities and licentiousness of the members of the established Church in England, they set about to exact rigid standards of sex behavior, sobriety and simplicity in dress. Sober zealots that they were, these early dissenters failed to recognize that England was passing through an economic and intellectual revolution occasioned by the tremendous changes of the times. (1) One was transition from the agricultural to an urban economy. (2) Even more important, perhaps, was the development of the mercantile system, the result of the explorations of the new world. (3) But above all was the importance we may attach to the intellectual impact of the extensions in geographical knowledge. Think what it must have meant to the placid clergy and laity alike to have their conception of the nature of the universe completely upset by the discovery of the Americas and the subsequent discovery that the earth was round.

Probably no discovery in history so touched the imagination of the common man or so completely lowered the prestige of the scholar who more often than not was the cleric as well. Today leaders in the church recognize that economic and social upheavals inevitably disrupt the church as a social institution and the church members as individuals in a disorganized society. Our Puritan forebears saw only one explanation, namely the willful sins of the flesh.

While the Cavalier South, generally speaking, was not so rigid in the restraints imposed as was New England, even so, stringent rules soon went into effect in an attempt to curb excesses. The Virginia House of Burgesses organized in 1619 passed many detailed regulations of conduct. One law referred to drunkenness which provided that for the first offense the minister reprove the culprit privately, the second time publicly, the third time the offender was to be put in the irons for twelve hours and fined in addition. For any further offenses more se-

* Presented to the Thirty-eighth Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Society, New York, December 5, 1943.

vere punishments were to be inflicted. Here we have a precursor of the habitual offender acts passed in Virginia in 1849¹ and in Massachusetts even earlier, in 1817² and of course more lately revised in the famous Baumes Laws of New York in 1926.

Despite the differences in religious ideology, the populations of Virginia and New England were both basically British; hence differences were not so deep-seated as the early colonists themselves may have imagined. In Colonial Virginia, criticism of those in political authority was strictly forbidden. Swearing was subject to fine; selling arms to an Indian earned life imprisonment. Any man or woman who played with the affections of another was subject to fine or whipping, while fornication and adultery were severely condemned.³

Even so there was a time when the Episcopal Church in Virginia was exceedingly corrupt, when some of the clergy were guilty of the very sins against which they preached.⁴ In consequence more than half of the Virginians turned Dissenter by the time of the Revolution. We shall not review the history of Virginia. Suffice it to say here that, even so, the Cavaliers continued to dominate Virginia and after the Restoration of Charles II many Loyalist families came to Virginia to look after their royal land grants. Of course not all of the early Virginians were the landed aristocracy, but nevertheless Virginia society always possessed an aristocratic character, an aristocracy unmatched in the greater austerity and intellectualism that was New England.

Counterpart to the aristocracy of Virginia was the rigid caste system occasioned by the influx of indentured whites and the introduction of Negro slaves. The criminals transported from England and the free but impecunious men who staked themselves to employers for their passage and the Negro slaves all contributed to the development of

the caste system in the South. This in turn gave rise to the discriminatory criminal law of the South. Fears of uprisings and rebellion of the slaves were partially responsible for such discrimination. In consequence, statutory provision was made that a runaway slave might be killed if he resisted attempts to seize him. He was also liable to emasculation for no white woman was considered safe. Any master who murdered a slave could not be punished. Testimony of a slave was not admissible either as evidence or information save when one of his own race was on trial for life.⁵ Slaves could not be freed except for meritorious service and this on license of the Governor and Council.⁶ By these early provisions the mores of the Englishman on the Virginia frontier were altered to meet his rationalizations as to the inferiority of the slave. The laws governing the colonial slaves set the standard for the treatment of the Negro which has persisted to the present day. From this cultural heritage present day discriminations may be traced.

This then was the dual moral code of the Virginia gentlemen. And it is the gentlemen, we must remember, that has always been the voice of the articulate upper and upper middle class which have written the laws of our nation. On the whole, Virginians were a high type of settler and generally speaking there was much less lawlessness in Virginia than that which later characterized North Carolina. Colonial North Carolina was in a sense Virginia's frontier into which the unsuccessful and shiftless poor whites from Virginia pushed seeking better times. Here, too, was a mecca for the escaped outlaws and the runaway indentured servants of Virginia and South Carolina. Life was simple and rough and in general lacked much of the polish and refinement so characteristic of life in Charleston or on the Virginia plantation. It is then in North Carolina that we have the earliest prototype of what we have come to think of as the lawless frontier. While crimes ran high on the mainland of North Carolina,

¹ *Code of Virginia* (1849), Chapter 109.

² *Massachusetts Laws* (1817), Chapter 176.

³ John Fiske, *Old Virginia and Her Neighbors*, Houghton Mifflin and Company, Boston, 1897, Vol. I, pp. 245-248.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 262.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 197-198.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 199.

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⁷ *Ibid.*

pirates were also ransacking the coast. Threats to life, property and common decency were so frequent that lynch law became widespread as a popular protest against this flaunting of the rights of free men.

North Carolina was almost entirely rural, with no urban centers or organized facilities for social control. There was no organized religion; in fact, Fiske tells us there was not even one clergyman until 1703, while no schools were opened until shortly before the Revolution.⁷ Somewhat later the Scotch-Irish migrations which began about 1719 altered the character of social life in the colony by the newcomers' insistence upon an orderly regime.

Unable to endure the new regulations, the less tractable elements of the population sought the frontier again. This time the frontier lay to the west, and the "poor whites" and the more adventurous of the better stock pushed toward the Alleghenies. Some stayed in the mountains and became the isolated Southern mountaineers. Others pushed beyond the Alleghenies and made their way across Tennessee, others to Missouri and Illinois. In the mythology of American folklore the lineal descendants of the degraded Carolinians are said to have figured in the desperadoes of Memphis and in Quantrill's raid on Lawrence, Kansas, where my own fair university is located.

These stories are undoubtedly gross exaggerations. Certainly no sociologist gives much credence to the biological heritage theory of criminality. Nor can we ascribe the settlement of the West primarily to lawless degeneracy. Out of the West have come some of the finest types of American men and women. But the restive spirit of the pioneer has created much of the pattern of freedom and liberty which has been so characteristic a part of our American way of life. Herein we have the origins of the American rejection of the restraining influences of group life in the cities, a rejection made possible by the existence of the vast open spaces where a man could exist without tribute to tax collectors, or law makers, and if he moved fast

enough he did not need to defer even to his neighbor's opinion.⁸

Let us turn for a moment from the escape from law and order which the plains country afforded to the piracy upon the high seas. The freedom of the seas which is one of the freedoms for which men fight today has been the result of the extension of ideas of law and order to the control of ocean traffic-ways. Piracy, or the looting of vessels at sea, ranked high among the economic crimes of the two centuries of our history. The origins of piracy must be traced to the earliest days of seagoing vessels. Piracy was, however, a characteristic type of illegal economic enterprise in our early history. In fact the period from 1632 to 1827 was one marked by excessive plundering of our merchant ships from colonial days until the combined navies of Britain and the United States abolished piracy in the Atlantic.⁹

During the colonial period, piracy developed largely as a result of the attempts of the Mother Country to control American trade through restrictive legislation. In the South such piracy was not only condoned, it was actively supported by at least two governors of Carolina.¹⁰ Political corruption is thus part of our political folkways and mores.

The Navigation Acts of 1661 and 1663, which restricted trade to the Mother Country seemed bad enough, but the subsequent Stamp Act levying a tax on tea, and the Molasses Act which placed such a prohibitive duty on rum, sugar and molasses were virtually non-enforced. Moreover in the development of smuggling and contraband trade there was such popular approval given to illicit trade that it achieved a status very comparable to that of a legitimate trade. To make a long story short, the British attempts to enforce legal restrictions were turned over to American privateers for the simple reason that there was no American navy.

⁷ Cf. *Ibid.*, Vol. II, Chapter XV, "The Carolina Frontier."

⁸ Cf. George Wycherly, "Pirates and Piracy on American Coasts," *Dictionary of American History*, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1940, Vol. IV, pp. 277-278.

⁹ John Fiske, *op. cit.*, pp. 362-363.

Later, during the Revolutionary War, American privateers played an important part in the capture of British vessels. Following the Revolution these privateers did not long continue to serve the interests of the state, however. After the War of 1812, many actually turned pirates themselves.¹¹ The spoils of war thus gave a compelling impetus to continue the plundering of merchant vessels in peace time. We cannot digress into any exhaustive analysis of piracy here. As students of crime we recognize the illegal character of piracy, but we may point out that the official support of piracy was also a revolt against the controls and restrictions which the British tried to place on colonial trade. By these same controls the seeds of the American revolution were sown, hence piracy was in one sense a demand for freedom and liberty. Yet we must also admit that piracy forms an important initial chapter in the trail of the gangster on the American scene. The pirate was in a sense the progenitor of the rum-runner who figured so significantly in the mad lawlessness of the more recent Prohibition era.

It was, as we have stated, the lawless, the reckless and adventurous, who ventured beyond the settled life of the Carolinas to stake out a new existence in the mountain country to the west, and to penetrate into the wilderness beyond. It was restless pioneers such as these who made this venture, who chopped down the trees, plowed the plains, tilled the soil, discovered the mineral wealth and opened up oil fields of the nation. With reckless abandon they and others following in their footsteps exploited the natural resources of our country.

The historical importance of the frontier has found its best expression in the classic work of Frederick J. Turner. None has excelled his description of the Westward course of civilization in our vast commonwealth. For with the ever-receding frontier any man with sufficient energy might clear a spot in the wilderness and secure for him-

¹¹ Cf. William M. Robinson, Jr., "Privateers and Privateering," *Dictionary of American History, op. cit.*, Vol. IV, pp. 349-350.

self a goodly competence through the effective assistance of our homestead laws.

In this conquering of the wilderness we may trace the roots of our particular brand of democracy. Here has developed the exaggerated individualism of the plains and mountain country and our much vaunted American standard of living.

Life on the Western frontier presented many variations. Opening up the fertile prairies was a relatively calm and peaceful business. There was, however, sufficient inland banditry and enough piracy in the steamboat trade to lend color and vitality to the tranquillity of the Ohio and Mississippi valleys. The opening up of the great agricultural states of the North Central area was, in the main, dependent upon orderly men willing to assume the necessary routine tasks. Men engaged in wresting a living from the soil have little occasion for sharp disputes or violent combat. Hence the great agricultural middle west, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota and Wisconsin, took on the general orderliness of life characteristic of New England. In these regions the strong motif of Puritanism developed. At the same time the folkways, mores and laws of New England were transplanted to the Western scene. Thus Iowa and Eastern Kansas became more New English than New England.

Those who were seeking a fortune in the Far West and especially those who invaded the mining sections of the Rocky Mountains were pioneers of different character. It is true that many sturdy and courageous men of honor were tempted by considerations of the economic opportunities and advantageous climate to participate in the development of Colorado, Montana, Wyoming, California and the Oregon Country. But here also came the flotsam, outlaws from Eastern states, ex-convicts made bitter by real or fancied injustice, desperadoes. The Western frontier became in fact the haven of refuge for the horse and cattle thief of Nebraska and Kansas, for the escaped burglar from an Eastern penitentiary, for the counterfeiter who might have new opportunity to ply his illicit vocation. Paroled convicts came from Australia,

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while Mexican outlaws swelled the numbers.¹²

In fact the background of many of our pioneers was so disreputable that a special code of etiquette arose for conversing with strangers. As one Westerner put it:

"Never ask a stranger where he came from or he may draw a trigger. He may very well have come from jail."

Indeed too much inquisitiveness, as Everett Dick expresses it, was "an invitation to gunplay."¹³

In California the signs of the times were well expressed in a song of the day:

"Oh what was your name in the States?
Was it Thompson or Johnson or Bates?
Did you murder your wife
And fly for your life?
Say, what was your name in the States?"¹⁴

Legal, religious and educational institutions and controls were virtually non-existent in the mining camps and mountain frontiers. Here, too, there were few women. This meant there was little of the conserving influence of good women or the stabilizing values of family life. The distorted sex ratio in the almost exclusively male population was undoubtedly a factor in the frontier crime rates. This distorted sex ratio brought the inevitable influx of scarlet women who became the hostesses of the gambling dens and night clubs and the dancing partners at the "Hurdy-gurdy" houses which offered the combined facilities of a bar, gambling house and dance hall.

Shooting scrapes and jealous quarrels over the attentions of these willing ladies, were a frequent accompaniment of strong liquor,

frustrated impulses and the code of the times. According to the latter, no red-blooded man was expected to take silently the curses and insults of his rivals. Personal insults, however much deserved, demanded immediate action. If a mountaineer was denounced as a liar, a thief, or by less mentionable epithets he did not hesitate to annihilate his slanderer. The mountaineer was quick on the trigger, aimed well, and without remorse. Thus we may account for the emotional origins of many a mountaineer murderer. Life was cheap, but honor was long on the Western frontier.

Climate, we may say parenthetically, may have added to the murder rate. At least high altitude is said to be irritating, and may have contributed to the resentment occasioning explosive murders.

A large share of frontier crimes were economic in motivation. Vast sums of money were afloat in the West and this, too, stimulated an invasion of outlaws and hoodlums. It was common practice in the cattle country to drive thousands of cattle up the long trail from the Southwest to the markets. First these markets were in Illinois, Missouri and Arkansas, but later as the railroads pushed west, they were in Abilene, Great Bend and Fort Dodge, Kansas, and finally in Utah, Nevada, Colorado and Wyoming.¹⁵ When the cattle were delivered, payment was made in cash and thousands of dollars were turned over to the rangers because of the lack of banking facilities. Often the rangers were forced to protect the gold and silver in their saddle bags with their lives, and many a life was lost. Sometimes the life was that of a cattleman, sometimes it was the quick-shooting outlaw's. Even the United States Marshals appointed to preserve law and order often had no other recourse than to shoot it out.

Many folktales have grown up in the Western plains country about the quick justice and lynch law of the men who subdued the

¹² Cf. Thomas J. Dimsdale, *The Vigilantes of Montana*, McKee Printing Company, Butte, Montana, 1929, Chapter I (Seventh printing); cf. also Stewart Edward White, *The Last Frontier in Chronicles of America Series* (Allen Johnson, Editor), Yale University Press, New Haven, Vol. XVI, Chapter II, and James G. Leyburn, *op. cit.*, p. 215.

¹³ Everett Dick, *Vanguards of the Frontier*, D. Appleton-Century Company, Inc., New York, 1941, p. 389.

¹⁴ Cf. Joseph Henry Jackson, *Anybody's Gold*, D. Appleton-Century Company, Inc., New York, 1941, for an account of the flotsam in California.

¹⁵ Cf. Emerson Hough, "The Cattle Trails," Chapter II in *The Passing Frontier*, Vol. XVI of *Chronicles of America Series* (Allen Johnson, Editor), Yale University Press, New Haven, 1918.

wilderness quite as often with a six-shooter as with the plow and ax. Old-timers in Kansas can still recount the exciting adventures "West of Salina," at Dodge City and Abilene. In the parlance of the day "there was no law west of Leavenworth," although common law was theoretically enforceable by territorial governments. Boot Hill Cemetery outside of Dodge City is silent testimonial to the days when gambling, hard liquor and hold-ups were outstanding accompaniments of the pay-off at the end of the cattle trail. Men either went about their own business peaceably or met with prompt and decisive lynch law.

In the silver and gold mining camps, riches were more fabulous than in the cattle country. In a Montana mountain valley ten thousand miners extracted more than ten million dollars worth of gold in a year. Between Virginia City, Montana, and Salt Lake City there lay a wilderness of four hundred and seventy-five miles. Organized crime grew apace. Clever scoundrels posed as honest men. One of the most active outlaws was Henry Plummer who got himself elected sheriff for two communities, Virginia City and Bannock, Montana. As a law enforcement officer he was naturally able to obtain information about shipments of gold by express. He also purported to be an expert mining engineer. In consequence he and his road agents were able to perpetrate some of the most astounding crimes in American history. While pretending to be in the pursuit of robbers fleeing from justice, he and his "road agents" are known to have killed one hundred and two men in their plunderous activities.¹⁶ Finally the outraged citizens organized a Vigilantes Committee for the purpose of eliminating this road agent band. In short order they executed twenty-four of these early racketeers along with other marauders.¹⁷ These two Montana communities are representative of the general lawlessness which flourished all over the West. On the Pacific coast there were mining camps

of similar varieties. Here too crimes were settled for the most part by lynch law which afforded the "popular tribunals" of the period.

In Texas a more highly organized group, the Texas Rangers, fulfilled something of the functions of the popular tribunals of Colorado, Wyoming and California. In Texas the frontier problem was both political and geographic. At first the Rangers were a privately financed organization which aimed to overcome the stealing and the interracial conflicts in an area in which Mexicans, Anglo-Americans and Indians were all striving for supremacy. In 1834 Austin called a meeting of American militia-men to put down Indian uprisings and a force of twenty to thirty full time Rangers was created. These men were soldiers in the saddle, but at the same time they were also illegal agents of the United States government, since Texas was at that time under Mexican rule. These Rangers incidentally became known as the "horse marines" because of their capture of some Mexican vessels.¹⁸

Following Texas' admission to the Union, the Texas Rangers made continuous war on the Indian tribes.¹⁹ Later during the Civil War the Texas Rangers were subordinated to the demands of the Confederacy and virtually passed out of existence. With the carpet-bag government organized in 1870, Governor Davis sponsored their rebirth in the creation of a state police. Murderers and other felons were rounded up with a notorious amount of lawlessness on the part of the police entrusted with the task.²⁰ Close upon this upheaval the Texas legislature created two military forces for protection of the frontier. One was the Frontier Battalion to control the Indians to the West, the other the Special Force of Rangers charged with suppressing bandits on the Mexican border.²¹ As time passed their duties changed. The great cattle country became a mecca for cattle thieves who were dealt with summarily

¹⁶ Emerson Hough, *supra*, cf. also Thomas Dimsdale, *op. cit.*

¹⁷ Thomas J. Dimsdale, *op. cit.*, p. 15, cf. also Emerson Hough, *op. cit.*, p. 77.

¹⁸ Walter P. Webb, *The Texas Rangers*, Houghton-Mifflin, Boston 1935, Chapters I and II.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, Chapter VIII.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, Chapter XI.

²¹ *Ibid.*, Chapter XII.

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²² *Ibid.*

by the pistol. On the Mexican border bandits were continually stealing sheep, cattle, and saddle horses. Mexico was at the same time in the throes of a revolution and this presented other problems.

With our entry into World War I, the menace of German spies crossing the border from Mexico created new problems, and it must be admitted that the Texas Rangers themselves were guilty of many irregular activities. They virtually took the law into their own hands. Following the war a legislative investigation resulted in the Ranger force being drastically reduced. Frontier problems came to be of little importance as friendly relations grew up with our neighbors to the South. In consequence the Rangers were reduced in 1935 to two mounted companies and a headquarters company. Border troubles are now wholly in the hands of the United States Army and a highway patrol is now assigned to take the Rangers' place in regulating public safety.²²

Thus briefly we may summarize some of the major characteristics of anti-social behavior on the frontier. With the exhaustion of free lands, marked alterations in our social and economic structure appeared and freedom in its more absolute nature was, so to speak, dethroned. So long as there were new wildernesses to conquer any man with sufficient energy and initiative could make a living. No one bothered much about the general laxities in business honesty and financial integrity and in consequence there was little restriction. If a man felt hampered by competitive forces he could always "go West." Social controls were at a minimum and if the sound of the neighbor's ax seemed menacing he could move further West.

Once free lands were exhausted, despite the numerous places which were sparsely settled, the population seemed nevertheless excessive. Immediately demands arose to restrict immigration. Increasingly the defenses of a pioneer democracy shifted from free land to social legislation. Instead of moving when he heard the sound of the neighbor's ax, the sons of the pioneer demanded, as

Turner has pointed out, a muffling of the ax!²³

Our population has settled down and in consequence innumerable measures have been adopted regulating business, health, sanitation, education and, altogether naturally, conduct. Criminal codes have in fact been so expanded as to include many types of behavior previously considered to be within the prerogative of free men. Bankers, once the most respected men of our economic hierarchy, are now languishing in State and Federal prisons for conduct which was once more or less accepted as common banking practise.

The great increase in our urban population and the enormous increase in the nature and variety of our material culture traits have been additional factors which have promoted the need for social legislation in recent years. That the era of social legislation has not ushered in the millennium but has instead created new crimes by redefining old practices is apparent to the least discerning among us. Even so, social legislation is silent witness to an increase in social consciousness. Such legislation does not implement of itself any automatic uprooting of deep seated patterns, however. When the social historian of the future writes the history of the epic period from 1896 to 1950 he will unquestionably find something naively comic in the American belief that "there ought to be a law" and in their attempts to solve their problems by writing laws without reeducation of the populace in the need for reevaluating basic patterns of human existence.

For out of our lawless heritage from frontier days many of the culture patterns of present day criminal behavior may be traced. Professor Sutherland startled American business men when he delivered his Presidential address to the American Sociological Society on the White Collar Criminal. This White Collar Criminal, whether he be business man or professional politician, is, I believe, a functional product of our frontier mores, the inevitable by-product of the customs and

²² Frederick L. Turner, *The Frontier in American History*, Henry Holt and Company, New York, 1920, p. 32.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 567.

the habits of a people impatient of restraints and controls. The unorganized social processes of pioneer society have left their cultural residue in the opposition to restrictive legislation, and in the amazingly elastic constructions which have been placed upon governmental regulations. This is no place to digress upon the constructions placed upon "constitutional rights," but it should be mentioned in passing that the constitution which was drawn up with the idea of protecting the submerged individual has been so manipulated that it has become the means of protecting the corporation from governmental regulation "without due process of law." This latter term has been so stretched as to subsume practically any unwanted interference in control of industry.²⁴

But let us turn to more recent evidences of the persistence of frontier behavior patterns. A few years ago a former Governor of a Western state now serving in the U. S. Senate gave full pardon to a man serving a sentence for embezzlement because of threats made to the Governor by business friends of the embezzler. Unless he did so these friends promised to "tell all they knew about the Governor." The Governor pardoned the man, and kept the matter from the public, although his conduct was strictly illegal and technically made the Governor an accomplice to the crime.

²⁴ Cf. Thurman Arnold, *The Folklore of Capitalism*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1937, especially Chapter II.

Rationing, which strikes at the heart of the consumer's habits, has been most laxly enforced in the West. Investigate for yourself if you believe that speed rules or gasoline rationing are enforced in the great open spaces of Western Kansas or Colorado. Lynchings of Negroes have been less frequent in recent years, but lynchings still persist in the South and without penalty for the lynchers.

Obviously it is far from this author's belief that the frontier mores explain all or most of our crime rate. Nevertheless, the frontier culture constitutes an important part of our social heritage and explains much of the American's rejection of and disrespect for formal legislative controls. Unlike our European cousins we have had our most serious frontier problems within our own borders. Perhaps, one might add facetiously, herein is one explanation why crime is writ large in the American mores—just as the mores are written in the lack of social consciousness of our forebears. In Europe, on the other hand, there has been much respect for laws within national boundaries, whereas cultural conflicts have led to war. As Turner has pointed out, ours is a democracy born of free land and such a democracy "strong in selfishness and individualism, intolerant of administrative experience and education and pressing individual liberty beyond its proper bounds, has its dangers as well as its benefits."²⁵

²⁵ Frederick L. Turner, *ibid.*

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OFFICIAL REPORTS and PROCEEDINGS



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President Vance has appointed the following as representatives at the Annual Meeting of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, to be held at the Benjamin Franklin Hotel, Philadelphia, April 14-15, 1944: Edward P. Hutchinson, J. S. Burgess, and Stanley H. Chapman.

CHAIRMEN OF SECTIONS, 1944 MEETING

SOCIAL RESEARCH, Raymond V. Bowers, Selective Service, 21st & C St. N.W., Washington, D.C.; POPULATION, Dorothy S. Thomas, University of California; SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, Richard T. LaPiere, Stanford University; COMMUNITY AND ECOLOGY, C. Arnold Anderson, Iowa State College; SOCIOOMETRY, Raymond F. Sletto, University of Minnesota; SOCIAL THEORY, Logan Wilson, University of Kentucky; FAMILY, Harriet R. Mowrer, 727 Monticello Place, Evanston, Ill.; CRIMINOLOGY, Mabel A. Elliott, University of Kansas; POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY and possibly others to be announced.

CURRENT ITEMS



NOTES ON RESEARCH AND TEACHING THE RELATION OF THE PRIMARY SOCIAL ATTITUDE VARIABLES TO "NATIONAL MORALE"

LEONARD W. FERGUSON

Metropolitan Life Insurance Company

The purpose of this study is to determine the relationships between three primary social attitude variables and "national morale." The problem was undertaken in order to clarify the meaning of "national morale," and to ascertain how well it may be described in terms of the dimensions provided by the primary attitude variables.

During the week of October 12 to 18, 1941, 139 elementary psychology students at the University of Connecticut were asked to respond to the questions in the *Washington State Survey of Opinions*¹ and the primary attitude scales: I—*Religionism*, II—*Humanitarianism*, and III—*Nationalism*.² Scores on the *Washington State Survey* were to serve as the index of "national morale"; attitudes measured by the primary social attitude scales are obvious from their titles.

The correlations between each of the primary attitude scales and the "national morale" scores of the *Washington State Survey* were as follows:

"National morale" and <i>Religionism</i>	.23
"National morale" and <i>Humanitarianism</i>	.03
"National morale" and <i>Nationalism</i>	.32

Two of the correlations are significant at the 1 percent level, but the other one is not significant at any level. The correlations indicate that "national morale" is related to *Religionism* in such a way that the more religious one is the higher his feelings of "national morale"; and is related to *Nationalism* in such a way that the

¹ Miller, D. C., "The measurement of national morale," *American Sociological Review*, 6: 487-498, Aug. 1941; "Effect of the War on the National Morale of American College Students," *American Sociological Review*, 7: 631-644, Oct. 1942. For full text of the *Washington State Survey of Opinion*, see 6: 497 or 7: 636.

² Ferguson, L. W., "The Measurement of Primary Social Attitudes," *J. Psychol.*, 10: 199-205, 1940; "The Isolation and Measurement of Nationalism," *J. Soc. Psychol.*, 16: 215-228, 1942.

more nationalistic one is the higher his feelings of "national morale." "National morale" is apparently unrelated to *Humanitarianism*.

The correlations of "national morale" with *Religionism* and *Nationalism* require further scrutiny. If one were to accept them at face value their comparison would suggest that feelings of "national morale" are possibly more closely related to nationalistic attitudes than to religious attitudes. This conclusion does not possess statistical significance but it gains support from a consideration of the partial correlations between *Religionism* and "national morale" with *Nationalism* held constant; and between *Nationalism* and "national morale" with *Religionism* held constant. The former correlation (i.e., between *Religionism* and "national morale") is reduced from .23 to .10; while the latter correlation (i.e., between *Nationalism* and "national morale") is reduced from .32 to .25. Only the correlation between *Nationalism* and "national morale" remains significant. Obviously this correlation is not high enough to make individual predictions very accurate, but it gives weight to the assertion that "national morale" bears a significant relationship to nationalistic attitudes.

The mean primary attitude scores³ of those who agree and of those who disagree with each of the eighteen statements included in the *Washington State Survey* tend to verify the conclusions reached above. In all except two instances those who give the answer indicating a high degree of "national morale" have as a group a more nationalistic score than those who give the opposing answer. In 15 instances they have the more religious scores, but as explained earlier this is most probably due to the relationship that exists between *Religionism* and *Nationalism*. The latter attitude appears to be the principal functional variable.

A NOTE ON A NEW FIELD COURSE

MIRRA KOMAROVSKY
Barnard College

In the summer of 1943 Barnard College offered a six-week field course entitled "A Workshop in Urban Social Problems." Field courses are relatively new and a brief description of

* Data available from author.

this recent experiment may be of interest to teachers of Sociology.

Sixteen juniors and seniors, all with previous training in sociology, were admitted to the course out of a much larger number of applicants. The course carried 8 points of credit which meant that the students gave it all their time for six weeks.

As the title indicates, the course dealt with urban social problems. Following a background consideration of urban society the discussion centered on selected urban problems such as the problems of racial and cultural minorities, housing, and juvenile delinquency. New York City materials were utilized to the utmost in the study of the historical emergence of the problem, in current statistics, and charts, in field trips to various areas and institutions of the city, in the numerous opportunities afforded the students to meet informally over "cider and doughnuts" with community leaders, judges, social workers, government officials, heads of institutions, and so on.

But, it is the field work proper which, more than anything else, fulfilled the purpose of the course "to utilize New York City as a laboratory for the study of urban problems." This is how the course was organized. Four two-hour morning meetings were given over to the theoretical core of the course. A full day and an afternoon were spent in the field. The other afternoons were given over to field trips, guest lecturers and informal discussions. One afternoon and the week-end were left free for reading and relaxation.

The field projects were planned very carefully. Indeed, the instructors spent the whole month preceding the opening of the summer session in planning these projects. By and large, they involved placements in various social agencies. The better the agency, the more responsibility it feels for the training of its student volunteers, and the more reluctant it is to accept any. How to provide for the student a really rich educational experience without imposing unfair burdens upon busy staffs? This problem proved soluble because of the good will and devotion to education on the part of some excellent agencies, but not before hours were spent in selecting projects and carefully matching students and agencies.

To illustrate the projects: three students made a study of a cottage plan institution for delinquent girls. They ate, worked, played with the girls, accompanying them on the daily routine, and also attended staff conferences with

cottage parents, psychiatrists and social workers. An elaborate outline for the study of institutions guided the students in their observations. Two students worked in a district office of a first-class family case work agency. Another group worked in the Children's Court under the supervision of a private agency. A Child Guidance Clinic and a settlement were the locale of two other projects. Each student kept a diary of daily observations which she submitted together with a written summary and an oral report to the class at the end of the course.

An attempt was made to integrate these various experiences through a theory of social problems, but it was not in the over-all integration that the unique features of the course lay. The main purpose of the course was to afford the student opportunities for personal first-hand contacts with social situations. A teacher of social science attempts to interpret social reality by means of concepts and generalizations which are a kind of a verbal shorthand denoting complex aspects of reality. There is no greater educational danger than this: that the students learn these concepts on a purely verbal level without the richness and fullness of meaning; that this body of words remains a sterile segment of mentality, relatively unrelated to the confused stream of life which it sought to interpret.

The immersion of students into concrete reality situations helped to guard them against this danger. First of all, the students were exposed to a multitude of "first-time-in-my-life" actual contacts with a "juvenile delinquent," a "union leader," a "social agency client," a Children's Court, a housing project, a health center, a City Council meeting. Students lead sheltered lives, and even an experienced instructor would doubtlessly be shocked if he could glimpse into the student's mind at the mention of these words. The images which ordinarily flood the memory would contain the color of the textbook, a blackboard diagram, a picture of the instructor in the course, or, even worse, shadowy stereotypes charged with emotion. After a day spent in a girls' reformatory one student, for example, could not get over the fact that the inmates "did not look like delinquents." One wonders at the image the student must have had to be so amazed that a delinquent could not be discovered at a glance! This lack of realism provides a fertile soil for confusion and prejudice.

But the contribution of the course went be-

yond the value just described. It helped to break the wall separating experiences of the student from classroom conceptualizations. The two streams interpenetrated. This is of course the goal of all education, but there is some evidence that the course was more than usually successful in this respect. In the absence of measuring devices, the following evidence is culled from the impressions of the instructor and the students.

The level of student interest was unusually high. The two-hour class meeting was too short for all the questions aroused by the previous day's experiences. Students stayed on almost invariably beyond the official closing time. Apparently an immense reservoir of natural curiosity was tapped by field experiences.

Students adduced *their own* (rather than the instructor's) illustrations of the concepts presented in class. Class discussions and written work abounded in: "As I observed last week," "But this was not my experience yesterday," and so on. This two-way process between observation and theory was particularly apparent in their field projects.

Students testified to many exploded stereotypes. While deep-rooted prejudices no doubt remained, many clichés of thinking were shaken by experiences. A student who had thought any government agency necessarily freer than one supported by private funds, and another who held the reverse view—both exhibited greater flexibility in their thinking at the end of the period.

The main danger of the course such as this is a failure to integrate the observations through a body of theory. The temptation to scatter field work over too wide an area must be resisted. One expedient used in this course consisted in having rather narrowly defined individual projects fitted into a broader setting of lectures and reading.

The instructor emerged with a conviction that a course of this sort has an important place in an undergraduate curriculum. The optimum time for it is perhaps the summer following the junior year. The previous systematic training will enable the student to make use of the field work, which in its turn will revitalize the academic work of the senior year. A number of field courses have been given in recent years. The time is ripe perhaps for a more detailed exchange of observations concerning successes and failures either in the pages of our journals or at the meetings of the Societies.

UNDERGRADUATE TRAINING FOR COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION*

ALBERT E. CROFT
American Red Cross

DEPARTMENTAL PROBLEMS

The interests of social science in some colleges and universities, perhaps many, could be served by certain measures which should be under consideration and formulation at the present time. These measures are of particular interest to sociologists and social workers and could well be initiated by them since they would lead to much needed mutual gains.

First there is need to define the purpose and methods of sociology departments. Should their prime purpose on the undergraduate level be to develop understanding concerning the nature and problems of society regardless of whether the student has a practical appreciation of what he is receiving? Or, should it also be the purpose of higher education to train young people in the actualities of community life and living by expecting some applied effort from them as a foundation to which they can integrate the somewhat rarefied knowledge of the classroom? If the latter, there is need for planned outlets by virtue of which the student can be associated with community activities and prepared to continue in them upon graduation. Before this goal of training for community life can be attained, the purpose of sociology departments must be expressed more in terms of integrating the student into his social life and less in terms of the morning light that strikes the sultan's towers of academica. In the light of the latter purpose, departments of sociology may still follow traditions and: assign term papers, promote "research" efforts, and gain special dispensation for student observation of various community activities. It remains to be proved that these traditional approaches are not merely vicarious and that they are bringing students to grips with reality in community affairs for which they should be training. Certainly these academic methods do not successfully apply the principles of participation status, role, and integration which are not so basic in all introductory sociology courses. Many sociologists still have to answer the question, "What are our purposes?" And, if it be to train people for life and living

* This statement, written by a member of the Society, is published on the recommendation of Secretary Taeuber, as a suggestion toward possible action by sociologists. Responses are invited: see closing sentence.

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in organized communities in addition to other purposes, we have problems and methods which can be answered only by the community and the school in mutual cooperation.

Secondly, there are problems of professional organization and integration before the job of integrating students with community life can be accomplished. All too often departments of sociology have suffered by inadequate relationships between and among the major professional groupings and especially between the sociological and the social welfare groups. This is readily understandable. The academic stress upon social science on the one hand and the occupational influence upon social work fields on the other hand have risen from different fields and have followed different paths. True, the academic line of development has always needed practical outlets for undergraduate students, and the occupational groups have always needed a general background of scientific knowledge, but the two have not been able to produce a satisfactory relationship. The intellectual leadership has produced theories of socialization but has at times been unable to produce integrative procedures or even control divisive tendencies. Similarly, leadership of the practical sort rising from occupational bedrock has not been realistic enough to team up with those who could help them in their efforts. As a result of this duality, an assignment to a student to participate as an apprentice in the organized activities of community life may be considered undesirable or even unprofessional! Perhaps the trend of the times may contain influences that will prompt study and action upon these problems as the halls of social science cannot remain aloof from community life, and young adults must be trained *in it* to be part of *it*. In this respect, Commencement Day could well be moved forward to Freshman Week. Furthermore, social workers cannot curb citizenship training activities for qualified, selected young adults. In fact, to continue to do so will merely deter the recruitment program of the social work professions. Karl de Schweinitz reports "among the interviewers in public assistance we found more graduates from unaccredited curriculums in social work than of accredited schools of social work."¹ The present writer knows of 80-odd young men and women who were his former students who would not have entered the fields of public assistance if they

had not been assigned to work in the agencies during their senior year in college. The same holds for sub-professional volunteer services in community agencies.

On February 8, 1944, the Army Emergency Relief transferred all its functions to the American National Red Cross, which according to its charter is authorized by Congress to care for the relief needs of the families of men in the armed forces. Most of the 3756 Red Cross chapters and 6084 branches do not have professional social workers enough to carry the additional load and also maintain standards. Former AER volunteers must be used along with others acceptable to the local chapter. Selected pre-professional college students are the best answer. They can help carry the load, maintain standards and grow both academically and professionally into the work. But sociologists and social workers must come to closer and more realistic cooperation than ever before to benefit most by this possibility.

A third consideration is that of course level. Some social science departments are offering field-work courses to selected students on the senior level, while some social work schools insist upon graduate use only of such courses. Conversely, some social work schools offer background courses in theory that should be undergraduate courses. Aside from arbitrary standards, the fact remains that many undergraduates who do not pursue graduate work are superior in knowledge and ability to many who do. It is also conceivable that some undergraduate departments in social science are superior to some accredited social work schools. If a general policy could be established, a co-ordinated front might result that would free social science departments to make citizenship training a substantial fact, and in a short time, social work schools would have an adequate stream of better selected students to personnel the professions.

A fourth problem is that of inter-department relationships. Ordinarily, no one department can satisfy the needs of social work schools for students with a broad liberal arts background. Nor can any one department alone prepare young adults for participation in community life. However, college organization has often departmentalized knowledge and students by a machinery intended for other purposes with the usual results of isolation produced by artificial barriers that can be mutually exclusive. This problem calls for close co-operation among the social sciences, on the undergraduate level, to meet the needs of the student, the community, and the professions, but none has a more vital

¹ de Schweinitz, Karl; *Training for Social Security*, Social Security Board, Washington, D.C., Nov. 27, 1943.

interest in the problem than the sociology departments. Perhaps the appointment of a committee to study this and the preceding problems might pay rich dividends.

All of these problems are affected by the new program of the American National Red Cross for promoting College Units which are virtually complete local chapters transferred to the campus for student operation. They form one basis for training students in actual community life by responsible participation; they bring social science and social work into a practical working relationship; they help define the problem of undergraduate and graduate school relationships; and, they co-ordinate local leadership, campus and community, in an inclusive endeavor.

RED CROSS COLLEGE UNITS

The American National Red Cross College Units program has received impetus from the general war situation but it emphasizes permanent values for students in community participation.

Red Cross College Units are extensions of local Red Cross chapter organization and program to the campus. They are similar to chapter branches except that they confine their activities to the student body and not to a suburban or satellite community as in the case of chapter branches. They have the professional guidance of the local chapter which will aid in organization, program development, and administration in co-operation with the college or university which is represented by a faculty advisory committee.

The organization of the college unit consists of an executive committee, vice-chairman, treasurer, secretary, and nine or more committee chairmen. These committees have the responsibility for promoting Red Cross activities according to the needs of the campus and in the light of what adaptation and development may be practical. Committee activities include: nutrition, home nursing, first aid, water safety, accident prevention, disaster preparedness and relief, arts and skills, volunteer special services, camp and hospital activities, blood donation, fund raising, public information, and other Red Cross services. Two student officers may represent the college unit on the chapter board. In general, it is a well-balanced organizational technique designed to appeal to student interest in realistically training for community responsibilities. That college students are responding eagerly is indicated in the fact that the program which has been implemented only since

September 1943 now contains scores of college units while hundreds of colleges and universities are in process of organizing or are considering organization.

On October 5, 1943, the American Council on Education issued a special bulletin, the information of which was taken from the Red Cross College Unit Pamphlet ARC-534, mailed to college and university executives only. No effort has been made to inform college students generally until educational and professional fields are fully informed. The plan has been presented and accepted as a permanent venture although it has many morale building opportunities and service outlets for students participating in the war effort.

Various functional aspects of the plan are of equal importance to its organizational technique and its program content. By virtue of the fact that the college unit is organized and administered by the students themselves, who have wide latitude for the introduction and application of programs under general responsibility to the school and the local chapter, student response is quite general, and interest is keen. The result is that the college unit is a personnel device for interesting, orienting, selecting, training, and placing students who are best qualified for community service and social welfare careers. Since graduate students may be members, they have possibilities of higher use as academically qualified instructors in certain courses offered by Red Cross in the community and have other semi-professional opportunities in chapter service.

Placement of qualified students is facilitated by the fact that the service directors of the chapter come to know personally the key students in the respective campus committees and can place them in the community to which they are going after graduation, or can aid them in their plans to continue graduate professional work. In many instances this follow-up system will save many years of time lost by individuals between graduation and the acceptance of civic duties. In other instances students will be interested in receiving American Red Cross scholarships which are offered for graduate work in nursing and social work. These scholarships provide school expenses and seventy-five dollars per month for one year. General indications are that college units can become an instrument of widespread recruitment for the social welfare professions and their method of selection should result in an increase of highly desirable young men and women.

Numerous activity tests have been made by college units with the results that the organized group approach is shown to be vastly superior to the individual approach with its usual sporadic and minimum response. For instance, in one large university their college unit held a blood donation campaign. The student body responded 100 percent. Those who could not contribute brought in a substitute. Contrast the scene with an equally large university that had no college unit. Here a minimum of students responded for blood donation, and morale was such that many students fainted. Consider another university which raised \$300 one year and then under a college unit organization raised nearly \$5,000 for aid to servicemen. The second university raised 4 percent of its expected quota, and over 70 percent of this was raised by university employees exclusive of faculty and students! The same trends are comparable in all fields of activity—group response has surpassed all expectations. The reasons for the success are obvious.

So far no effort has been made to inform students generally about Red Cross College Units. Only chapter officials and educational administrators have been informed. Of course all necessary liaison work has been done nationally but during the first year of the plan actual operations have been carefully limited to provide an adequate experience.

Sociologists should be placed in readiness next to co-operate with the plan according to how their situation permits. Departments of sociology are immediately interested in much of the Red Cross program and less directly in all of it. It has many possibilities for adding a firm foothold to our work with students and communities, and every sociology department should have its faculty advisor on the College Unit Advisory Committee. Full information can be obtained by addressing the writer, Assistant to the Vice Chairman, American National Red Cross, Washington, D.C.

NEWS AND ANNOUNCEMENTS

Michigan Sociological Society. The following papers were read before the spring meeting of the Michigan Sociological Society March 17 at Ann Arbor: Roy H. Holmes, University of Michigan, "Inquiry Into the American Way of Life"; Amos Hawley, University of Michigan, "Redistribution Versus Segregation: A Suggested Solution of Minority Group Status"; Frank E. Hartung, Wayne University, "An Appraisal of Positivism in Sociology"; Elizabeth Briant Lee, Detroit, "Ecological Influences on Eminent American Women"; Elmer

R. Akers and Vernon Fox, State Prison of Southern Michigan, and Maurice Floch, Detroit House of Correction, "The Detroit Race Rioters and Looters." Discussants were Edward C. Jandy and Norman D. Humphrey, Wayne University.

Committee reports were submitted by Alfred McClung Lee, Wayne University; Lowell J. Carr, University of Michigan; and Rupert C. Koeninger, Central Michigan College of Education.

"Responsibilities and Opportunities of the Social Sciences in Adult Education" was the subject of a panel discussion at luncheon, sponsored by the district anthropology, economics, history, political science, and sociology societies. Participants were: Orion Ulrey, Michigan State College, Chairman; Alexander G. Ruthven, University of Michigan; John F. Yeager, Michigan State Farm Bureau; Willard Martinson, Local 50, UAW-CIO; C. Wayne Brownell, Calumet and Hecla Consolidated Copper Company; Mrs. Helen Bryant, League of Women Voters; Henry Pointin, Michigan Department of Public Instruction; L. A. White, University of Michigan; Willis Dunbar, Kalamazoo College; Harold Dorr, University of Michigan; H. Warren Dunham, Wayne University.

The Office of Community War Services of the **Federal Security Agency** has published a 44-page pamphlet, *Citizens of Tomorrow—A Wartime Challenge to Community Action*. This compiles signed statements from the heads of ten Federal agencies concerned with youth problems, defining the responsibilities and resources of these agencies and recommending patterns of community service for young people. It also contains a check list of activities and points of concern for a community program for youth. Copies may be obtained from the publishing agency.

The **American Council on Education** has announced the appointment of a Commission on Motion Pictures in Education. The present members are: Mark A. May, chairman; George S. Counts; Edmund E. Day; Willard E. Givens; George Johnson; George F. Zook, ex officio. The work of the Commission is supported by a grant from eight motion picture production companies made through the Motion Picture Producers and Distributors of America, Incorporated. The grant covers a five year period. Special attention will be given to the planning of series of films for educational activities connected with postwar reconstruction. Suggestions concerning needed productions for educational purposes will be welcomed. The Commission is particularly interested in receiving curriculum materials that can be used as the basis for films. For the time being, all inquiries should be addressed to the Chairman, Mark A. May, 28 Hillhouse Avenue, New Haven, Connecticut.

American Association for the Advancement of Science. By vote of the Executive Committee, the

Association will hold its annual meeting for 1944 in Cleveland during the week of September 11-16. The Executive Committee passed the following resolution relative to the programs of the meetings:

"It was voted to bring to the attention of the Association and to all of the affiliated societies that in all programs of the September meeting emphasis be placed on the indispensability of science for the future of civilization, both in war and in peace."

The Association extends to all its affiliated and associated societies a cordial invitation to participate in the Cleveland meeting. Since the Association, as heretofore, will make all local arrangements for the meeting and print the General Program, societies intending to meet with the Association in Cleveland are urged to inform the Office of the Permanent Secretary as promptly as possible.

One of the main tasks of the *Rural Settlement Institute*, Poughkeepsie, N.Y., is to serve as a center of information on co-operative community development. The fact that the FSA has been prevented from continuing its experiments by no means signifies the termination of all co-operative community development in this country. The strength of this movement can be expected to increase considerably with the end of the war.

During 1943 a survey of past and present practice of co-operative communities was made under the joint sponsorship of this Institute and the Research Institute on Peace and Post War problems of the American Jewish Committee. It attempted to sum up the experience of such modern instances of co-operative community development as that of the FSA farms, the Mexican Ejido, the Soviet-Russian Kolkhoz, and the Palestinian Kvutza. The study has been completed and will soon be published in the RSI research series on co-operation, by the Dryden Press, Inc., New York. Henrik F. Infield: "Co-operative Communities at Work," a survey of past and present practice and its application to postwar resettlement. Within the next few months, will also be published: Henrik F. Infield, "Co-operative Living," a study of the co-operative communities in Palestine.

Temple University. Dr. Negley K. Teeters, assistant professor of sociology at Temple University, believes that when Camden's (N.J.) Director of Public Safety, David S. Rhone, invoked an old law prohibiting children under 14 years of age from going to the movies unless accompanied by an adult he may have resorted to the wrong means of combatting juvenile delinquency. The enforcement of the law may have an opposite effect on the rate of delinquency, he thinks. In general, thinks Dr. Teeters, children are not so deeply impressed by movies that they will become delinquents as a direct result; there are some children, however, who are emotionally unbalanced and will be too deeply affected by any type story. "Even the story of 'Little Red Riding Hood' can cause such children

to react improperly." Dr. Teeters is against children going to the movies at night as it keeps them from a regularity of activity. Children are often too upset to sleep immediately after seeing a movie.

Yale University. Enrollment in undergraduate courses in sociology has thus far kept up beyond expectations, due largely to the liberal program of the Navy. About 90 per cent of the students enrolled are in the V-12 program.

Professor Ralph Linton of Columbia University is part-time visiting professor, giving both graduate and undergraduate courses in anthropology.

James G. Leyburn, who is on leave of absence, is participating in a Lend-Lease mission to South Africa. In his spare time he is meeting with a group of anthropologists and psychologists at Witwatersrand University to discuss current trends in sociological thought in America.

Stephen W. Reed is a Lieutenant (j.g.) in the United States Naval Reserve. Leo W. Simmons, who holds a joint appointment in the department of psychiatry, has practically completed his studies of old age. C. Wendell King has recently been appointed as Instructor in Sociology, specializing in the field of community studies.

Raymond Kennedy, now Associate Professor, is in charge of the Foreign Areas Studies on the Southwest Pacific. Among his recent writings is *Islands and Peoples of the Indies*, published by the Smithsonian Institution. He is also devoting part-time in Washington as advisor on the Southwest Pacific.

Since the fall, Selden Bacon has been engaged in part-time research with the Yale School of Alcohol Studies, which has set up a diagnostic and guidance clinic for inebriates in cooperation with the Connecticut Prison Association. Bacon, who is a member of the State Commission for Social Protection, recently conducted a survey of crime in the state under the auspices of the Federal Security Administration and the Governor's Defense Council.

Maurice R. Davie is preparing a general treatise on the Negro in the United States. He is chairman of the M.A. Committee of the Yale Graduate School.

Since his retirement in 1942, Professor Keller has been serving as Secretary of the Sumner Club, and he is now editing the Club's *Bulletin*.

Edmund Volkart, who interrupted his graduate work to enlist in the Navy, has been promoted to Lieutenant (j.g.). He was cited for exceptionally meritorious conduct in the performance of outstanding service as Officer-in-Charge of the U.S.S. LCT 277, during the amphibious assault on the island of Sicily, and awarded the Legion of Merit.

Wayne University. Dr. Norman Daymond Humphrey, Assistant Professor of Sociology, is serving as Director of Research for the Metropolitan Detroit Council of Social Agencies. He has charge of coordinating the research activities of the Council and of its 160 member-agencies. Dr.

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Humphrey continues in his status as a full-time member of the Wayne University teaching staff. He has an article "On Assimilation and Acculturation" in the November issue of *Psychiatry*.

Joseph H. Bunzel, formerly connected with the City Health Department in Baltimore, has been appointed research assistant and field work supervisor with the Pittsburgh Housing Association.

Dr. W. E. Burghardt du Bois, head of the Department of Sociology at Atlanta University since 1932, has been elected a member of the National Institute of Arts and Letters. Dr. Du Bois is the first Negro to be elected to this Institute, which was founded 45 years ago to "honor achievement in art, music or literature."

Arthur Hillman, 1000 Loyola Ave., Chicago, writes:

"For the past year I have worked for the office of Community War Services of the Federal Security Agency, Chicago regional office (formerly called the Office of Defense Health, and Welfare Services). As a co-ordinating agency, OCWS has a foot in the door of many Federal and state agencies and has its lines out to all communities markedly affected by the war. My title of Senior Report Analyst is being changed to Technical Assistant to indicate a variety of duties in keeping with the broad scope of the agency's interests.

"I am also teaching an evening class at Central Y.M.C.A. College, Chicago, where I was on the full-time faculty."

FRANZ OPPENHEIMER—IN MEMORIAM (1864-1943)

On September 30, 1943, Franz Oppenheimer, eminent honorary member of the American Sociological Society died in Los Angeles. One of the most notable social scientists of the last generation, he was equally renowned as economist, sociologist, and social reformer. Oppenheimer was born in Berlin on March 30, 1864, the son of the preacher of the local reform Jewish community. After studying medicine at Freiburg and practising for a number of years (1886-1895) he abandoned his medical career to devote himself to social studies and reform. In 1908 after having published several weighty books on economics, he obtained his doctorate in this field (his dissertation was *Rodbertus' Angriff auf Ricardos Rententheorie und der Lexis-Diehlsche Rettungsversuch*) and the next year became a lecturer at the University of Berlin where his engaging personality, eloquent exposition and ardent idealism earned him a wide following. In 1917 he was advanced to the professoriate and in 1919 he was appointed to a

chair in sociology and economic theory established for him by a wealthy patron at the University of Frankfurt, where he remained until his retirement in 1929. He raised up a whole generation of scholars in the social sciences, many of whom are now in the United States. A prolific writer and a man of prodigious energy, he not only produced a veritable library of books and articles, but he also participated in numerous reformist movements including housing, maternal and child welfare, city planning, cremation, etc. But his great passion was the propagation of agricultural reform and the fostering of agrarian co-operatives.

Oppenheimer was also very active in certain aspects of Jewish life. In the course of his activity in behalf of agricultural co-operatives he met Theodore Herzl in 1902, and was won over by the latter to Zionism, becoming indeed the economist of the early movement. At the sixth Zionist Congress (1903) Oppenheimer proposed co-operative colonization in Palestine, which proposal he repeated at the ninth Congress.

A staunch patriot, he foresaw World War I as the inevitable consequence of the ineptness of Hohenzollern foreign policy, which, like Max Weber, he actively combatted. During the war he played a very important official rôle up to the end of 1916, as an expert in economic warfare. He prepared the plans for insuring the food supply and he helped to secure the harvests by arranging for the requisitioning of workers for this purpose. Another of his official duties during the war was the organization of the *Komitee für d. Osten* to conduct relief among the Jews of eastern Europe. He also participated in postwar planning, and produced the original draft of the Hindenburg decree providing for the distribution of land to veterans. At that time his lifelong dream of solving the primary social problem was on the verge of realization. He presented a program to the Social Democrats for internal colonization and large-scale resettlement on state land obtained by expropriation through idemnification; however, the plan was sabotaged by Sering.

Both his academic production and his intense social reform activity sprang from a common center, his early recognition of the importance of the land question as the ultimate source of social problems. His criticism of land monopoly and his advocacy of co-operativism were developed in two books, which established his reputation as an economist and which contained the core of all his subsequent work as a socio-economic theorist, *Die Siedlungsgenossenschaft*,

Versuch einer Überwindung d. Kommunismus durch Lösung d. Genossenschaftsproblems u. der Agrarfrage (1896; 3 ed., 1922); and *Grossgrundeigentum u. soziale Frage* (1898; 2 ed., 1922).

In an impressive series of works he criticized the theoretical inadequacy of both bourgeois and socialist economics. An outspoken critic of the historical school he advocated a system of theoretical economics, the ideational framework of which he expected to be contributed by sociology.

Oppenheimer eschewed all idealizations of the state, including sundry varieties of the organic theory, and developed a sociological political theory derived largely from Gumplovitz (whose works he edited). This view, crystallized out from his economic criticism, was first sketched in what is probably his most famous book, *Der Staat* (1908, Eng. transl., *The State*, 1914), which contained the basis of his system of historical sociology. In contrast to the speculative philosophies of history with their *Volkgeist* and idealistic political theory, and their concentration on the legal and spiritual goals of the state, he focussed on the power function of the state. His theory supposes a struggle of races, a variant of class struggle, and derives the emergence of the state from the conflict of heterogeneous peoples.

Quite in the tradition of Comte, Oppenheimer regarded sociology as the synthetic or universal science of society which, concentrating on "social process," generalizes the history of human society and derives social laws. Oppenheimer also accepted the methodological distinctions of the Dilthey-Rickert school between nomothetic and idiographic sciences and in general followed the ideas of Max Weber as regards the "ideal type."

Oppenheimer's chief sociological work is the massive *System d. Soziologie* (1922-1935) in eight volumes running to some 4,500 pages. It is a magisterial formulation of a system of historical sociology, which must be ranked as one of the most distinguished lucubrations of its genre. An ample discursive structure of theory, it is constructed on the scale of the great masters of sociology, Comte, Spencer Schaeffle, Gumplovitz and Durkheim. The historical portion of his system (now in v. 4 of his *System*) was intended to reveal the historical roots of capitalism and to serve as a check on the sociological theory expounded in the preceding volumes. Bearing the general title of *Abriss einer Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgesch. Europas con d. Volker-*

wanderung bis z. Gegenwart

and running into three massive volumes, it constitutes an exemplary review of the economic origins of European feudalism and capitalism from the viewpoint of liberal socialism. He had hoped to complete his system with a social philosophy, sociology of law, a sociological analysis of the older philosophies of history and a practical sociology, but this was not to be.

The life of Oppenheimer, the cultivated, many faceted cosmopolitan, the possessor of many talents, and winner of numerous laurels, was singularly tragic, both personally and symbolically. Though he was uncommonly successful as scholar, lecturer, and welfare worker, his central idea (like Schopenhauer, he believed that every creative scholar has really only one idea which he spins out in diverse variations of an integral theme) has not celebrated any conspicuous success. His eclectic theoretical system has been largely by-passed by the development of newer trends in sociology, especially of the social-psychological, social-psychanalytical, anthropological and statistical varieties. As to his social reform activity, not only has the agricultural co-operative movement made comparatively little headway but the whole cataclysm of our time has made his approach appear, for the nonce, pathetically naive. However, the tragedy goes deeper, for Oppenheimer's destiny represents the fate of a whole generation of scholars and indeed an epoch of culture. His generation has been destroyed, its rationalism flouted, its socialism desecrated, its dream of peaceful reconstruction shattered. Liberalism, rationalism, enlightenment, and internationalism have suffered their deepest eclipse since the eighteenth century, to which Oppenheimer *kat exochen*, properly belonged.

The pestilence of Nazism ultimately was the cause of the aged scholar's leaving Germany after his competence had been confiscated. En route to the United States which he had first visited in 1913, he had a brief connection with the University of Kobe. Though he participated in various academic enterprises in the United States, e.g., becoming chairman of the editorial board of the newly formed *Journal of Economics and Sociology*, to which he also contributed articles, he did not succeed in finding a post adequate to his talents, and he died in virtual penury.

In the passing of Franz Oppenheimer the world has lost a distinguished scholar, a zealous humanitarian, and a luminous human spirit.

Hunter College

EPHRAIM FISCHOFF

**PERCY A. ROBERT
(1904-1944)**

The death of Percy A. Robert on February 12, 1944, deprived American sociology of an inspiring teacher and a promising investigator. Born at Campbellford, Ontario, on June 27, 1904, Dr. Robert received his bachelor's degree from Loyola College, Montreal in 1926. Two years later he obtained the M.A. and a diploma in social work from McGill. Coming to New York University on a fellowship in the fall of 1928, he continued his graduate work and in the meantime taught at City College, at Dana College in Newark, as well as at New York University itself. It was in New York also that he met Mary Allison Read of Hamilton, New York, the future Mrs. Robert. The Ph.D. followed in 1938.

Meanwhile, in 1934, he had accepted a position as Instructor at the Catholic University of America in Washington and was promoted to the rank of Assistant Professor in 1939. Although he followed developments in the field of social theory with keen interest, Dr. Robert's own natural bent, as well as his training in social work and his association with Professor Fairchild in New York, led him to emphasize the more objective and empirical aspects of his subject. His teaching was for the most part confined to graduate subjects and it was his delight to develop a critical sense in his students by submitting prejudices and preconceptions to a keen and searching analysis. The same critical bent showed itself when Dr. Robert began to contribute to the technical literature. His first

contribution was a methodological note on delinquency research published in the *Journal of Educational Sociology*. The same spirit was manifest in his later writings, whether they were technical or popular in character.

In 1942 Dr. Robert obtained a leave of absence from the Catholic University to serve as Special Adviser on National Unity to Mr. Elliot M. Little who was then Director of National Selective Service in Canada. Later, in October, 1943, he undertook a survey of the Gaspé Peninsula with a view to postwar reconstruction. In giving himself to these projects, Dr. Robert was motivated both by a feeling of obligation toward his native Canada and by his interest in concrete social conditions. He wrote back enthusiastically about the effect which these studies would have on his future teaching and research. In the midst of this work which he found so interesting, Dr. Robert died suddenly in Quebec on February 12, 1944 as the result of complications following a surgical operation.

Dr. Robert found time for many constructive outside interests. He was active in the cause of labor organization, race relations, and social work. He was one of the organizers and later President of the Washington Chapter of the American Sociological Society. The writer, as a member of whose department Dr. Robert served, can testify to his spirit of cheerful co-operation, loyal friendship, and undeviating intellectual integrity.

PAUL HANLEY FURFEE
The Catholic University of America

EDITORIAL ANNOUNCEMENT

The newly elected Editor of the *American Sociological Review*, F. Stuart Chapin, University of Minnesota, will be responsible for the August and subsequent issues. Under authority granted him by the Executive Committee, Dr. Chapin has appointed Dr. George B. Vold, University of Minnesota, as Co-editor with himself of the *Review*. The Book Review Department, beginning with the August issue, will also be under the direction of Dr. Chapin and located at the University of Minnesota. The new Book Review Editors will be announced.

The June issue will be a special number on "Recent Social Trends in the Soviet Union." All further manuscripts and communications, not pertaining to the June or earlier issues, should be addressed to the Editor, *American Sociological Review*, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis.

The present issue consists of 96 pages instead of the usual 128. This is necessitated by the reduction in budget (see February number, p. 100). It is hoped that the remaining numbers for 1944 can be of 128 pages.

BOOK REVIEWS

BOOK REVIEW EDITORS

HOWARD BECKER AND THOMAS C. MCCORMICK

University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin

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Society and Ideology. By GERARD DEGRE. New York: The Hamilton Press; Columbia University Bookstore, Morningside Heights, New York, New York, distributors, 1943. Pp. iv + 114.

"The purposes of this study," writes the author, "are twofold: (1) to provide an introduction to the sociology of knowledge; and (2) to indicate the contributions which have been made to this field by a group of thinkers, most of whom have not received much attention as contributors to this relatively new field of inquiry." In accomplishing his purpose DeGre succeeds admirably: *Society and Ideology* serves at once as introduction and short treatise.

In broad strokes the author presents the contributions, both direct and indirect, to sociology of knowledge made by thinkers solely from Italy, France and the United States, with the exception of two German philosophers. Among the more important key concepts subjected to analysis are Nietzsche's *transvaluation* and re-

sentment with Scheler's extension of the latter concept, Pareto's *residue* and *derivation*, Sorel's *myth* and Durkheim's *category*. After describing the manner in which key ideas function for the conceptual systems in question, DeGre borrows from the work of other social thinkers, largely contemporary American sociologists, both to point out various limitations of the constructs and to suggest how sociology of knowledge might formulate their essential content more carefully and systematically.

For his conclusion the author outlines the postulates of method for sociology which he corroborates in the present inquiry. In brief, he contends that social actions result from the impact of the individual's subjective *Weltanschauung* upon the host of objective factors composing his social and physical surroundings. Likewise, the result of successive social actions is the creation of new environmental factors which, in turn, effect changes in the individual's value outlook. Thus the complete process per-

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petuates itself. The author further concludes that sociology of knowledge is a science, not epistemology. It concerns itself with the sociology of both specialists in knowledge and of ideas. Four important problems facing the new discipline are enumerated, but DeGre firmly insists that in these and all similar undertakings, sociology of knowledge must share the fate of its sister-sciences. It must make the same methodological presuppositions. But more of this presently.

Along with his statement of purpose in the introduction, the author expresses a twofold hope: "that this study will help to answer some of the questions as to what the sociology of knowledge is all about, and help stimulate further research . . ."; and "that in its indication of certain errors that have crept into the sociology of knowledge through its confusion with traditional epistemology, it will be perhaps instrumental in rendering these errors less frequent in the future." To the reviewer it seems that Dr. DeGre has done remarkably well in his attempt to realize both hopes. In addition to presenting a precisely formulated picture of sociology of knowledge, he has examined its foundations without becoming ensnared, like Mannheim, by the twin pitfalls of certain strains of pragmatism, overemphasis and oversimplification. "Within a scientific universe of discourse, the criteria of truth lie exclusively in the correspondence of ideas with the data of experience as well as their logical coherence with systematic scientific theory. . . ." Moreover, the sociologist is concerned not with the objective validity of the "truths" he interprets, but with their subjective validity for the human agents. "This distinction is fundamental in the differentiation between the *sociology of knowledge* and the sociological *theory of knowledge*, and its neglect has given rise to a number of pseudo-problems. . . ." At no point does Dr. DeGre's analysis lapse into loose or confused thinking either in his allusions to epistemology and scientific methodology or in the historical and sociological sections which constitute the bulk of the book. The author's treatment of questions relating to philosophy of science seems open to no criticism from the professional philosopher.

VIRGIL G. HINSHAW, JR.

Princeton University

Emile Durkheim and His Sociology. By HARRY ALPERT. New York: Columbia University Press, 1939. \$2.50.

Methodology is nice work if you can get it,

but some people never get anything else. Durkheim, fortunately enough, was a far better researcher than he would ever have been had he remained true to his announced methodological intentions. The great merit of Alpert's book lies in its clear statement of what Durkheim said he was doing and what he actually did. There have been other studies of the great Frenchman which have failed to take these two contrasting aspects into account; here one thinks first of all of Gehlke's one-sided presentation which, for many American sociologists of the generation now in its fifties or sixties, was the first and final word. Gehlke made much of "collective representations," "group mind," and similar flimsy cornices on the solid edifice of Durkheim's research. Alpert quite justifiably points out that when Durkheim's substantive studies rather than his methodological speculations are examined, Durkheim dealt with language and other symbolic systems, mores, institutions, and a host of other empirical data as the stuff in which "collective representations" and "group mind" are embodied. In other words, they are not brooding omnipresences in the sky, to take Justice Holmes out of context, but observable items making up the commonly accepted "human nature" of the members of a given society. At bottom, then, Durkheim is easily reconcilable with Mead, as Alpert shrewdly points out.

Excellent as Alpert's analysis is, however, it is to be regretted that it was necessary to present it to American readers in the year 1939. What he says should have been common knowledge in 1920. But, vain regrets aside, we can be thankful that something like a just evaluation of Durkheim's achievements is now at our disposal; we need no longer rely on the comic-strip distortions that have previously held the field. Moreover, the Alpert study makes available a well-organized arrangement of biographical detail that is exceedingly helpful in disentangling the ideological and the solidly scientific phases of Durkheim's work. If a note of hero-worship is sometimes apparent, it can do no great harm in view of the more damaging biases to which it is opposed.

HOWARD BECKER

University of Wisconsin

The Methodology of Pierre Duhem. By ARMAND LOWINGER. New York: Columbia University Press, 1942. Pp. 184. \$2.25.

Pierre Duhem (1861-1916) was a French professor of theoretical physics devoted to the unification of physical theories that flourished

during the period of his active life. The volume under review is an exposition of this enterprise, heavily involved as it was in the metaphysical morass that dominated physical theory during the last half of the last century. As a chapter in the history of theoretical physics of this time, the book is of some interest. Duhem sensed the futility of certain metaphysical preoccupations which only social scientists today engage in. Speaking of physical doctrines, he said:

. . . what is, in them, enduring and fertile, is the logical procedure by means of which they succeed in classifying naturally a great number of laws, by deducing them all from some few principles; what is sterile and perishable, is the labor undertaken to explain these principles, to connect them with suppositions touching the realities which are hidden under the sensible appearances.

He also argued against the notion that physics was a philosophy of nature, a cosmology, or a branch of metaphysics. "The new mathematical physics," he said, "does not preen itself on penetrating, in the knowledge of corporeal qualities, below what the analysis of the facts of experience reveals to us; briefly, it is a *Physics*; it is not a *Philosophy of Nature*, a *Cosmology*, a branch of *Metaphysics*." In a brief concluding chapter the author points out the inadequacies of Duhem's theories in the light of modern knowledge. The material is not of sufficient relevance to contemporary methodological problems to warrant more extensive review. There is a bibliography and an index.

GEORGE A. LUNDBERG

Bennington College

Free Minds: John Morley and His Friends. By FRANCES W. KNICKERBOCKER. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1943. Pp. xi + 288. \$3.00.

This book should be read by all social scientists who aspire to be literate beyond the narrow bounds of their specialties and who may never have known, or have forgotten, the significance of nineteenth-century critical thinking in England. The volume, while centering on John Morley's range of interests and achievements, portrays the concerted efforts of a group of his free-minded friends and associates to mould opinion in more liberal, even radical (for that day) form. Closest to Morley were Sir Leslie Stephen and Frederick Harrison. All three learned from Comte, but their real masters were John Stuart Mill and a changing world. The larger circle, including Huxley, Spencer, George

Lewes and George Eliot, Harriet Martineau, George Meredith, Walter Bagehot and others, is suggested but not drawn in full. The presentation of the objectives and methods of the whole group justifies the title, *Free Minds*.

For this reviewer, beyond the pleasure in the reading and some new insights on Comte's influence in England, the residual effect is a great desire to sit before the complete files of Morley's *Fortnightly Review* and analyze them more closely than Mrs. Knickerbocker's interests and purposes allowed her to do. Here, surely, would be a rich vein, mining of which would reveal most of those issues—economic, religious and scientific—which have been blurred for us by time and by overlaid interpretations. Here, too, would be seen the free-working intelligence of those who offered solutions. As Mrs. Knickerbocker says, citing Bury, "What the Encyclopaedists did for eighteenth-century France, the *Fortnightly Review* under John Morley did for nineteenth-century England." Morley was "a liberator of the mind of his time." She does manage to suggest briefly some of the problems which were vigorously dealt with in that journal: the claims of labor and collective bargaining, child labor, the inadequacies of *laissez-faire*, all facets of "the Irish question," woman suffrage, the struggle for a national and secular educational system. And, always, there is Morley's concern with the uses of rationalism against "the blindness and bigotry of the orthodox." It is not only as a nineteenth-century English liberal that Morley is shown; "he expressed the great motive of Western Civilization: the freedom and dignity of the individual, the effort toward a better social order and a world order."

The book is well documented and indexed; it bears the marks of an author thoroughly at home with the events, persons and ideas she deals with; more than that, it is written with conviction and grace.

GLADYS BRYSON

Smith College

The University and the Modern World. By ARNOLD S. NASH. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1943. Pp. 312. \$2.50.

Three years ago, T. S. Eliot, vagrant American poet and mystic, suggested in *The Idea of a Christian Society* that those intellectuals who believed in the "dogmatisms" of Christianity should form a select body, "a clerisy," whose influence, radiating outward, would correct the morals of the mass and create a Christian State by compelling the politicos (who are not neces-

sarily reverent men) to respect the ethics of Christianity in their actions. Arnold Nash, vagrant young British scholar (at present chaplain to the Student Christian Movement in the University of Toronto) whose path must have somewhere crossed Eliot's, makes a very pretty application of this idea in *The University and the Modern World*. His "clerisy" would be formed among the Christian believers on the faculties of the universities of the liberal countries of the world, not for the domination of those institutions by theologians, but rather to give meaning to their curricula through a synthesis of their subjects, which are today unrelated and empty disciplines. In Mr. Nash's view, the democracies can stand against the totalitarian states only if their learning is welded into a whole by this Christian synthesis to offset Marxian and Fascist syntheses. The welding instrument, rather surprisingly, is to be "the sociology of knowledge," and the goal no less than the Christian Universe.

Remembering Gibbon's famous inference that Rome was weakened for the barbarian onslaught by Christian proselytizing (which created so many nonresistants), we might take the position that the present is a poor time to advocate a return to Christianity. We are again fronted by the barbarians. Alarm on this score, however, is quite frivolous—it will take longer, we venture, to recruit "a clerisy" on our faculties than it did to Christianize heathen Rome. Hence we offer no opposition to Mr. Nash—if he succeeds, it will not be too soon.

Over and beyond its tractarian aspects, *The University and the Modern World* is an immensely stimulating book. Mr. Nash is an acquisitive scholar, of the order of C. E. M. Joad (whom he somehow suggests), and he puts together his many unusual fragments of knowledge in patterns new and splendid as Joseph's coat. For those who are tired of old combinations of ideas and who love the titillation of the novel (as does the present writer) there is no book to be preferred at the moment to this. Sedentary intellects on our faculties, however, will do well to pass up this number for the latest complimentary and elementary textbook, the *S.E.P.*, or something chosen by Canby and Company. What to them the fact that sociology—occupying as it does the crucial point between the sciences and the humanities—is favored to construct a synthesis, Christian or otherwise, for the next era of civilization?

OSCAR CARGILL

New York University

Education for Freedom. By ROBERT M. HUTCHINS. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1943. Pp. vi + 108. \$1.50.

The quality which one hears most frequently ascribed to the mind and mentality of Robert Hutchins is brilliance. It is often assumed that brilliancy and depth are incompatible, that a mind which shines cannot be profound. Certainly, no one can accuse Robert Hutchins of avoiding the search for profundity. Indeed, there are some who insist that his searches have gone too deeply, that is, too far into antiquity and that he has thereby missed the essential quality of his own age. In any case, the appraiser of his works must surely regard Hutchins as a philosopher and since he is also a complex personality, one must view his intellectual products with a multiple lens.

As philosopher it seems to me that the clue to Hutchins may be found in that biting remark of Ralph Waldo Emerson's when he spoke of the "terrifying need for certainty." In one sense all philosophy and hence all philosophers seem to fall into two groups, those who are content to live within margins of uncertainty and contingency and those who are happy only when they *know*. If the requisite knowledge does not present itself to their experience, they will then, as in the case of Hegel, for example, impose certainty upon the world in the form of affirmation and logic. Since they cannot tolerate uncertainty they must create dogma. One must grant at the outset that those who have embraced the certainty way of life attain a great advantage over those who speak more tentatively and more humbly. In debate they divide every topic into neat dialectical packages, some wrapped up in truth and good and beauty and others in falsehood and evil and ugliness. Since these qualities are nowhere existent in nature in pristine form, they must be imputed for the sake of argument. This Hutchins does with consummate skill when he deals with education. One of the objects of his scorn is what he calls materialism and which he believes education has fostered at the expense of moral and spiritual ends. This formula leads to easy resolutions: if *all* education tends to produce persons who believe that "material goods are ends in themselves" then all one needs to do is to posit an education which treats material goods as though they were means to other and higher ends. If progressive education is what needs to be castigated since it rests upon the experimental temper, then one must assume that *all* or most contemporary education is progressive if one is

to provide a formidable foe. With the use of this type of logic, a logic which allows the proponent to describe, if not to manufacture, his opposition, easy victories are attainable.

When Hutchins remains within the sphere of his own variety of experimentalism, he is superb. What he has to say in this volume concerning the junior college and the Bachelor of Arts degree needed badly to be said. Likewise, his defense of the type of education which is now being exemplified at St. Johns College can stand on its own feet as one experiment among many; it is not necessary to generalize from this project, which may indeed be desirable for some students, until the whole of education is embraced.

My allotted space is already gone but I have mentioned only two of the many-faceted analytical tools which are required if one is to understand the so-called Hutchins school of thought. In terms of the times and its inner conflicts one should employ at least one psychiatric insight in appraising those who point to panaceas. In this instance President Hutchins may be quoted directly since his words show more clearly than descriptive language could possibly do where at least one of his inner conflicts resides:

"I am afraid, therefore," writes Hutchins, page 64, "that I am proposing some notable sacrifices on the altar of reform. The first few generations of graduates of my educational system might suffer the same fate as the martyrs of the early church. They might be that phenomenon horrible to American eyes, financial failures. Yet it is possible that if the one college and the one university for which I hope could persevere, the blood of martyrs might prove to be the seed of an enlightened nation."

EDUARD C. LINDEMAN

Columbia University

Honorary Degrees: A Survey of Their Use and Abuse. By STEPHEN E. EPLER. Washington: American Council on Public Affairs, 1943. \$2.75 paper, \$3.25 cloth.

This somewhat pedestrian factual survey doubtless could have been written more interestingly by a journalist and more significantly by a social scientist. Since the author of *Honorary Degrees: A Survey of Their Use and Abuse* is an educationist by training and a dean of men by vocation, however, this is neither here nor there. Mr. Epler has tackled with temerity and fair-mindedness a controversial but neglected research topic of considerable symbolic impor-

tance in the academic scheme of things. Despite occasional methodological naivete, he has produced a very useful reference volume which ought to come to the attention of college and university faculties and administrators everywhere.

His approach to the subject is three-fold: (1) a somewhat detailed historical study of uses and abuses of the honorary degree practice in a sample of seven colleges and universities; (2) the contemporary practices of over two hundred institutions; and (3) the opinions of college presidents, business men, farm and labor leaders, and journalists. The last two phases of the study utilize questionnaire materials. Criteria for awarding degrees, variations in practices and sentiments among different categories of institutions, and the backgrounds of recipients are all subjected to qualitative and quantitative analyses. Mr. Epler has done some painstaking spadework which brings together an array of facts and opinions which cannot be ignored by anyone seeking the best available treatise on the subject.

A light motif appropriate to the mock dignity surrounding some practices is suggested by the illustrations sprinkled throughout the text: the frontispiece is a reproduction of Grant Wood's famed satirical lithograph, and there are numerous relevant cartoons from the *New Yorker* and other sources. The patent contrast between professed motives and actual practices, the parade of flagrant abuses, the fuzziness of criteria for selecting honorees, and the general lack of system for objectively attaching symbols of achievement to achievement depicted so pointedly in this book show that the whole business of honorary degrees is merely another instance in our society of the fumbling, uncertainties, and inconsistencies in defining success with clarity and rewarding it with objectivity.

LOGAN WILSON

University of Kentucky

Gauging Public Opinion. By HADLEY CANTRIL and research associates. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944. Pp. xiv + 318. \$3.75.

This volume presents a valuable compilation of research data that will help answer many of the pressing questions concerning public opinion polling.

The first three parts of the work are directed toward the problems of gathering opinion such as the meaning and wording of questions, modes of interviewing and balloting, and sampling. A

fourth, and perhaps generally most interesting section, is devoted to the delineation of opinion determinants, particularly education, information, and economic status. Part V applies the polling technique to the problem of morale, and seven appendices provide supplemental research information.

As with most socio-psychological study the most persistent problem of public opinion research is the one of interpretation. Obviously the data in themselves are of little value until we can gain an understanding of their meaning. While Cantril and his associates have been prudent in drawing conclusions from the breakdowns, we were conscious throughout the work of the prevalence of moot, *post factum* explanations. Here the social psychologist appears stymied, for his only technique of interpretation, in the absence of a specially directed study, is a "reasonable weighing" of possibilities *after* the fact. For example, a frequently used catch-all employed to explain discrepancies from otherwise rather general principles is the phrase, "when opinion is not solidly structured." Now in most instances throughout the book where Cantril, *et al.*, had recourse to this explanatory device we found ourselves agreeing that it was apparent that the public, in this case, had no "solidly structured opinion." But while this is a comforting statement it is not a scientific explanation, nor is it, in truth, much more than a *circulum in probando* for the index of loosely formed opinion is the very data it is supposed to explain.

As the editor well realizes, the inchoate stage of opinion-research does not provide us with great generalizing power, but, as is demonstrated, our present techniques are well able to answer certain specific problems.

GWINNE NETTLER

Stanford University

A Pioneer Radio Poll in Lebanon, Syria, and Palestine. By STUART C. DODD and assistants. Government Printer, Palestine, 1943. Pp. 103. No price stated.

It is easy to see why the Egyptian, Lebanese, Syrian, American, British, and French authorities sponsored and presumably paid for this study. They needed the data revealed in the seventeen tables obtained from 4,427 Arab-speaking interviewees, a 10 percent sample of all Arab radio owners, and the six-table data from 2,761 Hebrew-speaking mail-respondents, a 6 percent sample of all Jewish radio owners. A short comment follows and highlights what may

be learned from each table—a concise and sensible way to write a report. These 36 pages of tables are packed with facts—beautiful and exciting. They reveal the listening habits of the people in this area who have access to radio sets—an average of 5.6 persons per set. This is only about 5 percent of the total population, but probably is the part that most greatly influences public opinion.

Dodd was doubtless interested in these facts both from the point of view of their relation to public policy and the satisfaction of his own curiosity but I'm sure he was more interested in Part II, "The Reliability of the Facts." "Facts" must be *facts* whether to satisfy curiosity or to prevent impolitic action. Thus, Dodd continues to work like a scientist at a point where many similar researchers consider their task completed. A time may come when one honestly can stop at this point if his previous work has been done competently, but we certainly are far from that goal at present. Part II is especially recommended to those who are doubtful of quantitative methods in sociological research.

Most of the errors discussed by W. Edwards Deming in his valuable paper at the 1943 Annual Meeting are dealt with, or noted. It must suffice here to cite the conclusion that the distribution of the data obtained from the various groups was constant regardless of differing interviewers, informants, intervals up to one month between interviews, sizes of samples from 1 percent to 10 percent, and degrees of acquaintanceship between interviewers and informants. These differences were measured and the median reliability coefficient was close to .99. It is concluded that under the conditions of this investigation, a sample of 5 percent or less could safely be used. Very complete instructions were given to the interviewers and they were trained until they achieved 97 percent identical recording. The directions and schedules are given in full, together with a list of documents on file which are available for further analysis. These may be obtained from the Radio Poll Office, American University of Beirut, Beirut, Lebanon.

READ BAIN

Miami University

The Chicago Tribune: Its First Hundred Years (Vol. 1). By PHILIP KINSLEY. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1943. Pp. xv + 381 + vii. \$5.00.

On June 10, 1947, the *Chicago Tribune* will

be one hundred years old. In recognition of the anniversary a series of volumes has been planned to portray the history of the paper. This is the first, and covers the years 1847 through 1865 to the date of Lincoln's assassination. The final volume will appear in the centennial year.

As the author states in his preface, a newspaper which has grown to maturity and developed its distinguishable characteristics is not unlike an individual, and accordingly is properly the subject for a biographer. And as with the biography of an individual, the purpose is thorough analysis of the various forces that have been shaping its evolution to give an interpretation that enables the reader to understand how the newspaper as he knows it today has come to be what it is. Certainly the *Chicago Tribune* has had an enormous influence in the middle-west and the nation at large. Certainly, too, it has been a virile and vigorous newspaper. Regardless of what one may think of its news and editorial policies, its story should be told. Appraisal of the book, however, should be in terms of the success with which the author has created a living and well-rounded picture of the growth of the *Tribune*.

Judged on this basis, Volume I falls considerably below expectations, and the fault, in the opinion of this reviewer, lies in two facts. First, the story of the *Tribune* is told too much in terms of what was printed in the paper itself. It is as though Mr. Kinsley had in preparing his chapters depended over-much upon notes compiled by turning the pages day by day. Related to this criticism is the subsidiary point that the focus upon Lincoln and the emergence of him as a national political figure is over-weighted. Lincoln was important, and these were the crucial years of his life, but the story of the *Tribune* as a newspaper does not stand forth sharply in the mass of Lincoln detail that is used to carry the story.

The second fault is the failure to give the *Tribune* an adequate setting in the wider social environment. The expressed intentions, so well set forth in the opening chapter, "The Awakening of the Middle West," do not, in the writer's estimation, actually materialize. The interplay of economic and social changes in the life of the growing Chicago and the relation of them to the unfolding of the *Tribune's* history has not been sufficiently worked out. This is reflected in the meager bibliographical material that is introduced.

In short, a really intriguing subject and an unusual opportunity have not been developed to the fullest. In consequence, the book has neither the interest or usefulness for the sociologist that it might well have had.

MALCOLM M. WILLEY
University of Minnesota

German Strategy of World Conquest. By DERWENT WHITTLESEY with the collaboration of CHARLES C. COLBY and RICHARD HARTSHORNE. New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1942. Pp. xiii + 293. \$2.50.

This book originated at a time when geopolitics suddenly appeared to be the open sesame of politics. It is, however, far from being another product of that short-lived fashion. Long after the wave will have passed by, this study will stand up well. Following a suggestion of the National Planning Association and supported by the Carnegie Corporation the well-known Harvard geographer with the support of two other outstanding colleagues in the field studied carefully the writings and doctrines of the geopoliticians. The result is a factual and, all in all, objective analysis of this much discussed yet rarely tested school. An additional quality of the study derives from the fact that it makes available for the first time pertinent material of the German literature (drawing especially from the prolific and official organ, *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik*); the faithful translation indeed conveys "the curiously bewildering flavor of the originals." An excellent reproduction of the "dynamic" maps and symbols of geopolitical literature and an impressive bibliography give further value to this publication.

The well-planned book is clearly divided into two parts, one dealing with the historical background and contemporary setting of *Geopolitik*: How it came to be; the second dealing with the German pattern of conquest, country by country: What it is. The short concluding part tries to give an over-all picture of its implications: What it means for us.

While the main body of the book no doubt represents a most valuable introduction to crucial political geography and a clear evaluation of pseudo-scientific German *Geopolitik*, one may well make some reservations concerning its analysis of the ideological roots and the historical antecedents of Haushofer and his Munich school. It is certainly most appropriate to remind the hasty present-day observer of the long-range preparation of the German strategy

of conquest and to sum up intellectual forerunners such as the Pan-Germanic group. One may further state in defense of the author that he did not intend to give a complete history of the spiritual development of modern Germany (a most difficult if not impossible task under present circumstances) but to follow like a bloodhound the tracks of aggressive "Prussianism" leading directly to the Haushofer and Hitler. This well-justified endeavor becomes, however, most doubtful if one chooses (as Whittlesey obviously does) Chéradame's *Pan-German Plot Unmasked* as a one-sided guide to a far more complex development. If National Socialism were simply heir to late 19th century Pan-Germanism, and unfortunately an increasing number of popular interpreters seem to believe so, it would be only half as disquieting a phenomenon as it really is. Fed by forces more dynamic and nihilistic, the Nazi revolution challenges the whole fabric of European society. Only if these sociological implications are fully understood will the roots of expansive National Socialism be laid bare.

To streamline history into a single pattern is a frequent fallacy of contemporary surveys. No doubt such an approach makes history seemingly more conclusive and inevitable, cutting out all those elements of the past which are not meaningful to the present; yet only in retrospect does history follow one single track. Actually history at any time is polyform, full of divergent trends and possibilities even within the life and work of a single author. National Socialism, no doubt, was not the necessary and natural outcome of Prussian-Germany history. Neither can it claim the respectable list of philosophical forerunners which is easily construed *post facto*. Every new movement naturally enforces itself with such a weighty roster. Nazi Germany tried it in her use of Frederick the Great and Freiherrn vom Stein, of Herder and Hegel, of Schlegel and Fichte, of Nietzsche and Spengler. Hardly any of these men taught or intended to teach mankind to act as Mussolini or Hitler are doing. Their lives and their work testify against these modern exploiters of their ideas. While the Nazis may well abuse the great masters by lifting a line out of their works, a circumspect American scholar should not accept such testimonials on sight. Needless to say, men like Kant are too well-known for their contributions to European liberal thought to need white-wash.

The closer the study comes to the contem-

porary scene the more its real value is brought out. As a realistic and well-written treatise on global thinking for a slowly awakening American public it deserves praise and many readers.

SIGMUND NEWMANN

Wesleyan University

Crusade for Pan-Europe. By RICHARD N. COUDEHOVE-KALERGI. New York: Putnam, 1943. Pp. viii + 318. \$3.50.

The present volume is a mixture of personal experience and general history—it carries, indeed, the sub-title *Autobiography of a Man and a Movement*. This might be said of all of Count Coudenhove-Kalergi's writings and his oral utterances and it adds a distinct note to these utterances. It adds a piquant flavor to them without weakening them any more than they would be weakened by their own inherent improbability.

It is on the other hand, regrettable that issues as important as those discussed in this volume could not have a more impersonal, a more analytical, and a more thorough treatment than they receive in these pages. Nowhere in this book—nor, it may be added, in Count Coudenhove-Kalergi's other writings—are we presented with the kind of analysis of the problem which a conscientious student of political questions would seek. What are the objectives sought by the movement for Pan-European Union? Are these objectives desirable—for Europe and for the rest of the world? Can they be obtained in no other and less costly or difficult fashion? Can they, indeed, be obtained in this fashion, and if so how go about it, while at the same time guarding against unfortunate by-products? None of these questions is seriously studied here.

There will, of course, be strongly differing opinions on many of the substantive issues involved. Such is the idea (p. 263) that the post-war European union advocated by the writer must have a strong central government capable of assuring peace on the continent, of protecting the rights of all European citizens (*sic*), of overcoming the threat of any national hegemony, and of starting a policy of European reconstruction. With all the restraint becoming a non-European when speaking of such a matter, this seems to the reviewer like blithering nonsense, especially if, as seems the case, Britain and Russia are to remain outside of the Union. Where, in the Europe of 1944, are the elements for such unity and strength to be

found? Or if any such union could be created, it—and such a union would be much stronger than Axis-dominated Europe was at its peak—would be terribly dangerous not only to Russia (for whose welfare the Count does not, it is true, seem to feel great solicitude) but to Great Britain and indeed to the rest of the world as well.

So for the description of the Commonwealth of the World (pp. 283-283): it is to be only a very loose association of nations because of—the United States Senate and Joseph Stalin (p. 283)! Presumably the volume was completed before the Moscow declaration and the Connally resolution.

The fact is that the book is a confused, vague, and incoherent dream of hope and goodwill from a charming individual who seems himself without guile but without due respect for the difficulties of the world problem.

PITMAN B. POTTER

The Tragedy of European Labor 1918-1939 By ADOLF STURMTHAL. New York: Columbia University Press, 1943. Pp. 389. \$3.50.

Many authors of contemporary historical surveys have approached their subjects with pre-conceived ideas. Far from admitting it, however, they have, by pretending that they are free from any political bias, misled unsuspecting readers. Not so Dr. Sturmthal. One must be grateful to him for the frankness with which he emphasizes that he deals with his subject from a definite angle and with a particular purpose. He looks at European events between the wars with the eyes of a combatant in the political labor movement. His object is to show that, contrary to the belief of American labor leaders, the tragedy of European labor cannot be traced back to non-compliance with "the time-honored anti-political theory of the American trade unions." (Is it really so time-honored?) The failure of the European labor movement, according to Dr. Sturmthal, must rather be charged to insufficient political aptitude and willingness to give up "pressure-group thinking" and to accept political responsibility commensurate with its political and social strength. Both concepts are foreign to the ideology at present prevailing in the United States, and this fact makes the reading of the book especially interesting.

The detailed account of the history of European labor between the wars reads like a thriller (unfortunately without a happy ending); although the reader may sometimes have difficul-

ties because the author takes him through the single European countries one by one without giving a synchronized picture of the interrelated European events. This forces the reader to jump back and forth as to historical time.

Dr. Sturmthal certainly scourges the labor movement, which he loves. He sometimes goes so far as to make the fairness of his criticism questionable. The political parties which represented labor in the European countries were, in fact, not the only parties which displayed pressure-group thinking. They shared this tendency with other political parties which were chiefly backed by particular economic groups. And what political party on the European continent was not the representative of economic groups or political cliques, often under the guise of bombastic names designed to catch voters by the false pretence of representing the interests of all really patriotic citizens? The disgust incited in truly patriotic citizens by such pressure-group politics contributed substantially to the rise of National-Socialism and other nationalistic and dictatorial forms of government. It was the tragedy of the old continent that it did not find any other escape from that pressure-group democracy but to drift from Scylla to Charybdis. The labor movement was surrounded by pressure groups which grew increasingly hostile as it tried to hasten social and political progress. How could it by itself create governments representing the feeling of the whole nation?

It might have done so, indeed, if it only had been united in the desire to obtain this object. However, the traditional political representative of labor in Europe—Social Democracy—and labor's economic representation—unionism—were not only fought by pressure-groups on their right, but also on their left. Dr. Sturmthal presents a vivid account of how the Communist parties continually thwarted the constructive efforts of the Social-Democratic and liberal parties, and of the unions, no matter whether the Communists at one time chose to pose as their friends or their enemies. Whatever they chose, their aim was always the same: establishment of their own dictatorial power through destruction of what the majority in the nation wanted. The result? Fascist dictatorships in most of continental Europe while the Communists could not conquer a single country.

The book shows what intelligent people have known for a long time—Communism has little chance in countries with a labor class of high standard and intelligence. Unless there are at-

tempts to undermine such standards the labor group is the best defender against Communism. As a matter of fact, this has been obvious for such a long time that the Fascist groups and their backers without any doubt have used Communism as the bogeyman behind whose broad back they could march on to final victory. And the Communistic policy willingly, though unwittingly, helped them everywhere. The Hitlers and Mussolinis were carried to victory on the shoulders of their co-operative bogeyman.

The attentive reader may find much material for ideas of his own about this and other timely problems in Dr. Sturmthal's book. It is another and very helpful study in the series of attempts to evaluate recent European history being made by authors of most divergent political opinions.

KURT BRAUN

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Our Servicemen and Economic Security. Edited by ROBERT H. SKILTON (the May 1943, Vol. 227, issue of *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*. Price to non-members, \$2.00).

This issue of *The Annals* presents an exact account of the measures that had been taken by early 1943 for the economic protection of our servicemen. For the teacher, student, administrator, and interested citizen it is a ready reference of pertinent material upon the subject. The reviewer has always found each issue of *The Annals* to be a starting point for enlightenment. The policy of having each issue devoted to related essays on a single subject enhances its value. As a general social science journal it has few peers.

To the narrow specialist, however, who is interested in a detailed, critical and theoretical treatment of one segment of a subject, *The Annals* may not be of much value. Although this issue, in the reviewer's opinion, is less critical in content than most, such a comment can be brushed aside as unessential. The nature of the subject matter and the official intent of the Academy not to "take sides upon controverted questions" precludes such an approach. However, this volume, like its predecessors, does "present reliable information to assist the public in forming an intelligent and adequate opinion."

The volume is divided into three main sections. Part one contains articles on governmental attempts to ease the economic burdens of selectees' adjustments upon entry into serv-

ice; part two with readjustment upon termination of service; and three with women in the service.

Denzel C. Cline in the opening essay defines the theme of the first part. "The waging of total war," he insists, "necessitates the induction of millions of men into the Army and Navy, and creates a social obligation to provide some measure of financial assistance to their families." This part is replete with facts on dependency allowances, the soldiers' and sailors' relief act, relief from civil obligations for servicemen, etc. Several articles which contrast American and British policies add to the interest of this section.

The readjustment of the returning servicemen is taken up in the second part. These essays are especially significant for the prospective veteran. Using them as a factual basis he can, with a minimum amount of sagacity and imagination, predict his probable terrestrial future. Re-employment rights in public and private pursuits, veterans' preference, pension rights, and the availability of lands and homes are considered. Veterans' rights to social security benefits are unique to World War II because this is the first war that has been fought since the passage of the Social Security Act. William H. Wandel's article on "Unemployment Insurance and the Returning Serviceman" is an able treatment of one aspect of social security. Old-age and survivors' insurance is not given separate treatment, but some thought-provoking questions about it are raised by Alfred G. Buehler in his article on "Military Pensions." Public assistance, the third major aspect of social security, is not considered in its relationship to the returning serviceman. This is to be regretted for public assistance could be used to complement and supplement other grants. Furthermore, public assistance workers are located in every county and through their experience and training are able to utilize many community services for the readjustment of veterans.

An ardent feminist would undoubtedly declare that the third part on women in service was added as an afterthought. It does contain two brief but interesting articles on the provisions and benefits for women in the various services.

As usual, the "Book Department" contains excellent reviews of new books in various social science fields. The reviewer believes that this department alone makes *The Annals* indispensable for social scientists. In addition, a useful index of the contents of the volume is included.

All in all, this is a well edited volume on a timely subject. The editor and authors have succeeded in producing an essential reference work rather than a social almanac.

ARTHUR P. MILES

*Social Security Board
Denver, Colorado*

The Socialist Movement in Reading, Pennsylvania: A Study in Social Change. By HENRY G. STETLER. Storrs, Connecticut: University of Connecticut, 1943. Pp. vii + 197.

This is a socio-economic study of cultural change and continuity within a particular community. In this case the community is Reading, Pennsylvania, instead of Muncie, Indiana. The period is 1896 to 1936. The method of analysis, however, is that of Middletown; the influence of Lynd is apparent to the reader and acknowledged by the author. The socialist movement and class antagonism are the warp and woof of the cultural fabric, or, more accurately, they constitute the central design of the cultural pattern, which begins in people and place, but which ramifies out into institutions and their interpretation.

The impact of the "radical" socialist movement on the staid Pennsylvania-German city of Reading affected local industries and social institutions of that community. It produced or presented class conflict and a clash of ideologies. So called "agitators" were lined up against self-styled "Americans." The spirit of socialism was breathed into the body of trade-union organization, giving life to a local labor party.

This is a story worth telling and well told. It brings out such place contrasts as that between the indigenous socialism of Reading, founded by early German settlers back in colonial days, and that of Milwaukee, peopled largely by Germans of the second migration of the 1848 era. Likewise, it shows such time contrasts as that in conditions in the local textile mills before and after the legalization of collective bargaining in 1933. It is unfortunate that this story could not have been carried down to the present war.

The author has assembled considerable factual material from which he draws cautious but comprehensive interpretations. His conclusions are reasonable but not startling. Reading is viewed as different from most other industrial communities of the United States in that "class interests were not blurred by heterogeneous racial and cultural differences"; the political and social organization of the working classes

was blended.

The work is well documented and abounds in footnotes. It has tabular and methodological appendices. There is a brief but good bibliography, and a satisfactory index.

S. HOWARD PATTERSON

University of Pennsylvania

The Social Characteristics of Erin—a Rural Town in Southern New York. By DWIGHT SANDERSON and S. EARL GRIGSBY. Ithaca: Published by the Cornell University Agricultural Experiment Station, August, 1943, Pp. 54. Mimeographed.

All of the 234 families in Erin township in a marginal farming area in southern New York, near the industrial center of Elmira, were interviewed with a view to determining the land use practices which would make for the best social and economic adjustments. A companion report presented a farm management analysis of the area whereas this report deals with the locality groupings of the families, their social participation, levels of living, incomes, family types, and the age, sex, ethnic, occupational, educational and residential characteristics of the population.

Not many areas have been subjected to such intensive analysis which in this case involves simple cross tabulations included in 44 tables. Not satisfied with the total value of living and income criteria the authors use the Sewell Socio-Economic Status Scale as a basis of analysis. Also a "standard" cultural type is established and compared with "deviates."

The report would have been greatly strengthened had the authors compared the attitudes, hopes and aspirations of the people of Erin, where over one-half of the farms have been abandoned in 40 years, with more prosperous farming areas which have been studied in the State.

CHARLES P. LOOMIS

*United States Department of Agriculture
Washington, D.C.*

Delaware's Forgotten Folk: The Story of the Moors and Nanticokes. By C. A. WESLAKER. With photographs by L. T. Alexander and drawings by John Swientochowski. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1943. Pp. ix + 215. \$2.50.

This is a semi-popular but carefully written book about two mixed blood communities of Delaware: the Moors and the Nanticokes. These folk are similar to other mixed blood groups of

eastern states like the Croatans, the Red Bones, the Melungeons, and the Wesorts, except that the author believes that they have less Negro blood. These families, many of white appearance, have drawn together in defense of their white-Indian status by segregating themselves in school, church and social life. They actually know very little about their origins and history, but, as a result of struggles to maintain their status above that of neighboring Negroes, they have sought to revive their consciousness of an Indian heritage. This process was at one stage greatly aided by the friendly advice and aid of the anthropologist, Dr. Frank Speck, who visited and lived with the Nanticoke group over a period of many years. The story of this relationship is an interesting example of the interaction of a scientific investigation and a nativistic movement. (Anthropologists who deplore the passing of primitive cultures are, by their own investigations, apparently helping to give some of them a new, if perhaps temporary, lease on life.)

This book shows the difficulty of ascertaining accurate information on the origins and history of a mixed blood group in the United States, especially when that group is considered (perhaps inaccurately) to be Negroid. The white American has been indifferent and ignorant, and the mixed folk have had few written records and only a weak oral tradition. As a result, legends have arisen to explain and legitimize the groups' origin, legends which are romantic in nature and which omit reference to Negro intermixture. Nevertheless, the racial consciousness of these two communities, waxing and waning as it does in response to threats from the outside world, does not prevent some individuals from marrying out of the group, both into the white and the Negro races, and it does not halt the trend toward assimilating the white man's culture.

Although disclaiming the title of scientist, Mr. Weslager has nevertheless made a useful and readable contribution to a relatively little known aspect of American interracial history.

EVERETT V. STONEQUIST

Skidmore College

Physique, Personality and Scholarship. A Co-operative Study of School Children. By R. N. SANFORD, M. M. ADKINS, R. B. MILLER, and E. A. COBB. Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development, Volume 8, No. 1, 1943. Pp. 705.

This monograph, the co-operative effort of at least ten contributors from several departments of Harvard University, represents an intensive study of forty-odd children for approximately three years.

The "whole child" was the focus of the investigation. To this end, four major areas of study were delineated—physiological and anthropometric, intellectual and educational, personality, and home-environmental. Within each area, those variables which appeared the more significant were chosen, and existing techniques of investigation adapted, or new techniques developed. Finally, the findings in each area were related to those in the others, in an effort to arrive at an organismic whole.

The analysis of data included both statistical and clinical approaches. The chief statistical tool, a high-low correlation coefficient based on studies by Kelley and by Flanagan, was used extensively in the correlation between variables.

Of particular interest was the construction, within each of the four chosen areas, of *syndromes*, based on the grouping (at an arbitrary level of .30 to .50) of intercorrelated variables. Almost one hundred such syndromes were thus established, and relationships between areas were sought on the basis of these adherent groupings.

The clinical approach included intensive studies of the individual children, and attempts to synthesize all the data on one child. In the physical-physiological section, the graphic case summaries were especially informative.

In the final chapter of conclusions, the authors forestall certain criticisms by reviewing their own efforts. They point out a number of inevitable deficiencies in a work of this type, and make pertinent suggestions for improvements in methodology. This self-awareness is altogether admirable.

Lists of the variables and syndromes, the derivation of the correlation coefficient, and extensive intercorrelation tables are appended.

The true value of this monograph can be assayed satisfactorily only when future studies, made on larger series of children over longer periods of time, have tested the validity of its formulations. The present study is, as the authors clearly indicate, primarily exploratory. As such, it represents a real contribution to the rapidly growing field of child development.

EARLE L. REYNOLDS

*Fels Research Institute
Antioch College*

Personality and Economic Background: A Study of Highly Intelligent Children. By HELEN H. DAVIDSON. New York: King's Crown Press, 1943. Pp. x + 189. \$2.25.

Dr. Davidson was led to carry on the study reported in *Personality and Economic Background* by a desire to check the thesis that "differences in socio-economic status react differentially upon various aspects of personality." As a first step toward that end she made a to-be-expected survey of the earlier studies in this area. These were all considered inadequate for one reason or another—too few or too highly selected cases, questionable methods, etc.

The personality measures selected for the purposes of the present study included the Rorschach, the Scale of Beliefs developed by the Progressive Education Association, the Minnesota Scale for the Survey of Opinions developed by Rundquist and Sletto, the Progressive Education Association's Interest Index, Hildreth's Personality and Interest Inventory, the New Stanford Achievement Test, the Stanford-Binet, and a miscellaneous questionnaire. It was to have been expected that Dr. Davidson would make the Rorschach her major tool as she has recently been associated with Klopfer and has long had a strong interest in Rorschach procedures.

The subjects of the Davidson study included 49 children from the Speyer School, a unit of the New York City schools run in co-operation with Teachers College, Columbia University, and 53 from the Teachers College controlled Lincoln School. Almost all of the first group came from families of relatively low income level while the parents of the second were of higher levels. The age range of the subjects was from 9 to 14 years and the IQ range from 120 to 200. It should be noted that the children, deliberately chosen to be atypical in IQ, were

atypical in other important aspects as well. Their parents, rich or poor, had been previously "sold" on education of an extremely "progressive" sort. And, too, they were on the average from wealthier homes than one finds typically in New York City or Chicago. Another proof that the families were atypical can be seen in the negative rather than positive correlations which were found to exist between income level on the one hand and IQ and mental age on the other. All of this makes the study's data difficult to interpret. One cannot be at all sure that traditionally trained children with high IQ's and more normal pocketbooks would test as did Davidson's subjects.

Davidson goes to considerable pains to show that income is quite possibly the most valid single measure of socioeconomic status. By the use of the Hotelling variety of factor analysis she proves that income seems to possess a high loading on the most important factor which emerges from the intercorrelation of numerous measures of socioeconomic status.

The study demonstrates that these very bright children show as wide a variation in their personality characteristics as probably would be found in any group of children. It is also concluded that in general there is very little relationship between income and the personality variables studied. However, as these New York City children admittedly do not constitute a normal sample of the nation's brighter school children, the reviewer suggests that the reader of the study pay relatively less attention to the data which are presented and more to the details of the experimental set-up and to the tools. It is these latter that future experimenters will particularly scrutinize.

PAUL R. FARNSWORTH
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